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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to identify important factors that may affect the pricing and the 
probability of default of high yield bonds offered by shipping companies; and factors that 
may influence the pricing and the probability of underpricing of shipping US initial public 
offerings (IPOs). The analysis is carried out through five chapters and each chapter covers a 
topic on its own so that it can be read independently of previous and subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the shipping US public equity market for the 
period 1987-2010. It also considers the reasons for a shipping company to go public; the 
advantages and disadvantages of such a decision; and the role of underwriters in the IPO 
process. Finally, it provides a literature review on shipping equity capital markets. 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the shipping US high yield bond market for the 
period 1992-2010; it discusses the seniority of shipping high yield bonds, and, the advantages 
and disadvantages for shipping companies that decide to issue high yield bonds. Next, the 
credit ratings, the yield premia and the probability of default for shipping high yield bonds are 
examined. Finally, it provides a synopsis of the restructuring options that shipping companies 
have in case of default. 
Chapter 3 investigates the factors that may explain the dynamics of yield premia on 
seasoned shipping high yield bonds. The analysis utilises 40 seasoned high yield bonds 
offered by 32 shipping companies for the period April 1998 - December 2002; and it employs 
a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and, industry related factors. The methodology used 
is the fixed effects panel data regression model and the results of the study suggest that the 
dynamics of yield premia of seasoned shipping high yield bonds can be explained by: the 
credit rating; the term-to-maturity; the changes in earnings in the shipping market, as well as 
the changes in the yields on the 10-year US Treasury bonds and the Merrill Lynch single-B 
index. This chapter contributes to the existing ship finance literature in the following ways: 
first, it attempts to model the changes of yield premia on shipping high yield bonds in the 
secondary market, which is of interest to investors and traders since information on changes 
in yield premia can be used for investment and asset allocation purposes. Second, it 
... 
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distinguishes between high yield bond issues offered by listed and unlisted companies, as well 
as, defaulted and non-defaulted bond issues in order to examine whether there is any 
difference in the impact of the explanatory variables on the determination of yield premia. 
Third, the analysis employs a set of macroeconomic and industry related factors that have not 
been previously used in the ship finance literature. Finally, the results may have implications 
for shipping companies in the following ways: yield premia are indications of the possible 
cost level in order to enter the shipping high yield bond market and may affect the company's 
image; hence, shipping companies may be interested in the yield premia as they can affect 
their financing decision for future/further issuance of high yield bonds or their possible 
stepping to the equity capital market. 
Chapter 4 uses a binary logit model to predict the probability of default for high yield 
bonds issued by shipping companies for the period 1992-2004. The results suggest that two 
liquidity ratios, the gearing ratio, the amount raised over total assets ratio, and an industry 
specific variable are the best estimates for predicting default at the time of issuance. In - and out 
- of sample bootstrap tests further indicate the predictive ability and robustness of the model. 
This chapter contributes to the existing ship finance literature as for the first time the 
probability of default of shipping high yield bonds is predicted by employing a binary logit 
model. Investors may benefit from this research since, by employing easily accessible and 
quantifiable factors they can identify at the time of issuance a) which factors to look at when 
making investment decisions; b) issues that may have a high likelihood to default. At the same 
time, shipowners who offer high yield bonds can also identify and focus on the factors that are 
important in predicting the probability of default for their bond issues. 
Chapter 5 examines the extent that public information, available prior to the US initial 
public offering of shipping companies, is only partially incorporated in the final offer price set 
by the underwriters. The sample includes 51 shipping US initial public offerings for the 
period 1987-2008, and a set of prospecti and market specific characteristics is employed. The 
Ordinary-Least-Squared Regression results show that 20-53 percent of the variation in first 
day returns is explained by employing public available information known prior to the offer 
. 
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date; therefore, it can be argued that final offer prices of shipping US IPOs are only partially 
adjusted to broadly accessible information. Additionally, the probability of underpricing is 
examined and the logit model correctly predicts 90 percent of the entire sample, with in and 
out-of-sample bootstrap tests further supporting the robustness of the model. This chapter 
contributes to the existing ship finance literature by testing the hypotheses of partial 
adjustment (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) and winner's curse (Rock, 1986) theories as an 
explanation for shipping US IPOs' initial day returns. Moreover, it uses variables that have 
not been previously employed in shipping IPOs studies and the probability of underpricing a 
shipping IPO is examined for the first time. Finally, the results of the study show that by 
employing readily available information known prior to the shipping IPO date, investors can 
identify the factors that affect the initial day returns and also predict the probability of 
underpricing a shipping IPO. 
Chapters I and 2 are parts of chapters 20 and 21 in the book "The Blackwell 
Companion to Maritime Economics" (Grammenos and Papapostolou, forthcoming (a), 
forthcoming (b)). Chapter 3 has been published in Transportation Research Part E: Logistics 
and Transportation Review (Grammenos, Alizadeh, and Papapostolou, 2007) and an earlier 
version was presented at the International Association of Maritime Economists (lAME) 
conference in Izmir, Turkey in 2004. Chapter 4 has been published in Transportation 
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review (Grammenos, Nomikos, and 
Papapostolou, 2008) and an earlier version was presented at the International Association of 
Maritime Economists (lAME) conference in Limassol, Cyprus in 2005. Finally, chapter 5 has 
been submitted to Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review and it 
is under review. 
x 
Contribution of Thesis 
This thesis investigates different issues regarding the US capital markets, public 
equity and high yield bonds, as a source of finance for shipping companies. Given the number 
of defaults on shipping high yield bonds that occurred in 1998-1999; the renewed interest of 
shipping companies in issuing high yield bonds after 2002; and finally, the fact that only one 
research paper has been written on shipping high yield bonds prior to this thesis, makes the 
thesis' contribution to the ship finance literature to stand out. At the same time, the increased 
interest of shipping companies to enter the US public equity market after 2003 led to the 
production of a research paper with a different research angle than previously in the ship 
finance literature. 
To start with, this is the first piece of research giving an overview of the shipping US 
high yield bond market since its commencement. The dynamics of yield premia on shipping 
high yield bonds, which are of interest to investors and shipping companies alike, are studied 
for the first time; while, light is shed on the probability of default of shipping high yield 
bonds and the characteristics of shipping companies that defaulted on their bond issues. All 
are topics that have never been investigated since the inception of the US shipping high yield 
bond market and the first issue by Sea Containers Ltd. in 1992. 
Additionally, an overview of the shipping US public equity market is given; 
something that has never been conducted in the past. Then, the widely known phenomenon of 
underpricing is investigated, and although papers on the subject already exist in the ship 
finance literature, this thesis looks at underpricing from a different perspective. For the first 
time in the ship finance literature, financial ratios, offering characteristics and market 
conditions are all married in order to test whether there is asymmetry of information between 
the participants in a shipping initial public offering. Having established that there is no 
asymmetry of information the thesis continues and investigates, for the first time, the 
probability of underpricing a shipping initial public offering. 
Xl 
In conclusion, all the above topics have never previously been investigated in the ship 
finance literature in a similar approach/methodology as offered by this thesis, thus making its 
contribution an original source of reference for academics and a useful tool, under similar 
market conditions as those examined by this thesis, for practitioners. 
Xll 
Chapter 1. Shipping US Public Equities 
1.1) Introduction 
Since the Second World War the shipping industry, one of the most capital intensive 
industries, has utilised a wide spectrum of capital sources for financing acquisition of 
newbuilding vessels and sale and purchase of secondhand vessels. The decision by the 
shipping company of how to finance its replacement and/or growth plans is very important to 
the success of the project. In shipping finance there are three main categories of capital 
sources: Equity finance, Mezzanine finance, and Debt finance. In the case of Equity 
financing, shipping companies mainly use the following types: the owner's private equity; the 
company's retained earnings; and equity offerings\ public or private [including the 
Norwegian and German tax partnerships of Kommandit-Selskap (KS) and Kommandit-
Gesellschaft (KG)]. The main types in the case of Mezzanine finance are: preference 
shares; warrants; and convertibles. Finally, in the case of Debt financing shipping companies 
mainly utilise: bank loans (including Islamic finance); export finance; bond issues, public or 
private placements; and leasing. 
The need of capital markets, especially those of New York and London, as a source of 
finance for shipping companies was first highlighted by Grammenos (1985). Over the years, 
equity capital markets have played a minor role in the financing of the shipping industry due 
to a number of factors, such as the reluctance of the owners of the shipping companies to 
dilute control and disclose information, and the unattractiveness of the shipping industry to 
the investment community often due to its inability to provide stable profit and income 
streams. Nevertheless, this reluctance to enter the equity capital markets appeared to fade 
away during the stock and shipping bull markets of 2003 - 2008. This is well documented by 
the increase in the number of shipping companies entering the US equity capital markets for 
the first time or even by the secondary offerings of already listed companies (see table 1-2). 
This chapter concentrates on the US equity capital market as a source of finance for 
shipping companies and gives an overview of this market since it is the largest of its kind. It 
1 Islamic finance is included under equity offerings as well. 
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discusses important issues for the shipping companies that utilise this market for financing 
and the investors who invest in shipping equities. Specifically, the paper is structured as 
follows: section 1.2 provides a discussion about the different methods a shipping company 
can use in order to tap the US capital markets; the importance of the underwriter; and the 
three options available to the underwriter when taking a shipping company public. Section 1.3 
deals with the possible reasons that may lead a shipping company to seek a public listing and 
the advantages/disadvantages of such a decision. Section 1.4 provides an overview of 
shipping stocks issuance volume trends in the US for the period 1987·2010. The factors that 
may affect the pricing and long run performance of shipping stocks are discussed in section 
1.5; and finally, section 1.6 concludes the chapter. 
1.2) Equity Offerings and the Underwriter 
An equity public offering is a sale of equity securities made available publicly by already 
listed companies or companies about to be listed (initial public offerings) on stock exchanges. 
The first step for a shipping company willing to enter the equity capital markets is to 
hire an underwriter. The underwriter, usually an investment bank, may also perform the 
sponsor's functions but its chief role is to underwrite, price and distribute the issue. The 
underwriting function refers to undertaking the risk of adverse price fluctuations during the 
issue distribution period in return for a fee. Thus, the underwriter's reputation is at stake if the 
flotation fails, and in the case of the firm commitment method - which it is discussed in the 
following paragraph - the underwriter may also incur a financial loss. The reputation of the 
underwriter is of paramount importance for both the investment bank and the issuer. 
Investment banks invest in reputation because it facilitates the conduct of premarket activities 
and generates more business, hence higher fees. At the same time, issuers concerned about 
price adjustments prior to the offer date are willing to pay for the reputational service as they 
may benefit from more efficient premarket activities (Logue et aI., 2002; Chang et aI., 20 I 0). 
For large issues - in terms of the amount raised - the risk is normally spread through an 
underwriting syndicate (made up of financial institutions and brokerage houses) which carries 
out the distribution function, by selling through its own network of banks and stockbrokers. 
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Regarding the issuing method, there are three different types of agreement. The first 
one is the Firm Commitment where the underwriter agrees to purchase the entire issue from 
the issuer and then re-offer it to the general public. With this type of agreement the 
underwriter has guaranteed to provide a certain amount of cash to the issuer and the risk of 
the issue falls entirely upon the underwriter. If the underwriter fails to sell the amount of the 
securities being purchased, the agreed sum of money still has to be paid to the issuer. The 
second type of agreement is known as Best Efforts agreement where the underwriter agrees to 
sell the securities for the issuer but does not guarantee the amount of capital to be raised by 
the issue. Finally, book-building is the third type of agreement and the most commonly used 
in shipping. Book-building refers to the collection of bids from investors, which is based on 
an indicative price range, and the issue price being fixed after the bid closing date. The 
principal players involved in a book building process are the Book Running Lead Manager 
(BRLM), the syndicate members - who are appointed by the BRLM -, the shipping company, 
and the potential investors. The book-building process is undertaken basically to determine 
the investor's appetite for the shares at a particular price range. It is undertaken before making 
a public offering and it helps to determine the issue price and the number of shares to be 
issued. 
Regarding experience, size and prestige, there is a wide range of underwriters and in 
order to find the one best suited to its needs, the shipping company could turn for advice to 
lawyers and accountants. It is useful to find an underwriter who has done previous initial and 
secondary public offerings of shipping companies. Underwriters who have done other 
successful initial public offerings in the industry of the issuer are more familiar with the 
structure of the industry, pricing the issue should be easier, as selling the offering to a 
syndicate, and finally, they will already have worked or are working with analysts covering 
the industry (Logue et aI., 2002). It is also vital that the selected underwriters should be able 
to put together a strong syndicate and the desirable choice is to have a broad base of 
institutional and individual investors over many different capital cities (geographical spread). 
Furthermore, good underwriters support the stock for several weeks after the offering date 
and they provide buying in the aftermarket to support the price - this is perfectly legal and 
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incorporated as part of the underwriting agreement. Finally, analyst's coverage subsequent to 
the offering is important as analysts maintain an information flow about the company and the 
industry to the investing public; thus, it is beneficial for all major players in an IPO, i.e. the 
underwriters, the issuer and the investors. 
Apart from initial and secondary public offerings, different methods of tapping the US 
equity capital markets also include the "Special Purpose Acquisition Company" (SPAC) 
method and the "At-the-Market" (A TM) method2• A Special Purpose Acquisition Company 
(SPAC) is a pooled investment vehicle that allows public stock market investors to invest in 
private equity type transactions, particularly leverage buyouts. SPACs are shell or blank-
check companies that have no operations but go public with the intention of merging with or 
acquiring a company with the proceeds of the SPAC's initial public offering. SPACs can be 
industry specific or general and typically have eighteen months to complete an acquisition. If 
not successful the remaining cash held in trust by the SPAC must be returned to investors at 
that time. For practical purposes 80% of investors must approve a target acquisition. A SPAC 
is a fully reporting public company generally listed on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board 
(OTCBB). However, when an acquisition is made, a listing application is filed for listing on 
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as appropriate. 
An at-the-market (A TM) offering involves the sale by an issuer of equity securities into 
the market periodically over time, typically at the prevailing market price, through a 
placement agent, or designated broker-dealer. Pursuant to a distribution or sales agreement 
with the broker-dealer, the issuer maintains complete control over when securities are sold, 
the amount sold, and the minimum price at which they may be sold. The broker-dealer is paid 
a commission on the securities sold, and the issuer may stop the offering at any time. Because 
there is no lock-up period, the issuer is generally free to pursue a traditional deal if it desires 
while still keeping the at-the-market program in place. 
2 Examples of shipping companies that entered the equity capital markets via the SPAC method 
include: International Shipping Enterprises, Freeseas Inc. and Star Maritime Corporation. Examples of 
the A TM method are: Dryships Inc., Eagle Bulk, Paragon Shipping, and Euroseas 2009 offerings. 
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1.3) Reasons to Go Public, Advantages and Diasdvantages 
In certain parts of 1970s, 1980s and late 2000, one of the major causes of oversupply has 
been the liberal availability of debt finance for new-buildings from providers of credit and the 
corresponding willingness of shipowners to become excessively geared. This policy proved 
successful for shipping companies in prosperous markets when the return on assets exceeded 
the cost of debt, and was reflected in the rapid fleet expansions, particularly in the 1967/1973 
and 2003/2008 periods. However, the shipping crises of the 1970s, 1980s, and to a certain 
extent in 2008/9, resulted in severe debt servicing difficulties and an erosion of the industry's 
equity base. Consequently, the importance of less traditional shipping finance sources - such 
as the capital markets - started emerging in the second part of the 1980s and became apparent 
in the 21 st Century. The main reasons are: (1) the temporary difficulty of the banking system 
to provide on time the necessary funds for newbuilding and/or second-hand purchases; this 
happened during the banking crisis of 1982-85 and the world financial crisis of 2008-2010; 
(2) the depletion of the equity base of shipping companies in the mid-1980s; (3) the recent 
large scale vessel replacement programme; (4) the high vessel prices in 1999s and 2000s; (5) 
the emergence of a new generation of shipowners with a different academic background and 
more liberal philosophy towards the ownership of the vessel; (6) the need to increase the size 
of the shipping companies. The last reason gives the opportunity to shipping companies to 
increase their market share, improve their customer relations, utilise their fleet better, improve 
their financial flexibility, have greater economies of scale, and finally reduce their overall cost 
of finance. Panayides and Gong (2002) have also outlined the importance of M&As directed 
in achieving the financial, economic and strategic objectives of shipping companies, and their 
impact directly and immediately on the value of the company. 
Table 1-1: Average Gross Proceeds and Company Size According to the Primary Reason for Going Public 
Purpose oflssue No.of OtJers(%) Average Gross Proceeds Avenge Size of Company 
Vessel Acquisition 19(63%) $58,949,220 SI52,634,410 
Asset Play 7(24%) S61,199,180 S71,891,235 
Debt Repayment 3(13%) S61,726,890 S203,139,845 
Trading Activities 1(3%) S48,103,845 S 152,634,410 
Source: Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996b). 
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Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996b) - in the first ever paper on shipping IPOs - document 
that during the period 1983 to 1995 the number and size of shipping companies entering the 
equity capital markets has increased. According to the results of the study, shown in table 1-1, 
companies entering the equity markets for debt repayment purposes appear to be on average 
larger in size than those entering the equity markets for vessel acquisitions purposes. In 
addition, vessel acquisition appears to be the main purpose for going public (63%) followed 
by asset play (24%). Debt repayment (13%) constitutes another purpose for going public, with 
only one company deciding to go public for trading activities. On a similar note, in the 
finance literature, the IPO decision as a strategic move to raise equity financing for growth 
purposes has also been highlighted by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), and, Maksimovic 
and Pichler (2001). Kim and Weisbach (2008) find that funds raised by an IPO are used for 
several purposes in addition to financing growth, such as rebalancing leverage and increasing 
cash balances. Furthermore, Brau and Fawcett (2006) examine four issues3 related to initial 
public offerings using a survey of 438 chief financial officers (CFOs), and find that CFOs 
regard initial public offerings as vehicles for funding the company's growth and for 
developing liquidity. In addition, CFOs are concerned with the direct costs of taking the 
company public, for example underwriting fees4, but they are even more concerned with the 
indirect cost of loss of confidentiality. So, what are the advantages and disadvantages of 
taking a shipping company public? 
The fundamental advantage of going public is the reduction of financial risk by 
obtaining the finance required without the use of debt finance and the corresponding 
obligations it entails. In contrast to debt interest and principal repayments, the company has 
no obligation to pay shareholders' dividends. Additionally, equity finance through public 
offerings may pave the way for prudent injections of debt, since the equity raised results in 
lower gearing levels; Huyghebaert and Hulle (2005) argue that an IPO allows the company to 
3 1) why do firms go public? 2) is CFO sentiment stationary across bear and bull markets? 3) what 
concerns CFOs about going public? and 4) do CFO perceptions correlate with returns? 
4 Chen and Ritter (2000) present evidence that gross spreads on IPOs are clustering at seven percent, 
with the concentration of seven percent spreads increasing during the 1990s. They argue that a possible 
explanation for the clustering of spreads at seven percent is collusion. If underwriters compete for 
business on the basis of spreads that they charge, competition will drive the spread to the cost of 
providing the services. On the other hand, if underwriters agree to form a cartel, then they can increase 
their profits and a pricing mechanism would be needed to decide how much to charge; an arrangement 
would be to agree to always charge the same fees (seven percent), with the profits shared among the 
syndicate. 
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enhance its financial flexibility by generating additional sources of capital to finance its 
growth and expansion. When a company prospers and needs additional capital, it may find it 
desirable to go public by selling shares to a large number of diversified investors. Once the 
stock is publicly traded, this liquidity allows the company to raise additional capital on more 
favourable terms. 
Public offerings also enhance the share liquidity of the company, which in tum, may 
positively influence the company's market value [Amihud and Mendelson, 1986]. Sufficient 
liquidity in the equity market can be a prerequisite for raising further (even non-equity) 
capital. Indeed, an important explanation of why an active market can help in obtaining 
further finance is that the equity price acts as a signal of the company's value. On the other 
hand, once the company gets a listing, listed shares may be used as collateral for future loans 
or incentives for employees. Bancel and Mittoo (2009) find evidence that family-controlled 
companies view IPOs as vehicles to strengthen their bargaining power with creditors without 
relinquishing control. 
Furthermore, a successfuls public offering and stock exchange listing will result in 
the company improving its reputation and gaining prestige[Bancel and Mittoo, 2001], 
increase of market coverage [Cook et aI., 2006; Frieder and Subrahmanyan, 2005], and 
transfer of monitoring costs from the lenders to the stock exchange authorities. 
Mourdoukoutas and Stefanidis (2009) surveyed 10 Greek shipping companies that are listed 
on a US stock exchange and find that a public listing has met and exceeded the Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs)6 expectations in regards to the following advantages: broadening 
and diversifying capital financing, improving the image and prestige, strengthening their 
bargaining power with creditors, and enhancing their entrepreneurial opportunities. Finally, a 
stock exchange listing also results in tighter control over the company, which reduces the 
probability of fraudulent actions of management. 
S Many factors playa role into an IPO's success. The most important of these is the company's 
expected market capitalisation. However, even a highly anticipated market capitalisation does not 
guarantee a successful IPO. Other factors that affect an IPO's success include the corporation's 
popularity in its industry, the timing of the offering relative to financial market activity, the 
competitiveness of the stock's price to comparable stocks, the company's growth potential, and the 
reputation and ability of the underwriter. 
6 The questionnaire of the survey was filled in by the CEOs of the companies and only in three cases 
the questionnaire was filled in by the CFOs. 
~-----
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Thus, for a number of shipping companies the emphasis of finance has shifted from 
the traditional means of financing, such as bank loans and equity investments by family 
members and private investors to the Anglo-Saxon-style of capital market financing. 
On the other hand, a major disadvantage of going public is the possibility that the 
company's existing shareholders may lose the managerial control of the company. Relevant 
information will have to be furnished regularly [Pagano and Roell, 1998] and such 
information is likely to cover sensitive areas such as salaries and terms of vessels' 
employment (Grammenos, 1994; 2010). Similarly, the management's job becomes onerous 
and less flexible e.g. executive time for shareholders. Furthennore, once the company's 
shares are traded publicly, its market price is influenced by external factors which are out of 
the management's hand, such as the performance of stock exchanges. In addition, there are 
substantial one-time costs 7 associated with initial public offerings [Chen and Ritter, 2000; 
Hansen, 2001] and the income generated by the listed company is shared with the new 
common shareholders in contrast to the case of a private independent company. Nevertheless, 
Bancel and Mittoo (2009) find that CFOs express less concern about the costs, and perceive 
benefits to be significantly higher than the costs of going public. 
1.4) US Shipping Equities 1987-2010 
At the beginning of the second part of the 1980s an interesting experiment took place. 
Seven newly established shipping companies raised funds in the US public capital markets. It 
was a period during which the capital base of shipping companies, as mentioned previously, 
had been depleted; banks were financing a smaller percentage of the vessel's market value-
approximately 50-60 percent; while a number of banks had abandoned financing the shipping 
industry. These companies, most of which became public growth companies in 1987-1992, 
were established as limited life companies. This means that a liquidation of the company 
would take place provided that the vessel's market value would have increased; otherwise, the 
7 Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996b) have documented that the direct costs of shipping companies 
going public are on average 7.89% of gross proceeds and the indirect costs (underpricing) are 5.32% on 
average. The direct costs (defined as the difference between net & gross proceeds of the issue reported 
in the prospectus - the overallotment option is not taken into account in these calculations) include the 
legal, auditing, advertising and road show expenses and underwriting fees. The indirect costs are the 
management time and effort devoted to conducting the offering, and the dilution associated with selling 
shares at an offering price that is, on average, below the price prevailing in the market shortly after the 
IPO. This phenomenon is known in the finance literature as underpricing of the initial public offerings. 
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life would have been extended until the right time has come. Their goal was to exploit the 
expected rise of the shipping market, materialise capital gains, and also make operational 
profits ; whereas, the promoters (issuers of shares) and managers of these companies were 
going to get rewarded according to a distribution scheme (approximately one third of the 
operating profits and capital gains). 
Many of these companies failed because the anticipated shipping boom, mainly in the 
tanker sector, did not take place and, as a result, they could not meet the expected 
targets/returns of investors. In addition, the vessel's repair and maintenance costs proved 
much higher than projected, whi le at the same time insurance premia soared. However, this 
pioneering method attracted the interest of a generation of younger shipowners who at a later 
stage between 1993- 1997 and 2004-2007, were to raise substantial funds - through growth 
companies this time - from the international equity capital markets. 
Figure 1-1: US Shipping IPOs and Secondary Offerings 1987 - 2010 
Source: The Costas Grammenos International Centre for Shipping, Trade & Finance; Data collected 
from Reuters Thomson Financial Banker One (as of March 20 I 0) . 
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As it is evident in figure 1-1, equity offerings by shipping companies in the US have 
experienced a strong period of initial public issuance during 2004-2007 with 2005 being the 
best year in the history of the shipping IPOs listed in the US. In total, shipping companies 
raised $3.35 billion in that year by entering the equity capital markets for the first time. 
Overall, for the period 1987-2010, shipping companies have raised $11.37 billion by initial 
public offerings. Similarly, secondary offerings by shipping companies experienced a boost 
after 2004, with 2007 being the best year. In total, secondary offerings by shipping companies 
have reached $13.12 billion during the period 1987-2010. Let us now have a closer look at 
the issuance trends that the shipping US equity capital markets have experienced. 
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Table 1-2: US Initial Public Offerings and Secondary Offerings Statistics 1987 2010 <as of Mareb 2010) 
Source: The Costas Grammenos International Centre for Shippin2, Trade & Finance; Data collected from Reuters Thomson Financial Banker One. 
ALL US EQUITY - IPOs US SHIPPING IPOs ALL US EQUITY - SECONDARY OFFERINGS US SHIPPING SECONDARY OFFERINGS 
Average Average 
'%of Average Average Amount Ameuat Raised % of Total No of Amount Amount % of Total Amount Amount Amount Amount -I_ of Total Year ($miJlioa) Amount Issues Raised per Raised Amount No of Raised Raised Total Noof Raised Raised No of Raised per Issue Issues Amount Issues Amount Issues (Smillion) Raised Issue (Smillion) Raised per Issue (Smillion) per Issue (Smillion) Raised (SmiIlion) (Smillion) Raised (Smillion) 
1987 28,872.42 2.10% 676 42.71 139.44 1.23% 2 69.72 31,692.16 1.16% 554 5721 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 1988 27,130.70 1.97"/0 340 79.80 82.50 0.73% 2 41.25 19,866.69 0.73% 430 46.20 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 1989 15,165.47 1.10% 278 54.55 232.95 2.05% 5 46.59 33,165.70 1.22% 548 60.52 50.95 0.39% 1 50.95 1990 15,235.45 1.11% 295 51.65 0.00 0.00010 0 0.00 24,577.48 0.90% 434 56.63 92.39 0.70% 2 46.20 1991 28,632.90 2.08% 457 62.65 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 45,800.55 1.68% 702 65.24 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 1992 48,403.77 3.52% 750 64.54 83.76 0.74% 2 41.88 48,989.48 1.80% 743 65.93 56.76 0.43% 1 56.76 1993 70,932.41 5.15% 981 72.31 289.40 2.55% 3 96.47 65,501.71 2.40% 952 68.80 342.43 2.61% 3 114.14 1994 55,488.59 4.03% 943 58.84 221.90 1.95% 3 73.97 58,046.09 2.13% 804 72.20 89.85 0.68% 2 44.93 1995 42,020.60 3.05% 694 60.55 200.55 1.76% 2 100.28 79,450.60 2.91% 863 92.06 128.69 0.98% 2 64.35 1996 68,553.57 4.98% 1,093 62.72 162.96 1.43% 3 54.32 110,704.32 4.06% 1113 99.46 418.13 3.19% 4 104.53 
1997 54,238.80 3.94% 794 68.31 288.65 2.54% 2 144.33 123,293.94 4.52% 999 123.42 382.05 2.91% 3 127.35 
1998 66,965.41 4.87"10 632 105.96 12.00 0.11% 1 12.00 144,465.35 5.30% 942 153.36 145.25 1.11% 1 145.25 
1999 82,468.65 5.99% 726 113.59 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 161,889.89 5.93% TI2 209.70 50.00 0.38% I 50.00 
2000 98,190.86 7.13% 780 125.89 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 197,255.60 7.23% 749 263.36 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 
2001 48,235.39 3.50% 199 242.39 304.25 2.68% 3 101.42 144,096.96 5.28% 723 199.30 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 
2002 53,952.51 3.92% 250 215.81 257.88 2.27% 3 85.96 114,445.59 4.20% 681 168.06 394.04 3.00% 5 78.81 
2003 51,505.82 3.74% 180 286.14 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 103,012.98 3.78% 772 133.44 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 
2004 103,887.21 7.55% 473 219.63 1723.93 15.17% 8 215.49 141,255.56 5.18% 890 158.71 954.44 7.27% 7 136.35 
2005 77,002.22 5.59% 393 195.93 3353.69 29.50% 17 197.28 162,713.31 5.96% 767 212.14 643.71 4.90% 7 91.96 
2006 91,123.16 6.62% 383 237.92 1033.30 9.09% 6 172.22 178,605.12 6.55% 860 20768 1740.35 13.26% 12 145.03 
2007 134,241.50 9.75% 549 244.52 2012.59 17.70% 9 223.62 207,617.80 7.61% 906 229.16 3423.94 26.08% 29 118.07 
2008 55,256.98 4.01% 201 274.91 315.00 2.TI% 2 157.50 232,609.20 8.53% 462 503.48 1342.03 10.22% 9 149.11 
2009 52,018.76 3.78% 187 278.18 0.00 0.00% 0 0.00 256,134.64 9.39% 732 349.91 1735.24 13.22% 19 91.33 
2010 6,771.70 0.49% 53 127.TI 653.05 5.74% 3 217.68 42,750.35 1.57% 213 200.71 1136.60 8.66% 13 87.43 
1987- 604,108.74 43.89% 8,659 69.77 1,714.11 15.08% 25 68.56 947,443.96 34.73% 9,856 96.13 1,756.50 13.38% 20 87.83 1999 
20G0- 772.186.11 56.11% 3,648 211.67 9,653.69 84.9zek 51 189.29 1,780,497.11 65.27% 7,755 229.59 11,370.35 86.62% 101 112.58 2010 
Total 1,376,294.85 100.00-;' 12,307 111.83 11,367.80 l00.00~_ 76 149.58 2,727,941.07 100.00~_ 17,611 154.89 13,126.85 lOO.OO-!. III 108.49 
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Table 1-2 is categorised by year, overall, and shipping companies and shows statistics 
for the initial and secondary public issues in the US equity markets for the period 1987-2010. 
Shipping initial public offerings activity was at its highest levels during the years 2004 to 
2007 - in percentage terms as of the total amount raised; in particular, year 2005 accounts for 
29.50 percent of the total amount raised by shipping companies through initial public 
offerings. Similarly, secondary offerings by shipping companies experienced a boom from 
2006 to 2009, with 2007 accounting for 26.08 percent of the total amount raised through 
secondary offerings. Furthermore, when the sample is split into two periods, 1987-1999 and 
2000-2010, it can be observed that issuance activity for IPOs and secondary offerings in the 
second period accounts for 84.92 percent and 86.62 percent of the total respectively. 
The main reasons for the increased issuance activity in shipping initial and secondary 
offerings in 2004-2007 were: 1) the general investment sentiment was very good as the world 
economy had come out ofthe 2000-2003 downturn and tapping the equity public markets was 
easier than before; 2) the shipping market conditions - especially in the dry bulk sector - were 
very good; 3) the need for funds to finance the overall fleet expansion programme (see table 
1-3) due to the growing Chinese economy, which was perceived as a factor to increase the 
demand for seaborne trade; and 4) the appetite of investment banks towards a fee generating 
income by completing equity offering deals was high. Generally, if the shipping initial public 
offerings are compared to the overall US initial public offerings for the period 2004-2007 it 
can be argued that the issuing activity coincides and fits well with the hot issue puzzle. 
Ibboston and Jaffe [1975] originally documented the hot issue puzzle where there is a cyclical 
pattern in the IPO market. Ritter [1984] extended this study and found that hot issue markets 
continue to exist. Hot and cold markets are defined on the basis of the monthly IPO volume 
[Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996; Helwege and Liang, 2004; Alti, 2006,] and it can be argued 
that the hot issue market phenomenon also applies in the case of shipping IPOs for the period 
2004-2007. 
Another observation is the increase of the average amount raised per issue - on a 
yearly basis - for the period 2004-2007 - both for the shipping and overall equity initial 
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public offerings, an observation that does not stands for the shipping secondary offerings. The 
average amount per issue - for all categories and the whole period 1987 to 2010 ranges 
between $US 1 08 million and $US 155 million, with shipping initial public offerings having an 
average of $US 150 million and secondary shipping offerings an average of $US 1 08 million. 
For all 4 categories, when the two periods (1987-1999 and 2000-2010) are compared, it can 
be observed a dramatic increase in the average of the amount raised; thus, it can be argued 
that issues for the second part (2000-2010) of the sample are larger in size. Overall, shipping 
equity initial and secondary offerings activity had a dramatic boost for the period 2004 to 
2007 and on average the issues offered during this period were larger in terms of the amount 
raised, i.e. shipping companies entering the US equity capital markets are larger in size, in 
terms of market capitalisation. The higher volume of shipping lPOs can be attributed to the 
expansion of the fleet and orderbook during the same period. 
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Table 1-3 (Panel a): Total World Fleet (DWT million) - Martb 2010 
Source: Clarksons Shippine: Intel1ie:enc:e Network 
Tanker Dry8ulk Container Total (tanker+cLrybulk+container) 
DWT YIYO/O DWT YIY ·1. DWT YIY % DWT YIY% 
1998 280,907 264,483 49,281 594,670 
1999 286,019 1.82% 263,772 -0.27% 55,049 11.71% 604,840 1.71% 
2000 288,794 0.97% 266,957 1.21% 57,748 4.90% 613,498 1.43% 
2001 295,862 2.45% 274,854 2.96% 63,404 9.79% 634,119 3.36% 
2002 290,915 -1.67% 286,905 4.38% 71,054 12.07"10 648,874 2.33% 
2003 295,492 1.57% 294,780 2.74% 78,524 10.51% 668,795 3.07"/. 
2004 303,819 2.82% 302,171 2.51% 85,511 8.90% 691,501 3.40% 
2005 320,172 5.38% 322,587 6.76% 93,883 9.79% 736,641 6.53% 
2006 343,264 7.21% 345,160 7.00% 106,161 13.08% 794,585 7.87% 
2007 363,159 5.80% 368,479 6.76% 123,720 16.54% 855,357 7.65% 
2008 385,411 6.13% 392,596 6.55% 140,612 13.65% 918,619 7.40% 
2009 406,582 5.49% 417,842 6.43% 158,411 12.66% 982,834 6.99% 
2010 441,440 8.57% 475,550 13.81% 171,790 8.45% 1,088,780 10.78% 
Table 1-3 (Panel b) Total World Orderbook (DWT million) - Martb 2010 
Sourte: Clarksons SbippinelnteUi2enc:e Network 
Tanker Dry8ulk Container Total (tanker+dl1'bulk+c:ontainer) 
DWT YIY % DWT YIY °/. DWT YIY °/. DWT Y/y°/. 
1998 42.49 69.07 9.92 121.47 
1999 46.10 8.51% 70.45 2.00% 8.20 -17.35% 124.75 2.69% 
2000 37.03 -19.67% 70.71 0.37% 11. 91 45.33% 119.65 -4.08% 
2001 51.01 37.73% 86.66 22.57% 1838 54.30% 156.05 30.42% 
2002 61.24 20.06% 85.40 -1.46% 17.04 -7.27% 163.68 4.89% 
2003 58.18 -5.00% 90.34 5.79% 14.04 -17.61% 162.56 -0.68% 
2004 76.78 31.97% 132.60 46.78% 32.67 132.60% 242.04 48.89% 
2005 86.94 13.23% 155.72 17.44% 45.09 38.03% 287.75 18.88% 
2006 87.16 0.26% 162.70 4.48% 54.22 20.25% 304.08 5.68% 
2007 150.69 72.88% 255.16 56.83% 57.89 6.78% 463.74 52.51% 
2008 168.76 11.99% 421.78 65.30% 78.80 36.10% 669.34 44.33% 
2009 182.89 8.37"10 506.98 20.20% 72.32 -8.21% 762.19 13.87"10 
2010 140.71 
-23.06% 434.87 -14.22% 55.58 -23.16% 631.15 -17.19% 
As it can be observed in table 1-3 (panel a), there was a steady increase in the yearly 
growth of the fleet after 2004; for example, the combined total fleet of tanker, dry bulk, and 
container vessels increased by almost 7 percent per year after 2004, whereas the growth rate 
before was around 3 percent per year. At the same time, shipping companies needed 
additional capital to finance their fleet expansion which is also evident by the large increase 
of the orderbook, especially for the periods 2004/5 and 2007/8 (table 1-3, panel b). 
Furthermore, the increased appetite for secondary shipping equity offerings during 2004-2007 
illustrates that, once listed, shipping companies continue to utilise this market as a source of 
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funding. On the other hand, most of the secondary offerings taking place in 2008/9 were 
mainly for existing debt repayment purposes. 
1.5) Pricing and Long-Run Performance of an IPO 
The most researched pattern associated with initial public offerings is underpricing8 • 
There is extensive empirical literature documenting the underpricing phenomenon due to its 
persistence in IPO deals and the fact that it has increased over time. Work on the underpricing 
phenomenon includes, among others, Ibbotson (1975) who studies the initial performance of 
newly issued common stocks offered to the public during the 1960s and finds an average 
initial return of 11.4 percent; Ibbotson et al. (1988) who report an average underpricing of 21 
percent for 2,259 firms during 1980-1984; Ritter and Welch (2002) who find an average 
initial day return of about 19 percent; and more recently Ritter (2009) documents that for the 
period 1960-2009 the average initial day return for the US IPOs stands at 16.9 percent. The 
papers conclude that underpricing is a persistent feature of the IPO markets, the magnitude of 
underpricing changes over time, and finally, undepricing exists in every stock market9 • 
Throughout the years different theories have been developed in order to explain the 
underpricing phenomenon and can be categorised in asymmetric and symmetric information 
theories (Ritter and Welch, 2002)10. Theories based on asymmetric information ll include the: 
1) Winner's Curse theory (Rock, 1986), 2) Information disclosure theory (Benveniste and 
Spindt, 1989), 3) Principal - agent theory (Baron, 1982), and 4) Signalling theory (Allen and 
8 Underpricing measures the realised return from the prospectus offer price to the closing price on the 
first trading day Academics also prefer to measure the amount of "money left on the table", since this is 
the money actually gained by IPO investors. The "money left on the table" is defined as the number of 
shares sold at an IPO multiplied by the difference between the first day closing market price and the 
offer price. 
9 Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) argue that research on IPO underpricing can be traced back in 1963 when 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) undertook a study. 
10 Ljungqvist (2006) has classified the theories into four categories: asymmetric information theories; 
ownership and control theories, institutional theories; and behavioural theories. 
11 Winner's curse theory is based on informed versus uniformed investors and empirical research on 
this theory can be found in Keloharju (1993), and Lee et al. (1999). Information disclosure theory is 
based on the fact that underwriters can obtain information from informed investors during the IPO 
process; work on this theory includes Hanley (1993), Comelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) and, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2004). The Principal-agent theory assumes that issuers are less informed than 
underwriters, whereas the Signalling theory assumes the opposite, issuers are more informed than 
underwriters (Ljungvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Welch, 1989). 
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Faulhaber, 1989). On the other hand, theories that rely on the symmetric assumption12 include 
the: 1) Legal liability theory (Tinic, 1988), and 2) Prospect theory (Loughran and Ritter, 
2002). 
Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996b) is the first ever study to examine shipping initial 
public offerings. The study investigates 31 international shipping IPOs for the period 1983 -
1995 and the results seem to be in line with the then existing literature as shipping stocks' 
initial day returns are of the magnitude of 5.32 percent on average 13 • Moreover, gearing is 
found to be the only explanatory factor and positively affecting underpricing, while for a 
reduced sample excluding 7 limited life shipping funds, the proportion of equity offered has 
also explanatory power over the cross-sectional underpricing. Finally, the study gives 
evidence that the average direct cost of gojng public is approximately 8 percent of the amount 
raised. 
Cullinane and Gong (2002) investigate the transportation IPOs in the China mainland and 
Hong Kong and find evidence that freight related IPOs are subject to more severe 
underpricing than non-freight related IPOs, 104.95 percent and 19.17 percent respectively. 
Recently, Merikas et al. (2009) investigate global shipping IPOs and find an average 
underpricing of 17.69 percent. In addition, the study examines factors that may explain first 
trading day returns and concludes that underpricing is positively related to the age of the firm, 
the reputation of the stock market, and the market conditions prevailing at the time of the 
issue; on the other hand, the reputation of the underwriter negatively affects underpricing. On 
a similar note, Merikas et al. (2010) examine shipping initial public offerings in the US for 
the period 1987 - 2007 and find an average underpricing of 4.4 percent. It is evident from the 
ship finance literature that underpricing for the US shipping IPOs is not that high, whereas on 
a global scale is much higher; with Asian shipping IPOs leaving the most money on the table 
for investors. 
12 Legal liability theory assumes that underpricing takes place in order to reduce possible future 
litigation from investors (Lowry and Shu, 2002). Prospect theory argues that issuers permit 
underpricing because their wealth gain from the IPO is greater (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2005). 
13 Ritter (2009) has found an average initial day return of8.1% for the same period. 
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Another pattern associated with initial public offerings is the poor post-issue perfonnance 
in the longer tenn compared to benchmark indices/stocks. Using a sample of 1,526 IPOs that 
took place in 1975 - 1984, Ritter (1991) finds that, in the three years after going public, 
stocks significantly underperfonn against a set of comparable stocks matched by size and 
industry. Levis (1993) also reports that 721 IPOs in the UK (1980-1988) have an average first 
day return of 14.3 percent and underperfonn against relevant benchmark indices during the 
first 36 months of public trading 14 • Furthermore, Ritter and Welch (2002) arrive at the same 
underperformance conclusion where the average market-adjusted 3-year buy-and-hold return 
for the period 1980-2005 is -20.6 percent. 
In the case of shipping stocks, Grammenos and Arkoulis (1999) examine the long-run 
performance of 27 shipping IPOs issued in the stock exchanges of 7 different countries for the 
period 1987-1995. They find that a portfolio of shipping IPOs underperforms the local stock 
market indices by 36.79% by the end of their second anniversary of public listing. However, 
no underperfonnance is documented when IPO returns are compared to the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) Shipping Index. Merikas et al. (2009) argue that, in the long-
run, shipping IPOs underperform after a 5 month holding period; specifically, using the buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) as a measurement for performance, the study finds an 
underperformance of 15.72 percent. Similarly, on a US based sample, Merikas et at. (2010) 
study the long-run performance of US shipping IPOs and conclude that holding these stocks 
for a period of 1, 2 and 3 years offers returns of 7.50, 7.73, and 3.26 percent respectively, as 
measured by buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
The factors that may affect the long run performance of shipping IPOs are investigated by 
Grammenos and Arkoulis (1999). The study finds gearing to be positively related to the after-
market performance, something that can be attributed to the higher rates of return required by 
investors for taking more risk (normally 15-20% per annum), and to the lower financial 
leverage of the companies in the secondary market - perceived as a positive signal. On the 
other hand, fleet age is found to be negatively related to the share performance in the long-run 
14 Other studies include: Brav and Gompers (1997); Gompers and Lerner (2003); and Chan et al. 
(2004). 
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- a result not surprising, as operation of older vessels usually involves higher running costs in 
terms of maintenance and repairs, insurance and oil consumption. Merikas et at. (2010) find 
the operating history of the company to positively affect its stock long term performance 
while a reputable underwriter will affect negatively the performance of the shipping stocks. 
Additionally, shipping stocks performance seems to be positively affected when these are 
listed in reputable stock exchanges and during hot periods. 
The factors that may influence shipping stocks' returns in the longer term have also been 
investigated by a number of studies. Grammenos and Marcoulis (l996a) - in the first ever 
paper on shipping capital markets - find that shipping shares' returns are positively related to 
the financial leverage when this is measured in book value terms IS (BV), and negatively 
related to the average age of the fleet whether measured on a per vessel or a per deadweight 
basis. Stock market beta and the dividend yield are also explanatory factors but not as strong 
as the two mentioned before. Kavussanos and Marcoulis (2000a, 2000b) also investigate the 
US transport industry and detect explanatory power of industrial production and oil prices on 
stock returns. 
Grammenos and Arkoulis (2002) provide evidence about the relationships of global 
macroeconomic sources of risk with shipping returns internationally. The paper suggests that 
oil prices and laid up tonnagel6 are negatively related to shipping stock returns; and the 
exchange rate is found to be positively related with the shipping stock returns. Finally, 
Drobetz et al. (2010) identify the world stock market index, currency fluctuations against the 
US dollar, changes in industrial production, and changes in the oil prices as long run 
systematic risk factors that drive expected shipping stock returns. 
15 Regarding leverage the paper made usage of two measures. The first is defined as (BV of Total 
Assets - BV of Equity) / (MV of Equity) and proposed by - Bhandari L.c. (1998), "Debt-Equity Ratio 
and Expected Common Stock returns: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Finance, 43, 507-529. The 
second one (more traditional) is defined as (BV of Total Assets - BV of Equity) / (BV of Equity) and 
~roposed by several authors (see paper for reference). 
6 Laid up tonnage is used as a proxy for the shipping market, as it is closely related to the equilibrium 
of demand and supply for seaborne trade and hence with the determination of freight rates. 
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1.6) Conclusion 
The utilisation of other sources than the traditional bank finance has been illustrated by 
the growing importance of public offerings and private placements for the purposes of raising 
equity in the US capital markets over the second part of the '80s, the '90s and 21 st Century. 
During the last decade, the good shipping market conditions and the growing demand for 
seaborne trade due to the Chinese economic growth, and the need to finance the fleet 
replacement and expansion programme, are factors that contributed to the high issuance 
volume activity in the US equity market. 
Developments in the banking sector - such as debt securitisation -, the deregulation of 
financial markets, advances of technology and innovation, and the trend towards fee, as 
opposed to interest rate, banking income (particularly in conjunction with more stringent 
capital adequacy rules l7) have also been - in the initial stage - major contributing factors. 
When it comes to external financing, it seems that shipping companies have come through 
two stages of capital structure; in the 1990s the pecking order theory seems to be dominant in 
trying to explaining the decision of external financing, whereas, from 2000 onwards the 
market timing theory seems to be more applicable. Nevertheless, we cannot disregard the 
world financial crisis of 2008-2010 when the availability of bank finance became very 
limited, thus, pressurising shipping companies to seek alternative ways of financing. 
Overall, shipping equity initial and secondary offerings issuance activity had a dramatic 
boost for the period 2003 to 2007 and on average the issues offered during this period were 
larger in terms of the amount raised. Another development is that the concept of the corporate 
structure has been strengthened, and the companies have become larger in size due to 
increased profitability, merger and acquisitions which enhances their market value, and their 
fleet expansion. Their increase in size is also manifested by their total fleet - which is also 
quite young in age - in deadweight tonnage terms in relation to the total world fleet, which 
accounts approximately for 9 percent; indicating in that way their importance in the shipping 
17 Central Banks, under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), imposed the 
Capital Adequacy Rules in 1993; as time passed, weaknesses in the banking system required the re-
assessment of the old rules and the imposition of a set of new Capital Adequacy Rules in 2008. 
Currently, there is talk about a new set again. 
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industry. Furthermore, the large number of institutional investors holding shipping stocks in 
their portfolios and the increase of analyst coverage for shipping stocks are indications that 
shipping stocks and the shipping industry are increasingly regarded by investors as a 
mainstream investment opportunity rather than a niche sector for just a few specialised 
investors. 
Chapter 1 - Page 20 
Chapter 2. Shipping High Yield Bonds 
2.1) Introduction 
The high yield debt market has been providing finance to non-investment grade 
companies since the late 1970s, especially during the early part of the 1980s and for the larger 
part of the 1990s. The major centre for the high yield bond market has been the United States 
and in particular the financial centre of New York. Domestic US and international 
institutional investors seeking higher yields, as well as companies in need of capital, have 
fuelled the rapid growth of this market, making it truly global. High yield bonds are defined 
as those bonds rated below investment grade by the rating agencies; that means BB+ or lower 
by Standard & Poor's and Ba1 or lower by Moody's Investors Service (see table 2-3 for a 
description of credit ratings). These bonds are often issued by companies with a high degree 
of leverage, making the credit quality of their bonds questionable; and the high yield in these 
bonds comes as compensation for the high risk undertaken by those who invest in them. 
The starting point for the high yield debt market was in March 1977, when Lehman 
Brothers underwrote three single-B rated issues raising $178 million and in April of the same 
year Drexel Burnham Lambert underwrote a further $30 million of subordinated debentures 
for Texas International Inc. The era of high yield debt commenced in this way during the late 
1970s and, by 1990, the high yield bond market virtually disappeared with one of its main 
participants, Drexel Burnham Lambert, declaring bankruptcy 1• Nevertheless, since then, the 
market has strengthened and it constitutes a large source of financing in the international 
capital markets arena; in particular, it continued expanding in the first years of the 21 at 
century, benefiting from low interest rates and limited default rates (De Bondt and Marques, 
2004). 
This chapter concentrates on the US high yield bond market as a source of finance for 
shipping companies. In particular, section 2.2 discusses high yield bonds and their seniority. 
I In late 1980s, Drexel Burnham Lambert accounted for about 60 percent of all underwriting in the US 
high yield bond market (KrichetT and Strenk, 1999). In 1989, the company was under investigation for 
insider trading and the economy was already slowing down. In February 1990 the company was forced 
into bankruptcy by its involvement in illegal activities in the junk bond market, driven by its employee 
Michael Milken. 
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The anatomy of the US shipping high yield bond market is provided in section 2.3, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of high yield bonds for shipping companies are discussed in 
section 2.4. The importance of credit ratings, the pricing of shipping high yield bonds and 
their probability of default are examined in section 2.5. Section 2.6 deals with the different 
restructuring options available to shipping companies that may default on their bonds; and 
section 2.7 concludes the chapter. 
2.2) High Yield Bonds and their Seniority 
All bonds are debt securities issued by organizations to raise capital for various purposes. 
When you buy a bond, you lend your money to the entity that issues it. In return for the loan 
of your funds, the issuer agrees to pay you interest and ultimately to return the face value 
(principal) when the bond matures or is called, at a specified date in the future known as the 
"maturity date" or "call date, respectively." 
Different terms are used to describe the high yield debt market, such as "junk bonds", 
"speculative grade bonds" and "high interest bonds". All of these refer to the same concept of 
high yield bonds. 
As the high-yield market has grown, companies have become more creative with the 
shape and structure of bond issues. The following varieties of issues may be found in the bond 
market: "Straight cash bonds" are the high-yield market's plain vanilla bonds, offering a 
fixed coupon rate of interest that is paid in cash, usually in semi-annual payments, through the 
maturity or call date. "Split-coupon bonds" offer one interest (coupon) rate in the early years 
of the bond's life, followed by a second interest rate in later years. Split-coupon issues in 
which the interest rate increases in later years are al so called step-up notes. "Pay-in-kind 
bonds" allow the issuer the option of paying the bondholder interest coupon by issuing 
additional bonds for a predetermined period of time. "Floating-rate and increasing-rate notes 
(IRNs) " pay fluctuating or adjusted rates of interest based on an interest rate benchmark or a 
schedule of payments. "Extendable reset notes" give the issuer the option of resetting the 
Coupon rate and extending the bond's maturity at periodic intervals or at the time of specified 
events. In exchange for these options, the bondholder has the right to sell, or "put," the bond 
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back to the issuer. "Deferred-interest bonds" pay no interest to the bondholder until a future 
date. "Zero-coupon bonds (zeros)" are sold at a deep discount to their face value upon 
issuance and pay no interest to the bondholder until accreted at maturity. "Convertible 
bonds" may be converted into shares of another security under stated terms. The security is 
often the issuing company's common stock. "Multi-tranche bonds" offer bondholders several 
tiers of investments within the same issue. Typically, the tiers may vary in their targeted 
maturities and credit quality. 
According to Moody's Investors Service (1995), the seniority of bond holders regarding 
their claims in the event of the issuer defaulting on its debt obligations is of importance, as it 
will determine the degree of recovery in such an event. The seniority scale is as follows: 
Senior Secured collateralized by some type of asset, in the case of shipping companies, the 
vessels. The bondholder has the right to foreclose on the collateral and either liquidates it or 
transfers it to the bondholder's name. Senior Unsecured not backed by assets, and is 
subordinated, in terms of debt claims, only to senior secured debt. Senior debt, both secured 
and unsecured, has a claim prior to subordinated debt. Subordinated debt is repayable only 
after other debt with a higher claim has been satisfied. Senior Subordinated referring to non 
collateralized debt subordinated in right of payment to senior secured and senior unsecured 
debt. Structural Subordinated usually refers to a senior bond of a pure holding company. In 
this case the bondholder is dependent on the company's dividends from its subsidiaries, 
which are junior to any senior claims at those entities. In the event of the subsidiary being a 
bond issuer, the senior bondholder of the holding company, in effect, becomes subordinated 
to the subsidiaries' bondholders. Junior Subordinated is ranked below all the above 
debentures in terms of claim. For instance, subordinated (or junior) debt holders have a 
secondary claim on the assets of an issuer in the case of insolvency. As a result, subordinated 
securities will normally be rated one or two rating categories below senior debt securities to 
account for the higher expected credit loss after default occurs. Conversely, a secured 
obligation may be rated one or more rating categories higher than the company's 
senior/unsecured rating level. 
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2.3) The Anatomy ofthe Shipping High Yield Bond Market 1992-2010 
The first high yield bond offered by a shipping company took place in 1992 when Sea 
Containers Ltd. issued $125 million of subordinated debentures; since then, 74 issues have 
taken place and have raised $13.7 billion. A problem faced by shipping companies entering 
the high yield bond market is that the shipping industry is characterized as being highly 
cyclical, volatile, and often highly geared; and this might be a setback for companies that 
have to make interest and capital repayments in a recessed shipping market. 
Due to the above, shipping has created a bad reputation as a result of the heavy losses and 
the default of shipping bonds in the late 1990s. Several shipping companies (see table 2-1) 
entered the high yield bond market in 1997/1998 taking advantage of the prosperous market, 
and when the shipping market conditions deteriorated in the mid-1998 and 1999 their bond 
issues defaulted. Possible reasons for the default of these companies were the high gearing 
level of those companies after entering the high yield market, the chartering policy, the age 
and size of their fleet2• These specific characteristics for a number of shipping companies that 
defaulted in their debt obligations during 1999 can be found in table 6. Furthermore, as noted 
by Grammenos (1994) "we may have experienced a similar situation like in the 1970s and 
1980s, when young, enthusiastic bankers - without shipping experience and knowledge -
were wandering around, offering large loans to anyone who was prepared to listen to them. 
Similarly, in the case of shipping high yield bonds, the investment banking area, with some 
exceptions, is a candidate for mistakes". 
2 In favourable market conditions, when company's cash flow situation is strong the company's 
probability of default is low; whereas in unfavourable market conditions when cash flow is tight and 
the company's gearing is high the probability of the company not meeting its payment obligations is 
high, i.e. higher probability of default. 
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Table 2-1: Characteristics of Shipping Companies that Defaulted in 1999 
Source: Offering Prospecti; The Costas Grammenos International Centre for Shipping, Trade and Finance 
Gearing Spread Credit Number of Vessels Age of Chartering 
after (bps) Rating Fleet Policy 
Offerin!!: (S&P) (years) 
Alpha Shipping Pic 75% 106.00 B- 32 21.5 
Ermis Maritime Holdings Ltd 95% 675.00 B 14 20 
Global Ocean Carriers Ltd 93% 1390.00 CCC+ 13 19.3 
Golden Ocean Group Ltd 97% 705.00 B- 28 1.4 
Pacific & Atlantic Holdings Inc 123% 610.00 B 27 13.9 
PanOceanic Bulk Carriers Ltd 85% 609.00 B 6 11.8 
Pegasus Shipping Hellas Ltd 94% 677.50 B 10 18.2 
TBS Shippin!!: International Ltd 91% 564.00 B+ 25 16.8 
Averale 94% 667.06 B 19.38 15.36 
Particularly in 1998, much of the global shipping industry experienced recessed market 
conditions, with freight rates and vessel prices falling dramatically in several shipping sectors. 
These market conditions led to a downturn in corporate credit quality in the shipping industry, 
which consequently led several companies defaulting in their high yield bond issues. The 
Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) financial crises - which were the main reason for the 
downturn in the shipping market - had an immediate and direct impact on trade, and hit hard 
several of the shipping sectors. This deterioration of the shipping market troubled many 
companies, especially those that were highly geared and operated their fleet mainly in the spot 
market, thus, could not maintain the high interest rate repayments. For instance, in 1999 
alone, 10 shipping companies defaulted on their high yield debt. In an article of Lloyd's 
Shipping Economist (2000) it was mentioned that "the overall public debt default rate by 
issuer in 1999 was 1.28% compared to the shipping public debt default rate of somewhere 
around 38%. Though shipping industry issuers represented less than 0.5% of the overall 
public debt by issuer outstanding as of January 2000, shipping industry defaults totalled 
nearly 9% of all defaults by issuer for 1999." 
Grammenos (2000) in a Lloyds List article predicted that in spite of the battering shipping 









larger and high growth shipping companies with more stabilised cash flow. Similarly, 
Leggate (2000) examined shipping high bonds and how they are perceived by the European 
shipping industry as a source of finance. She anticipated that in the next decade the European 
shipping companies will face large capital requirements due to their fleet replacement 
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program and an increase in international trade. This need for capital will come at a time when 
the number of banks willing to finance the shipping industry will contract and, in general, 
there will be a tightening in credit facilities. The study concludes that the shipping high yield 
bond market should continue to be an alternative way of financing and that it is largely 
dependent on the perception of the maritime industry by the investment community. 
Figure 2-1: US Shipping Higb Yield Bonds 1992 - 2010 
Source: The Costas Grammenos International Centre for Shipping, Trade & Finance; Data collected 
from Reuters Thomson Financial Banker One (As of March 2010). 
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Did we have an end of the shipping high yield bond market era as many thought after the 
bad period of 1999? Figure 2-1 depicts that there is a re-emergence of the high yield bond 
market after 2002 where a large number of higher quality companies3 tapped this market for 
satisfying their financing needs. Another fundamental change in comparison to the pre-2000 
era is that shipping companies entering the high yield bond market are more sophisticated, 
and have deeper expertise and knowledge of capital markets; either because they have 
already issued high yield bonds in the past or they have already been publicly listed on a 
stock exchange. Similarly, investment banks that underwrite the shipping bonds and the 
credit rating agencies have gained better knowledge and expertise of the shipping industry; 
have developed their models to assess shipping companies; and in that sense are considered 
as well equipped compared to the past. Specifically, as we can observe in figure 2-1 , there 
3 General Maritime Corporation, Teekay Shipping Group, Overseas Shipholdings and OMI are among 
those. 







was an increased interest for the high yield bond market by shipping companies in the 
periods 2003-2004, and 2009. 























Total Amount raised No of Average Amount Raised Average Coupon Average Yield Average Spread 
(Sm) issues (Sm) (°/.) (0/.) (bpa) 
125.00 I 125.00 12.50 12.50 500.00 
985.50 8 123.19 9.44 9.43 357.00 
175.00 1 175.00 11.25 11.25 325.00 
175.00 I 175.00 10.50 10.50 480.00 
490.00 3 163.33 9.61 9.63 352.67 
849.00 6 141.50 10.17 10.35 623.60 
2,728.00 17 160.47 10.11 10.27 447.94 




425.00 2 212.50 9.75 9.94 483.50 
650.00 3 216.67 9.58 9.75 443.00 
1,596.62 8 199.58 9.58 9.62 383.38 
1,313.00 8 164.13 8.27 8.34 429.25 
75.00 I 75.00 6.13 6.23 195.00 
585.00 3 195.00 11.17 11.79 709.67 




2,200.00 7 314.29 10.96 11.46 845.00 
700.00 2 350.00 9.69 9.87 643.50 
5642.5 38 148.48 10.05 10.16 448.70 
8064.62 36 224.01 9.40 9.62 520.27 
13,707.12 74 185.23 9.74 9.90 483.52 
Table 2-2 displays the characteristics of 74 US shipping high yield bond issues (1992-
2010) by the year of issuance as well as, average coupon, average yield, average spread and 
average credit rating. It can be seen that a total of $US 13,707 million was raised by shipping 
companies in the speculative grade bond sector during the period 1992 to 2010, with an 
average coupon, yield and spread4 of 9.74%, 9.90% and 483 basis points, respectively. 
Furthermore, the average amount per issue raised during this period was $USI8S.23 million 
and had an average credit rating of BB-. Another observation is the low average credit rating 
assigned to issues during high issuance activity years (with the exception of 1993), hence 
higher credit spread, where on average in 1997/8,200314 and 2009 the average credit rating 
was B+/B compared to an overall average ofBB-. 
4 The difference between the yield to maturity of the high yield bond and the yield to maturity of a 
government bond, which is considered riskless, is defined as yield premium/credit spread/spread. 


























When the issues are separated into two periods, 1992-2000 and 2001-2010, we can 
observe that the number of issues is almost equal for both periods, 38 and 36 issues 
respectively; on the other hand, like in the shipping US public equity market, the total amount 
raised in the 2001-2010 period is larger, with the average amount per issue standing at 
$US224.01 million compared to $USI48.48 million for the 1992-2000 period. In respect to 
the coupon and yield there are no notable differences between the two periods. Finally, as it 
appears in table 2-2 the average spread for the 2001-2010 period is slightly higher than in the 
1992-2000 period (520 basis points compared to 448 basis points) while the average credit 
rating is standing at BB- and B+ respectively. 
In terms of issuing activity, it is clear that there is high activity concentrated in 1993 (8 
issues), 1997-1998 (23 issues), 2003-2004 (16 issues) and 2009 (7 issues). In 1993, interest 
rates were at low levels and, as a result, the bond market as a whole and the high yield bond 
market in particular, were very popular. For the period between 1997 and 1998 the main 
reasons for the high issuance level were the debt repayment/restructuring and the replacement 
of the fleet, as the companies entering the high yield bond market at that period appeared to 
have very high gearing levels and old fleets. In 2003-2004, the orderbook for newbuilding 
vessels had already started to increase due to the upcoming Chinese economy - which was 
perceived as a boost for the demand of seaborne trade - and the interest rates were set at very 
low levels; thus, the high activity in the shipping high yield bond market. Finally, in 2009, the 
shipping market had just come out of a crash in the dry bulk freight rates, and in the tanker 
freight rates during the first half of 2009. In addition, bank lending had also dried up due to 
the world financial crisis and many shipping companies, like in 1997/98, had to restructurel 
repay existing loans for replacing/expanding their fleet. In fact, all the offering prospecti of 
the 2009/20 I 0 issues state that the proceeds will be used in order to repay existing debt and in 
some cases for vessel acquisitions purposes as well. Hence, the renewed interest in the 
shipping high yield bond market. 
The high yield bond market emerges as a source that offers financial flexibility to 
shipowing companies under conditions of tight banking liquidity. This trend that has been 
created, is further illustrated by the annual volume of shipping syndicated loans, a relatively 
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comparable financial source to high yield bonds, which was at a record low of $US 32.9 
billion in 2009, remarkably below 2008's figure of $US 85 billion (Marine Money, Freshly 
Minted, 2010), and reflects the aftermath effect of the 2008-2009 world financial crisis. 
Investment banks that benefit from the hefty fees for completing high yield bond deals and 
also by the high coupon that the shipping high yield bonds pay - while at the same time 
shipowners meet their financing needs but at a higher cost - may also constitute a 
contributing factor in the issuance of high yield bonds. In particular, shipping companies that 
had already committed themselves in acquiring newbuilding vessels, but had not closed a deal 
for a bank credit facility, may have faced difficulties in receiving the necessary funds from a 
bank after interbank liquidity dried up during the 2008/9 world financial crisis. As a result the 
high yield bond market was considered as an alternative financing option. 
2.4) Advantages and Disadvantages of High Yield Bonds 
A survey of managers in shipping companies indicated several advantages to using the 
bond market (Grammenos et al., 1998). First, the principal is repaid on the date of maturity; 
hence, the bond issuer is obliged only to pay the interest during the duration of the bond, 
thereby allowing to divert substantial resources for further expansion if the market conditions 
allow it and/or to other projects. Second, the long-term maturity of bonds better matches the 
duration of vessel life than does that of bank loans. Last, but not least, shipping companies 
that have long-term plans to make equity offerings regard the bond market as an opportunity 
to gain experience in modem financial-market techniques. Other advantages in raising capital 
through the high yield bond market making it attractive to shipowners as a method of fmance 
are the following: relatively quick access to funds as it normally takes about three months for 
a deal to be completed and the company to have the funds at its disposal; provides the 
company with a diversified source of capital and access to US capital market funds; the 
shipping company has fewer disclosure requirements in comparison to an equity initial public 
offering; it is a first exposure of the company to the investors, and by doing so it forces a 
considerable amount of discipline on the company; a successful high yield bond issue 
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contributes to the company's credibility and publicity in the market; and finally, the existence 
of minimal covenant restrictions in comparison to bank syndicated finance. 
The high yield bond market has drawbacks, as well. It is a very expensive form of 
financing in terms of expenditure and time. These expenses include both the initial outlay of 
capital to complete the bond issue (issuance costs such as underwriting, legal fees, accounting 
fees, rating and printing), as well as, the high interest payments - in the form of coupons -
applied on the total amount of the bond issue and paid till maturity in comparison to 
syndicated bank loans where interest is applied on the outstanding balance. Another concern 
for the shipping company is the fact that the amount raised through the bond issue has to be 
invested rapidly as the interest paid is very high in comparison to the commitment fee paid for 
the undrawn facility amount in the case of a standby bank loan. Additionally, shipping 
companies come under closer SEC scrutiny. Other disadvantages when raising capital in the 
high yield bond market are: the loss of flexibility and lack of personal interface; no public or 
organized market for the trading of bonds issued in the high yield market, as these bonds are 
usually available only to Qualified Institutional Buyers and InvestorsS (QIBs); and finally, 
prepayment is costly. 
2.5) Credit Ratings, Yield Premia and the Probability of Default 
The question "What is a bond rating?" has been asked at least since 1909 when such 
ratings were started in the United States. Corporate bond ratings were developed prior to 
World War I in response to a commercially viable need for independent and reliable judgment 
about the quality of corporate bonds. At that time, accounting theory and practice, public 
regulation of many of the financial aspects of enterprises, and the pressures and requirements 
S In April 1990 rule 144A, adopted by the SEC, enlarged the investor base and created a secondary 
market for high yield bonds. This secondary market was open only to Qualified Institutional Buyers 
(Qffis). There are three categories of Qffis. The first one consists of institutional investors, which must 
own and invest on a discretionary basis at least SUS 100 million in securities of issuers that are not 
affiliated with the entity. The second category consists of banks and savings and loans associations 
regulated by state or federal law, which in addition to the SUS 100 million portfolio must meet a SUS 
2S million net asset requirement. Finally, the last category consists of security dealers, which are 
registered under the Exchange Act, and are required to have a portfolio of securities worth above S10 
million. The above categories of investors are allowed to resell or transfer the securities within three 
years after the issuance of a security to the issuer, other QIBs, accredited investors and foreign 
investors. The secondary trade takes place in the Private Offerings Resale and Trading through 
Automated Linkages (PORTAL) for trading unregistered securities. 
Chapter 2 - Page 30 
for published financial information, were primitive or minimal as compared with the present 
situation. The leading persons associated with the development of bond ratings were Roger 
Babson, Freeman Putney, Jr., and John Moody (Pogue and Soldofsky, 1969). 
The main tool in identifying the credit quality of an issue is the rating awarded to the 
issuer by credit rating agencies. Standard & Poor's and Moody's are the two major US rating 
agencies, with Fitch being another established rating agency. Credit Ratings are meant to be 
indications of the likelihood that a company will repay its debt on time, i.e. a measure of 
credit risk. They are opinions of future relative creditworthiness and provide objective, 
consistent and simple measures. As such ratings improve the flow of information between 
lenders (institutional investors/wealthy individuals) and borrowers (issuers). Generally, there 
is some "information asymmetry" between the borrowers and the lenders because the 
borrowers know more about their companies than their lenders; thus, ratings agencies help 
reduce this asymmetry of information. Furthermore, the investors' cost of gathering, 
analysing, and monitoring the financial positions of the borrowers is also reduced. 
Accordingly, the overall market efficiency for both borrowers and lenders is improved. Table 
2-3 gives a brief description of the rating scales used by Moody's and Standard and Poor's. 
Table 2-3: Brief Description of Rating Standards - (see 2.7 Appendix for a full description). 
Moody's applies numerical modifiers 1,2, and 3 in each generic rating classification from Aa through Caa. 
The modifier 1 indicates that the obligation ranks in the higher end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 
indicates a mid-range ranking; and the modifier 3 indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating 
category. Standard & Poor's applies the plus (+) or minus (-) signs from AA through CCC to show relative 
standing within the maior rating categories. Source: Fabozzi (2005). 
Moody's S&P Characteristic Comments Class 
Aaa AAA Highest Grade Maximum Safety 
Aa AA High Grade Slightly lower standards INVESTMENT GRADE A A Upper Medium Favorable but possible future problems 
Baa BBB Medium Grade Moderate security and protection 
Ba BB Moderate Protection Contain speculative elements SPECULATIVE 
B B Potentially Undesirable Low assurance of future payments 
Caa CCC Danger of default Dangerous elements present 
Ca CC Likely in or to default Highly speculative JUNK BONDS 
CC C Lowest Class Extremely poor prospects 
C D Bottom most arade Unlikely to attain any stand ina 
NR NR Not Ranked No evaluation available 
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In order to arrive at an opinion as to the credit quality of a shipping company and/or its 
debt, rating agencies will cover areas of analysis along the lines of 6 Cs of credit analysis 
(Grammenos, 2002). Specifically, when assessing shipping issues in order to assign a rating, 
the major credit rating agencies take into consideration the following factors: financial 
position; operating position; company structure; industry outlook; management quality; 
sovereign/macroeconomic issues and issue structure [Kindahl (2008); Moody's (2009)]. 
Assigning a rating is an ongoing analysis providing for the possibility of upgrading or 
downgrading in line with the company's performance and changing market conditions. They 
are important in pricing debt securities - Fridson and Garman (1998), Garman (2000), and 
Gabbi and Sironi (2002) - and assisting investors in their management of credit risk by 
providing a low cost supplement to an investor's own credit assessment. Ratings are not 
predictions of a specific or absolute level of credit risk. Their purpose is to provide the 
investors with an indication of the comparative credit risk of any two investments within the 
universe of rated instruments. Additionally, ratings keep investors informed in a timely and 
objective manner of the relative risk of credit loss potential on particular instruments. It 
should be noted that, ratings are intended to measure credit risk, and not other forms of 
investment risk such as prepayment risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, or currency risk. 
Moreover, they are applied to all debt and credit-related obligations with initial maturities 
longer than one year. For short-term debt and related securities (commercial paper, bank 
deposits, and other money market instruments) a separate rating system is used. 
Table 2-4: Shipping High Yield Bond Offerings According to Standard & Poor's Credit Rating Classification 1992 -2010 
Source: The Costas Grammenos International Centre for Shipping, Trade and Finance. 
No of Total Amount Average Amount Raised per Average Coupon Average Yield Average 
Issues raised (Sm) Issue (Sm) (%) (%) Spread (%) 
BB+ 7 960.00 137.14 8.52 8.61 321.14 
BB 7 1,640.00 234.29 8.87 8.89 336.57 
BB- 27 4,496.12 166.52 9.23 9.28 361.89 
B+ 10 1,975.00 197.50 10.45 10.79 590.80 
B 14 2,981.00 212.93 10.78 10.99 614.32 
B- 7 1,341.00 191.57 10.79 11.23 687.86 
CCC+ 2 286.00 143.00 9.63 9.75 1,041.00 
Total 74 13,707.12 185.23 9.74 9.90 483.52 
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Generally, the shipping industry's risk profile, rated as BB [Kindahl, 2008], can be 
characterized as speculative-grade because of its economic sensitivity, capital intensity, and 
competitive factors, all of which lead to extremely volatile pricing swings in both freight rates 
and asset values. Table 2-4 provides evidence on the credit ratings assigned to shipping high 
yield bond issues for the period 1992-2010. It can be noted that most shipping high yield 
bonds are assigned a credit rating ofBB-. Theoretically, bonds with higher default risk should 
award the holder with higher returns. Therefore, the yield on bond with higher default risk 
must be higher than those with less or no default risk. In general, the lower the rating the 
higher the probability of default and, thus, the higher the spread that the high yield instrument 
should carry. This can be seen clearly in table 2-4 which shows the average spread for the 
shipping high yield bond market over the period 1992 - 2010 against the rating awarded. It 
can be observed that higher ratings are associated with lower spreads on average. This is 
anticipated as lower grade bonds carry more risk in terms of default compared to bonds with 
higher ratings. 
The determinants of pricing of new high yield bond offerings of shipping companies are 
investigated by Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003); which is also the pioneer research paper on 
shipping high yield bonds. The results of the study indicate that credit rating is the major 
pricing determinant, whereas, gearing and laid-up tonnage (proxy for shipping market 
conditions) also account for a significant part of price variability. These results support the 
idea that the market and/or investors undertake its own credit analysis for assessing and 
pricing high yield bonds offered by shipping companies; it seems that the statistical 
significance of all three variables in the model points towards a different perception for 
leverage and market conditions by investors/market and credit rating agencies. Hence, there 
may be an agency problem related to conflicting interests between rating agencies and their 
customers, the shipping companies, who are the issuers of the high yield bonds. 
Once a shipping high yield bond is issued, its yield premium may change depending on 
several factors that can be categorised as company specific factors, industry specific factors 
and macroeconomic factors. Modelling yield premia both in aggregated and desegregated 
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forms involves identifying these factors and measuring their impact on the dynamics of yield 
premia. Although there have been several studies on the determinants of yield premia on 
bonds in other industries/markets (Alessandrini, 1999; Collin-Dufresne et aI., 2001; Bedendo 
et al.. 2004), there has been only one study on the dynamics of yield premia on shipping high 
yield bonds. 
Grammenos, Alizadeh and Papapostolou (2007)6 investigate the dynamics of seasoned 
shipping high yield bonds. The results of the study suggest that the yield premia of shipping 
high yield bonds will be wider - all other things being equal - the lower the credit rating and 
the lower the shipping market earnings are. The statistical significance of credit rating and 
shipping earnings at the same time - which is in line with the Grammenos and Arkoulis 
(2003) study' - may be explained in two different ways. Hand et al. (1992) and Kisgen (2006) 
suggest that credit ratings may respond slow to new information, but they are clearly a focal 
point for financial markets; similarly, we can argue that credit ratings are not normally 
adjusted to immediately reflect shipping market changes and investors do look at the shipping 
market closely even though it is incorporated in the credit ratings. Another explanation may 
be the importance that investors base on the cash flow stability of the company, hence, the 
need to constantly monitor the shipping market. 
The yield premia of shipping high yield bonds will also be wider throughout the passage 
of time until maturity (Grammenos et at. 2007); a result that contradicts Fons (1994) who 
argues that the more a speculative company has been in the debt market the lower the yield 
premium should carry, but in line with the study of Helwege and Turner (1999). A possible 
reason for this may be the highly cyclical nature of the shipping industry; for instance, the bad 
shipping market conditions of 1998/9 led a number of shipping bonds to default, and as a 
result, higher yield premia may also be the outcome of a slow process of regaining the 
confidence of investors and credit rating agencies. Finally, changes in the yield of 10 year 
6 Grammenos et al. (2007) is complementary to the Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) study; the 2007 
study examines the dynamics of yield premia for seasoned shipping issues whereas the 2003 study 
investigated the yield premia on the primary pricing only. 
7 The difference is that the Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) study uses laid-up tonnage as a proxy for 
the shipping market conditions and it is based on data at the time of the issue, whereas, the 
Grammenos, Alizadeh, and Papaposto!ou (2007) study is based on a dynamic environment. 
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Treasury bonds and the yield on the Merrill Lynch single-B index appear to positively affect 
the yield premia on seasoned shipping high yield bonds. 
According to Moody's Investors Service (1995) long-term ratings are also intended to 
forecast the probability of default, as well as, the likely severity of loss if default occurs. 
Probability of default refers to the relative likelihood that there will be any difference at all 
between what investors were promised and what they receive - i.e. a default8 • In addition, the 
definition includes "forced exchanges" in which the issuer of the bond or other instrument has 
offered security holders a new instrument or package of securities containing a diminished 
financial obligation (i.e. preferred or common stock or debt with a lower coupon or par 
amount). Overall, long-term ratings can also be viewed as forecasts of the relative degrees of 
protection that an investor in a particular obligation will enjoy should the issuer face poor 
economic conditions and other plausible stress situations in the future . 
. A study by Grammenos, Nomikos and Papapostolou (2008) provides evidence that the 
probability of default of a shipping high yield bond portfolio may be reduced on average if 
one selects only high rated bonds. Table 2-5 shows the credit ratings for the 50 issues 
employed in the study and the issues are categorised in defaulted and non-defaulted issues. As 
it can be observed, most of the new issues of shipping high yield bonds were assigned a credit 
rating of double-B when entering the market, with fewer, a credit rating of single-B. 
Moreover, table 2-5, indicates that 8.82 percent of the double-B rated bonds (BB+, BB, and 
BB- ratings) in the sample defaulted, compared to 53.30 percent of single-B rated bonds (B+, 
B, and B- ratings). This indicates that choosing only the higher rated bonds in a shipping high 
yield bond portfolio may ensure that the probability of default is reduced on average; 
nevertheless, on an individual issue basis the same assumption may not hold. 
8 Any missed or delayed disbursement of interest or principal, including late payments made within a 
grace period (specified in the legal documentation associated with the obligation) is defined as default. 
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Table 2-5: Descriptive Statistics for Shipping High Yield Bonds Ratings 
Source: Grammenos, Nomikos, and Papaposto1ou (2008) 
All Issues (SO) Defaulted Issues (13) Non-Defaulted Issues (37) 
Number Number % of Group Number % of Group 
BB+ 4 0 0% 4 100% 
BB 5 1 20% 4 80% 
BB- 25 2 8% 23 92% 
Total BBs 34 3 8.82% 31 91.18-;0 
B+ 6 3 50.00% 3 50.00% 
B 8 5 62.50% 3 37.50% 
B- 1 1 100% 0 0% 
Total Bs 15 9 53.30% 6 46.70% 
CCC+ 1 1 100% 0 0% 
All Issues in Sample 50 13 24% 37 76°/. 
The same study used a binary logit model to predict the probability of default for high 
yield bonds issued by shipping companies 9• The estimated results of the model indicated that 
higher gearinglO levels are associated with higher probabilities of default; and the marginal 
effect of gearing on the likelihood of default is higher when the ratio is 65 percent and above. 
Similarly, when companies raise an amount that exceeds their total assets by 80 percent or 
more, then the probability of default will also be high. On the other hand, shipping market 
conditions, working capital over total assets and retained earnings over total assets are 
9 Altman's (1968) study was the first one to use multivariate discriminant analysis in order to explain 
the interaction of financial ratios in predicting bankruptcy. Other studies that used the logit analysis 
approach include (Santomero and Visno, 1977; Martin, 1977; Estrella et aI., t 999) where they tried to 
estimate the probability of failure for banks and the banking system. Studies using accounting ratios to 
predict bankruptcy for corporate companies include (Collins, 1980), who also made a comparison 
between discriminant analysis and linear probability models, Platt and Platt (1990), Bemhardsen 
(2001) who used logit analysis, and Saretto (2004) who applied a simple piece-wise constant hazard 
model. Finally, Huffman and Ward (1996) have established a logit model for the prediction of default 
for high yield bonds at the time of issuance. 
9 One of the most important factors affecting the probability of default is the gearing level. Pre-issue 
gearing is defined as the ratio of long-term debt over the long-term debt and shareholders' equity. It 
shows at a glance the debt ofa company and is a measure of the company's ability to survive in income 
recession periods. A rising gearing will indicate an increasing reliance upon bank money or other forms 
of debt for vessel acquisitions, and this may create problems with paying interest and repaying capital 
if the market conditions deteriorate. Shipping companies with high gearing ratios and unstable income 
generation, faced survival problems in the early 1980s; while others, defaulted in their high yield debt 
obligations in 1998/9. However, during high income periods such as in the second part of the 1980s 
and in 2003/8, highly geared companies substantially increased their revenues and expanded. Naturally, 
companies operating in the time-charter market may have no difficulties in paying out interest to the 
bondholders, while companies operating in the spot or in the short term time-charter markets may face 
severe difficulties in paying them interest, as happened in 1998/9. 
9 In and out - of - sample tests were also performed in order to further test the robustness of the model 
and indicated that the predictive ability of the model was significant since the model could predict 
correctly 97.30 percent of the non-defaulted bonds and 92.31 percent of the defaulted bond 
respectively. 
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negatively related to the probability of default ll . Therefore, the results outline the importance 
of leverage and cash flow stability; thus, shipping companies may be better off if they focus 
on their income stability - achieved by offering better quality of services in order to attract 
first class charterers and longer chartering contracts - which consequently, would be 
adequate to service their debt obligations during bad shipping market conditions. 
2.6) Shipping Yield Bond Defaults and Restructuring Options 
As mentioned previously, in 1998 much of the global shipping industry experienced 
depressed market conditions, and freight rates and vessel prices fell dramatically in several 
shipping sectors. These weak market conditions led to a downturn in corporate credit quality 
in the shipping industry in 1998, which consequently led several companies in default. When 
a company defaults on its debt obligation, both issuers and investors with the help of financial 
institutions have to formulate a restructuring mechanism. Financial distressed shipping 
companies have three options available to them to continue independent operations: 
traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy, prepackaged bankruptcy, and out-of-court restructuring. 
Ideally, value maximising companies should choose the restructuring option that results 
in the least costly resolution of financial distress. According to Tashj ian et al. (1996) and 
Betker (1997), traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy results in higher costs than prepackaged 
bankruptcy and out-of-court restructuring. A Chapter 11 has also the disadvantage of 
potentially wasting corporate assets since the U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires judges to set 
corporate operating policies and approve all major business decisions. In addition, when a 
company chooses to restructure its debt through Chapter 11 and this ultimately leads to 
liquidation, then creditors and shareholders will give up the difference between the 
company's value as a going concern and its liquidation value by not settling privately. 
Finally, Chapter 11 creates additional delays in a settlement because of procedural demands 
placed on managers before taking any decisions. There are, however, several advantages for 
companies that choose Chapter 11. Under Chapter 11 the company is not obliged to pay any 
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interest on any of its unsecured debt and fewer creditors are required for its reorganisation 
plan approval - where in the case of an out-of-court settlement the creditor's unanimous 
consent is required. In addition, the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision protects the 
company from creditor harassment until it emerges from bankruptcy. 
Firms that choose pre-packaged bankruptcy inherently waive the benefits of the automatic 
stay provision by negotiating and seeking approval of a reorganisation plan prior to filing. In 
addition, because firms are under court protection for significantly less time than traditional 
Chapter 11 companies, and thus protected from creditors for significantly less time, the 
accrued benefits of an automatic stay are likely to be significantly less. However, because the 
voting requirements under Bankruptcy Code are the same for both prepakcaged bankruptcy 
and traditional Chapter 11, forms choosing either of these two restructuring alternatives 
benefit from not having to seek unanimous consent. 
In practice most companies will first try to restructure their debt in an out-of-court 
settlement and file for Chapter 11 only when an agreement has not been reached (Gilson, 
1999). According to a study by Yost (2002), firms are significantly more likely to restructure 
out-of-court rather than in traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy when they come from industries 
with higher market-to-book ratios and when they have a higher ratio of operating income to 
total assets. 
2.7) Conclusions 
The shipping US high yield bond market commenced in 1992 and in 1998/99 a 
number of shipping companies defaulted on their bonds resulting in a sharp decline in 
volume activity for the next couple of years. However, the recent re-emergence of the high 
yield bond market, which began in 2009 and continues today, highlights the importance of 
this market as a alternative source that offers financial flexibility to shipowing companies. 
This financial flexibility comes with some advantages such as longer repayment horizon, and 
less strict covenants that a high yield bond issue may entail. 
Investment banks may constitute another contributing factor in the recent issuance of 
shipping high yield bonds. They benefit from the hefty fees for completing high yield bond 
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deals and also by the high coupon that the shipping high yield bonds pay - while at the same 
time shipowners meet their financing needs but at a much higher cost. Finally, we cannot 
disregard the fact that interest rates in the US were at very low levels supporting the issuance 
of bonds. 
While the 2009 statistics for syndicated bank finance show a substantial decrease in 
the overall annual volume of shipping syndicated loans, bank finance is expected to continue 
to be in the future the major source of capital for shipping companies. It is a low cost, flexible 
-and, often, innovative source - adaptable to changing market conditions. A bank may be 
supportive to a shipping company during lean and fat years of the shipping cycle. However, 
what may have changed after the world financial crisis is the fact that banks have become 
more selective with their clientele and they are after medium and above-size shipping 
companies with a proven profitability track record, with smaller size shipping companies and 
newcomers facing funding problems. 
Finally, research on shipping high yield bonds has highlighted the importance of cash 
flow stability, which can be achieved by offering better quality services and longer time 
chartering contracts with first class charterers. Gearing and the shipping market conditions -
among others - are also important factors for high yield bonds issues offered by shipping 
companies. Up to date, there are only four studies on shipping high yield bonds and have 
examined their initial and secondary pricing, and their probability of default. Going forward 
more studies will appear in the literature and address different issues regarding shipping 
bonds in general, including, for instance, the chartering policy and its impact on shipping 
bonds. High yield bonds re-emerged in the 21 st Century and will remain an alternative source 
of capital to be tapped by shipping companies, not by all shipping companies though, under 
the appropriate conditions. 
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2.8) Appendix 
Credit Ratings Explanations - Standard and Poor's 
AAA 
An obligation rated 'AAA' has the highest rating assigned by Standard & Poor's. The 
obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is extremely strong. 
AA 
An obligation rated 'AA' differs from the highest-rated obligations only in small degree. 
The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is very strong. 
A 
An obligation rated' A' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in 
circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. 
However, the obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is still 
strong. 
BBB 
An obligation rated 'BBB' exhibits adequate protection parameters. However, adverse 
economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened 
capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. 
BB, B, CCC, CC, and C 
Obligations rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC', 'CC', and 'C' are regarded as having significant 
speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least degree of speculation and 'C' the 
highest. While such obligations will likely have some quality and protective 
characteristics, these may be outweighed by large uncertainties or major exposures to 
adverse conditions. 
BB 
An obligation rated 'BB' is less vulnerable to nonpayment than other speculative issues. 
However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial, 
or economic conditions, which could lead to the obligor's inadequate capacity to meet its 
financial commitment on the obligation. 
B 
An obligation rated 'B' is more vulnerable to nonpayment than obligations rated 'BB', 
but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial commitment on the 
obligation. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the 
obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitment on the obligation. 
CCC 
An obligation rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable to nonpayment and is dependent upon 
favorable business, financial, and economic conditions for the obligor to meet its financial 
commitment on the obligation. In the event of adverse business, financial, or economic 
conditions, the obligor is not likely to have the capacity to meet its financial commitment 
on the obligation. 
CC 
An obligation rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment. 
C 
The 'C' rating may be used to cover a situation where a bankruptcy petition has been filed 
or similar action has been taken, but payments on this obligation are being continued. 
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D 
An obligation rated 'D' is in payment default. The 'D' rating category is used when 
payments on an obligation are not made on the date due even if the applicable grace 
period has not expired, unless Standard & Poor's believes that such payments will be 
made during such grace period. The 'D' rating also will be used upon the filing of a 
bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action if payments on an obligation are 
jeopardized. 
Plus (+) or minus (-) 
The ratings from' AA' to 'CCC' may be modified by the addition of a plus or minus sign 
to show relative standing within the major rating categories. 
c 
The 'c' sUbscript is used to provide additional information to investors that the bank may 
terminate its obligation to purchase tendered bonds if the long-term credit rating of the 
issuer is below an investment-grade level and/or the issuer's bonds are deemed taxable. 
p 
The letter 'p' indicates that the rating is provisional. A provisional rating assumes the 
successful completion of the project financed by the debt being rated and indicates that 
payment of debt service requirements is largely or entirely dependent upon the successful, 
timely completion of the project. This rating, however, while addressing credit quality 
subsequent to completion of the project, makes no comment on the likelihood of or the 
risk of default upon failure of such completion. The investor should exercise his own 
judgment with respect to such likelihood and risk . 
• 
Continuance of the ratings is contingent upon Standard & Poor's receipt of an executed 
copy of the escrow agreement or closing documentation confirming investments and cash 
flows. 
r 
The 'r' highlights derivative, hybrid, and certain other obligations that Standard & Poor's 
believes may experience high volatility or high variability in expected returns as a result 
of noncredit risks. Examples of such obligations are securities with principal or interest 
return indexed to equities, commodities, or currencies; certain swaps and options; and 
interest-only and principal-only mortgage securities. The absence of an 'r' symbol should 
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Credit Ratings Explanations - Moody's 
Aaa 
Bonds and preferred stock which are rated Aaa are judged to be of the best quality. They 
carry the smallest degree of investment risk and are generally referred to as "gilt edged." 
Interest payments are protected by a large or by an exceptionally stable margin and 
principal is secure. While the various protective elements are likely to change, such 
changes as can be visualized are most unlikely to impair the fundamentally strong 
position of such issues. 
Aa 
Bonds and preferred stock which are rated Aa are judged to be of high quality by all 
standards. Together with the Aaa group they comprise what are generally known as high-
grade bonds. They are rated lower than the best bonds because margins of protection may 
not be as large as in Aaa securities or fluctuation of protective elements may be of greater 
amplitude or there may be other elements present which make the long-term risk appear 
somewhat larger than the Aaa securities. 
A 
Bonds and preferred stock which are rated A possess many favorable investment 
attributes and are to be considered as upper-medium-grade obligations. Factors giving 
security to principal and interest are considered adequate, but elements may be present 
which suggest a susceptibility to impairment some time in the future. 
Daa 
Bonds and preferred stock which are rated Baa are considered as medium-grade 
obligations (i.e., they are neither highly protected nor poorly secured). Interest payments 
and principal security appear adequate for the present but certain protective elements may 
be lacking or may be characteristically unreliable over any great length of time. Such 
bonds lack outstanding investment characteristics and in fact have speculative 
characteristics as well. 
Da 
Bonds and preferred stock which are rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements; 
their future cannot be considered as well-assured. Often the protection of interest and 
principal payments may be very moderate, and thereby not well safeguarded during both 
good and bad times over the future. Uncertainty of position characterizes bonds in this 
class. 
D 
Bonds and preferred stock which are rated B generally lack characteristics of the 
desirable investment. Assurance of interest and principal payments or of maintenance of 
other terms of the contract over any long period of time may be small. 
Caa 
Bonds and preferred stock which are rated Caa are of poor standing. Such issues may be 
in default or there may be present elements of danger with respect to principal or interest. 
Ca 
Bonds and preferred stock which are rated Ca represent obligations which are speculative 
in a high degree. Such issues are often in default or have other marked shortcomings. 
C 
Bonds and preferred stock which are rated C are the lowest rated class of bonds, and 
issues so rated can be regarded as having extremely poor prospects of ever attaining any 
real investment standing. 
Note: Moody's applies numerical modifiers 1,2, and 3 in each generic rating 
classification from Aa through Caa. The modifier I indicates that the obligation ranks in 
the higher end of its generic rating category; the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking; 
and the modifier 3 indicates a ranking in the lower end of that generic rating category. 
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Chapter 3. Factors Affecting the Dynamics of Yield Premia on 
Shipping Seasoned High Yield Bonds 
Published in: 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review (2007), 43, 549-564 
3.1) Introduction 
Some of the major factors that may have influenced a large number of shipping 
companies to issue, mainly, equity and debt in international and national - public and private 
- capital markets over the last twenty years, during which capital markets have increased their 
presence in the array of sources for shipping finance, are: the increase of the fleet over the 
same period and the acceleration - through regulations - of replacement; the perceived need 
for size increase of shipping companies; the unwillingness of the banking industry - the main 
source for shipping finance - to provide shipping companies with bilateral and syndicated 
loans beyond a level due to the corresponding increase of credit risk; the need for flexibility 
of shipping companies in choosing the appropriate source of finance at a particular point in 
time; and the ever changing conditions in the shipping and financial markets - and 
consequently in the shipping companies themselves. 
The appearance of the shipping industry in the high yield bond market took place in 
1992 when Sea Containers Ltd. issued $125 million of subordinated debentures. By 1998, 
$5,527 million had been raised in the high yield bond market for shipping companies, through 
37 issues of various types of high yield notes (see table 3-2). Despite the decline in the 
number of shipping high yield bond issues after 1999 - mainly due to a number of shipping 
companies defaulting in their debt obligations - the market has seen an increase of new issues 
(15 in the US debt capital market during 2003 and 2004) primarily due to the strong shipping 
market l • 
1 During bad shipping market conditions - where spreads are high in order to reflect the riskiness of the 
issues - the costs of issuing new high yield bonds may be high (a shipping company that issues a bond 
during that period must be in great financial need) and investors are discouraged from investing in 
shipping high yield bonds. On the other hand, in good shipping conditions the issuance costs may be 
lower (thus, higher issuance of shipping high yield bonds) and the shipping high yield bond market 
attracts more investors; although, during periods of prosperity in the shipping market there is a 
tendency of shipping companies to prefer the equity capital market as a means of raising funds. 
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Little is known about the factors that affect the pricing and thus the dynamics of yield 
premia2 of shipping seasonedJ high yield bonds. The question of how spreads for shipping 
high yield bonds are determined in the "secondary market" merits a closer investigation in 
view of the importance they carry for investors, and for shipping companies as a means of 
raising funds after the recent revival of the shipping high yield bond market. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the factors that can explain the dynamics of 
yield premia of seasoned shipping high yield bonds; thus, complementing the previous study 
of Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) that examined factors that affect the yield premia on the 
primary pricing. As a result, the main difference between the two studies is that the previous 
analysis of Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) was based on a static environment whereas the 
analysis of this chapter is based on a dynamic environment. 
This study contributes to the existing ship finance literature in the following ways: 
first, it attempts to model the changes of credit spreads of shipping high yield bonds in the 
secondary market, which is of interest to investors and traders since information on changes 
in yield premia can be used for investment and asset allocation purposes. In general, high 
yield bond funds diversify their holdings by industry, and transactions do not occur only at 
the time of issuance; thus, the problem of mispricing - or looking at the wrong explanatory 
factors - by using the existing models that apply to the overall high yield bond market or only 
at the time of issuance may be overcome4 • Secondly, it distinguishes between high yield 
issues by listed and unlisted companies as well as defaulted and non-defaulted bond issues in 
order to examine whether there is any difference in the impact of the explanatory variables on 
the determination of yield premia. Thirdly, in the analysis we also employ a set of 
macroeconomic and industry related factors. 
The chapter is structured as follows: in the next section - section 3.2 - the literature 
review is laid out; section 3.3 illustrates the methodology used in the analysis and section 3.4 
2 Yield is defined as the percentage rate of return on the bond when the bond is held until maturity. The 
yield premium is defined as the difference between the yield to maturity on a corporate bond and the 
yield to maturity on a government bond of the same maturity. Yield premium, yield spread and credit 
spread are used interchangeably in the text. 
3 Bonds are traded from one investor to another in the "secondary" high yield bond market. 
4 Sorensen and Burke (1986), Kavussanos and Marcoulis (1997) and, Fridson and Garman (1998) have 
outlined the importance of industry classification. ~=:::----
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discusses the data used in the model; section 3.5 deals with the empirical results of the 
analysis; and finally, the conclusions are in section 3.6. 
3.2) Literature Review 
According to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), although much is known about the yield 
changes of corporate bonds, there is very limited knowledge about the determinants of credit 
spread changes; and it is the change in credit spreads rather than in bond yields that is 
important to institutional investorss. 
Collin-Dufresne et at. (2001) also investigated the determinants of credit spread 
changes (both on investment and noninvestment6 grade bonds) and they found that "variables 
that should in theory determine credit spread changes have rather limited explanatory power. 
Furthermore, the residuals from their regression were highly cross-correlated driven by a 
single common factor; and although they took into account and examined several 
macroeconomic and financial variables as candidate proxies for this common factor, they 
were still unable to explain it". Joutz et al. (2001) concluded that - for investment and 
noninvestment grade bonds - there is a long-run relationship between credit spreads and 
default risk as measured by the level and the slope of the Treasury term structure; however, 
the relationship between credit spreads and the term structure variables can vary based on the 
time-to-maturity and credit quality of corporate bonds. 
Another study by Alessandrini (1999) on investment grade bonds revealed a negative 
relationship between credit spread and the level of interest rates, the slope of the term 
structure, and stock returns. Bedendo et al. (2004) examined the determinants of credit 
spreads for investment grade bonds and concluded that "treasury yield curves are an 
important, but not a unique, determinant; both market and idiosyncratic equity variables play 
a significant role on the credit spread level". 
5 According to Collin-Dufresne et. al (2001), hedge funds often take leveraged positions in corporate 
bonds while hedging away interest rate risk by shorting treasuries. As a result, their portfolios become 
extremely sensitive to changes in credit spreads and not bond yields. 
6 Bonds are divided into two categories: investment grade and noninvestment grade (speculated grade 
or high yield) bonds. In the US the two major rating agencies are Moody's and Standard and Poor's 
(S&P). Any bond that has a rating of BBB- and above, assigned by S&P or Baa3 and above, assigned 
by Moody's is regarded as investment grade. On the other hand, bonds rated BB+ and below by S&P 
or Bal and below by Moody's belong to the speculative grade universe. The rating scales for the two 
major rating agencies are illustrated in table 3-4 . 
.;.;;...;;'--'-"----
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Barnhill et al. (2000) examined the yields on noninvestment grade bond indices and, 
by utilizing cointegration techniques, they found a long-run relationship between 
noninvestment grade yields, Treasury securities, and default rates. 
A number of studies have also concentrated on examining the determinants of new 
issue yield spreads - rather than the dynamics - in the overall noninvestment grade sector. 
Fridson and Garman (1998) identified a number of factors that explained the variance of new 
issue yield premia in the high yield bond market for the period 1995-1996. Their results 
suggested that the yield spread of newly issued high yield bonds is sensitive to factors such as 
credit rating, term-to- maturity, and secondary market yield premia. Their model explained 
more than half of the variance in the yield spreads, and the factors they employed were easily 
quantifiable. 
Garman (2000) examined the high yield new bond issue pricing in Europe. He found 
that the majority of variance in the primary pricing' of European new noninvestment grade 
issues could be quantified in a simple four-factor model. His results were comparable to those 
of Fridson and Garman (1998) for the US high yield market. The significant variables in the 
Garman (2000) European new issue model include: the bond's credit rating; the secondary 
market yield spread of the European high yield bonds; the size of the offering; and whether 
the bond is deferred-interest coupon. 
A study by Gabbi and Sironi (2002) analyzed the issuance spreads of Eurobonds and 
the main results emerging from their analysis are: credit rating is the most important 
determinant of spreads; bond investors' reliance on ratings increased over the time for their 
sample period; and finally, while a bond's expected tax treatment represents a relevant factor 
explaining spreads, the primary market efficiency and the secondary market liquidity appear 
as poor explanatory variables. 
To date there is only one study that has investigated shipping initial offerings in the 
bond market. Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) examined the primary pricing of high yield 
bond offerings in the shipping industry during the period 1993-1998. Their empirical results 
suggest that - at the time of issuance - credit rating, financial leverage and laid up tonnage, 
are determinants of the shipping bonds' yield premia. 
, Primary pricing refers to the determination of the yield premium of the new high yield bond issues. 
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3.3) Methodology 
The estimation approach of our model is the use of panel methodology. Baltagi 
(2005) lists several benefits and limitations8 from using panel data estimation methods over 
time-series and cross-section data methods. According to Baltagi (2005), one of the benefits is 
that of controlling for individual heterogeneity. Panel data suggests individuals, firms, states 
or countries are heterogeneous, while time-series and cross-section studies by not controlling 
this heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased results. In the shipping industry, there are 
variables difficult to measure and quantify on a monthly basis which also differ across 
individual companies. These may include the quality of managerial capacity, or the 
company's chartering policy (spot or time-charter). It is this heterogeneity among companies9 
that we are trying to capture by using a fixed effects model. 
The Hausman (1978) test to choose between the fixed and random effects 
specification of the model is used. A central assumption in random effects estimation is that 
the effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. To test this assumption we 
performed the Hausman (1978) test which gave a~-stat=76.72, providing little evidence that 
there is no misspecification and, thus, favoured the fixed effects specification. Additionally, 
two tests are used to evaluate the joint significance of the cross-section fixed effects by using 
sums-of-squares (F-test) and the likelihood function (Z2 -test). The two statistic 
values F(39,1292)= 53.88 , ,d9 = 1293 .11 and the associated p-values of [0.00] and [0.00], 
respectively, strongly rejected the null hypothesis that the effects are redundant. As a result 
our fixed effects model equation is: 
Yir = Pli + XkirPk + &ir' i = 1,2,K ,N and t = 1,2,K,r (1) 
where Yit is the yield premium of issue i at time period t; Xkll is the set of k variables10 ; 
Pli = PI + Pi is the intercept for the ith issue, while PI is the mean intercept and PI represents the 
8 For a detailed analysis on the benefits and limitations of panel data see Hsiao (2003) and Klevmarken 
(1989). 
9 There are companies in our sample that have issued more than one high yield bond. The heterogeneity 
among companies would not be valid in the case we had issues offered by the same company with the 
same issue date. We control for this by excluding any issues with that characteristic. 
10 Variables in our model are in logarithm.:..:ic:.,.:f;.;:.:orm=. ___ _ 
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difference from this mean for the ith individual capturing the fixed individual effects; Eit is the random 
error term II . 
3.4) Data Description 
The sample includes data for 40 high yield bonds of shipping companiesl2 for the 
period April 1998 to December 2002 in the U.s. market I3 •14 , and a collection of time series 
data for the cross-section. Our sample contains shipping companies with prime business in the 
tanker, dry, container, ferry, and gas sectors; the spread and credit rating for those companies' 
high yield bonds were collected on a monthly basis from issues of Tradewinds. A variety of 
factors were tested and the list includes a set of microeconomic, macroeconomic and industry 
related factors. A detailed description ofthe variables is shown in table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: Variables Description 





Standard & Poor's Rating Scale (BB+= 11.. ... C= 1) 
Term to Maturity (Remaining Months) 
Monthly Change in Company's Market Capitalisation Value (0/0) 
Industry Variables 
ClarkSea Index Monthly Change in Clarkson's Earnings Indicator Index (0/0) 




Merrill Lynch Single-B Index 
Month-Over-Month Change on Consumer Price Index - Inflation (0/0) 
Month-over-Month Change in Yield on Ten-Year Treasuries (0/0) 
Monthly Changes in the Yield on Merrill Lynch Single-B Index (0/0) 
11 The error term follows the classical assumption: E(Eil ) ~ N(O, 0'2 ). 
12 The original sample was 45 high yield bonds but after eliminating those that: were nonrated; had an 
extremely high spread compared to the other companies; or observations for the specific company were 
inadequate, we obtained a final sample of 40 issues. 
13 The reason we examined the period April 1998 to December 2002 was purely due to the availability 
of data. The main source of collecting our data (Tradewinds) stopped providing the credit rating for the 
individual bond issues on a monthly basis after December 2002 up to April 2005. As result, it was not 
possible to run our model without the credit rating as it constitutes a major explanatory variable for 
explaining the dynamics of yield premia for shipping high yield bonds. 
14 The reasons we concentrated only on U.S. shipping high yield bonds are the following: the U.S. high 
yield bond market is much larger in comparison to the European one (for the period 1999-2005 the new 
issues amount in the U.S. totaled to $601 billion where in Europe only to $105 billion - Source: 
Bloomberg); furthermore, the number of shipping high yield bonds in Europe is very limited and a 
comparison with the U.S. shipping high yield bonds could not be made; finally, there are only a couple 
of investment grade bonds and the rating - as assigned by Standard and Poor's (Source: Standard and 
Poor's Rating Direct) - of the overall shipping industry is BB, that is to say it belongs to the group of 
sectors that according to Standard and Poor's "an obligation rated BB is less vulnerable to non-
payment than other speculative issues. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to 
adverse business, financial, or economic conditions, which could lead the obligor's inadequate capacity 
to meet its financial commitment on the obligation". Thus, the vast majority of shipping companies 
issue only high yield bonds. 












Table 3-2 displays the characteristics of the 40 shipping high yield bonds by the year 
of issuance. A total of $6,102 million was raised by these shipping companies in the 
speculative grade sector during the period 1992-2002, with an average issue float of $152.55 
million. The average coupon is 10.36% and the average term to maturity is 9.681 years with 
no substantial variations in either. The average rating is B+ as assigned by Standard and 
Poor's, or B 1 by Moody's. 
Table 3-2: Characteristics of Shipping High Yield Bond Offerings by Year of Issue (1992-2002) 















Number of Total Float Average Float Coupon Term 
Issues {S million} {S million} (%} (years) (S&P/MoodI's) 
1 125.00 125.00 12.50 12.00 BB-IBa3 
8 1135.0 141.88 9.44 9.625 BB-IBa3 
1 175.00 175.00 11.25 10.00 BBIBa2 
1 175.00 175.00 10.50 10.00 BBIBa2 
3 490.00 163.33 9.61 9.66 BB-IBa3 
6 849.00 141.50 10.l7 9.00 BIB2 
17 2,728.00 1160.47 10.11 9.53 B+IBI 
1 115.00 115.00 10.75 7.00 BB-IBa3 
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1 260.00 260.00 8.88 10.00 BB-IBa3 
1 200.00 200.00 10.38 10.00 BB+IBa3 
40 6,102 152.55 10.36 9.681 B+IBI 
It is clear that most of the issuing activity is concentrated in 1993 (8 issues) and 1997-
1998 (23 issues). In 1993, the interest rates were at low levels and, as a result, the bond 
market as a whole, and thus, high yield bonds were very popular. In addition, in the same 
period, the issuing activity of shipping equity initial public offerings was also high as noted 
by Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996); with the main reason being the anticipation of an 
upturn in tanker freight rates, and the expectation of high growth rates in the East Asia and 
Pacific areas where some of the companies operated at that time. These reasons seemed to 
apply in the high yield market as well. For the period between 1997 and 1998, as noted by 
Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003), the primary reasons for the high issuance level were the 
debt repayment/restructuring and the replacement of the fleet, because the companies entering 
the high yield bond market at that period appeared to have very high gearing levels and old 
fleets. 
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As part of the analysis we investigated whether the variables used in the model are 
stationary or noe 5 • Recent literature16 suggests that panel-based unit root tests have higher 
power than unit root tests based on individual time series. While these tests are commonly 
termed "panel unit root" tests, they are, theoretically, simply multiple-series unit root tests 
that have been applied to panel data structures. For the variables used in our model we have 
computed the following types of panel unit root tests: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002); Breitung 
(2000); 1m, Pesaran and Shin (2003); Fisher-type tests using ADF and PP tests (Madda\a and 
Wu (1999) and Choi (2001)). 
We begin by classifying our unit root tests on the basis of whether there are 
restrictions on the autoregressive process across cross-sections or series. Consider the 
following AR(l) process for panel data: Yit = PiYit-1 + Xit8i + Eit, where i=I,2, .. ,N are 
cross-section units or series, that are observed over periods t =1,2, ... ,r;. The X it represents 
the exogenous variables in the model, including any fixed effects or individual trends; P i 
are the autoregressive coefficients; and finally, the errors E it are assumed to be mutually 
independent idiosyncratic disturbance. Iflpi I < 1 , then Yi is said to be weakly stationary; on 
the other hand, if I Pi I = 1 then Yi contains a unit root. For purposes of testing, there are two 
natural assumptions that we can make about the Pi . First, one can assume that the persistence 
parameters are common across cross-sections so that Pi = P for all i. The Levin, Lin, and 
Chu (2002) and Breitung (2000) tests employ this assumption. Alternatively, one can allow 
Pi to vary freely across cross-sections; the 1m, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), and Fisher-ADF 
and Fisher-PP tests are of this form. 
Table 3-3 displays the results of all four panel-based unit roots tests at levels and first 
differences respectively. The tests in levels indicate the presence of a unit root for the 
variables as they cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. The only exceptions to this 
15 Non-stationary data can be misleading and spurious and results obtained from a regression including 
this kind of data are called spurious regressions (Granger and Newbold, 1974). "A spurious regression 
usually has very high R2 and t-statistics that appear to provide significant estimates, but the results have 
no economic meaning. This is because the OLS estimates are not consistent, and therefore the tests of 
statistical inference are not valid (Asteriou, 2006)". 
16 Levin, Lin and Chu (2002); Breitung (2000); 1m, Pesaran and Shin (2003); Fisher-type tests using 
ADF and PP tests [Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (200Ill. 
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pattern are the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Breitung (2000) tests for the Merrill Lynch 
single-B index. The tests in first differences reject the null hypothesis of unit root. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that all the variables contain one unit root and are in fact integrated of 
order one I( 1 ). 
Table 3-3: Panel-Based Unit Root Tests 
Panel A: Levels 
Laid-Up Consumer Interest Earnings Merrill Lynch Market 
Method Tonnage Price Index Rates Index B-Index Value 
(LU) (CPl) (R) (EARN) (MLBl) (MV) 
Levin, Lin & Chu (t-stat) -0.460 0.086 2.492 -1.120 -4.208 
-0.233 
[0.32] [0.53] [0.00] [0.13] [0.00] [0.40] 
Breitung (t-stat) 2.170 5.316 -1.068 2.155 -4.503 
-2.084 
[0.98] [1.00] [0.14] [0.98] [0.00] [0.01] 
1m, Perasan & Shin (W-stat) 1.065 8.502 2.144 2.886 -1.341 
1.382 
[0.85] [1.00] [0.98] [0.00] [0.10] [0.91] 
ADF-Fisher (chi-square) 55.07 17.90 37.16 54.78 96.64 
23.18 
[0.98] [1.00] [1.00] [0.98] [0.71] [0.72] 
PP-Fisher (Chi-square) 50.63 24.43 43.57 35.38 65.88 
22.43 
[0.99] [1.00] [0.99] [1.00] [0.83] [0.76] 
Panel B: First Difference 
-37.33 -23.20 -27.94 -7.80 -14.93 -19.30 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
-26.76 -24.04 -25.28 -13.10 -17.91 -17.57 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
-32.45 -19.49 -22.76 -9.57 -13.17 -17.05 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
994.9 578.8 691.4 268.6 484.2 310.8 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
1060.2 572.1 701.2 298.6 770.3 331.4 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Levin, Lin & Chu (t-stat) 
Breitung (t-stat) 
1m, Perasan & Shin (W-stat) 
ADF-Fisher (Chi-square) 
PP-Fisher (Chi-square) 
• The lag length for the panel-based unit root tests is automatically chosen by using the Schwarz Criterion for lag 
differences; the Newey-West (1994) method and the Bartlett Kernel were used for the Bandwidth selection. 
• Values in [ ] are the probabilities for the tests. 
In the remaining of this section we are going to briefly discuss the possible 
explanatory variables of the dynamics of yield premia of seasoned shipping high yield bonds. 
Credit Rating (table 3-4) is meant to be an indication of the likelihood that a company 
will repay its debt on time, i.e. a measure of credit risk. It is an opinion of future relative 
creditworthiness and provides objective, consistent and simple measures. As such rating 
improves the flow of information between lenders (institutional investors / wealthy 
individuals) and borrowers (issuers). Generally, there is some information asymmetry 
between the borrowers and the lenders because the borrowers know more about their 
companies; ratings agencies help reduce this asymmetry of information. Furthermore, the 
investors' cost of gathering, analysing, and monitoring the financial positions of the 
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borrowers is also reduced. Accordingly, the overall market efficiency for both borrowers and 
lenders is improved. 
Table 3-4: Standard & Poor's and Moody's Rating Scales 






























Moody's assesses the company's ability to repay its debt obligations by focusing on 
the following main areas: industry trends; national political and regulatory environment; 
management quality; basic operating and competitive position; financial position and liquidity 
sources; company structure; parent company support agreements; and special event risk 
(Moody's Investors Service, 1999). This is a general list of factors that varies according to the 
industry each company operates. Standard and Poor's views shipping industry'S risk profile as 
speCUlative grade because of its economic sensitivity, capital intensity. and competitive 
factors (Lloyd's Shipping Economist, August 2000). Factors such as chartering policy and 
customer base, fleet efficiency, industry segments, quality of management, debt leverage, and 
capital structure, are among the major factors which rating agencies focus on when assessing 
shipping companies' credit quality. 
Table 3-5 presents the changes in credit ratings of shipping high yield bonds over the 
period April 1998 to December 2002 on an annual basis. It can be seen that that the most 
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prevalent rating in the shipping sector is Ba3 (Moody's) or BB- (Standard and Poor's). The 
mean rating is even lower at B2 (Moody's) or B (Standard and Poor's). For example, 
according to the Standard and Poor's rating scale, in 1998 when a large number of issues took 
place in an uncertain shipping market, as the earnings for shipping companies started to drop, 
most of the bonds were assigned ratings ofBB- and B. 
Table 3-5: Bond Ratings in the Shipping Industry 
Source: Data collected from Tradewinds 
Moody's Apr. 98 Dec. 98 Dec. 99 Dec. 00 Dec.Ol Dec. 02 S&P Apr. 98 Dec. 98 Dec. 99 Dec. 00 Dec. 01 Dec. 02 





Ba2 6 4 3 1 1 1 4 3 3 420 
Ba3 10 14 11 12 9 7 15 13 11 6 4 4 
Bl 7 7 7 4 2 4 3 5 346 5 
B2 2 1 0 0 0 0 B 653 102 
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Caa2 0 0 2 2 2 1 000 32 2 
Caa3 0 0 1 4 3 2 001 110 
Ca 0 0 3 3 0 2 o 020 1 0 
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31 35 33 28 24 23 
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31 35 33 28 24 23 
B~ B~ B~ B~ B~ BB- BB- BB- BB- B+ 
Bl Bl B2 B2 B2 B2 B+ B+ B B B 
In 1999, when the shipping market reached bottom levels as in the year 1992, we can 
observe a downward trend in the credit ratings of shipping companies, and the first defaults. 
During 2000, although the shipping market had an upward trend the credit ratings for the 
shipping companies did not improve because they still reflected the previous year's bad 
shipping conditions and the inability of some shipping companies to meet their debt 
obligations. As a result, we can see that shipping high yield bond ratings cluster around the 
BB- and B+ grades as well as the CCC grade. The picture did not change during 2001 and 
2002, as the market had a downward trend during 2001 and remained at low levels for most 
of 2002. Thus, the downgrade of many shipping companies during the period under this 
analysis can be attributed to the unstable and bad shipping market conditions that prevailed 
and due to the financial difficulties this caused for the shipping companies. 
Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003); Fridson and Garman (1998); and Garman (2000) 
found credit rating to have the highest correlation with new issue spreads, among other 
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B+ 
B 
variables employed in their studies. In our analysis we assign a dummy variable in each rating 
level of the Standard and Poor's rating scale. We allocate the value of 1 to bonds with the 
lowest credit quality (C) up to the value of 11 for bonds with the highest credit quality (BB+). 
A clear pattern emerges between rating and spread from figure 3-1. The average yield 
premium is plotted against each rating and we observe some evidence of higher rated bonds 
with lower spreads. Figure 3-1 illustrates that, in one case, the average yield premium level of 
CCC+ rated companies is higher than those rated CCC-, suggesting that other factors may 
play a part in the determination of the spread. In general, the lower the rating the higher the 
yield premium should be, thus we anticipate a negative relationship between spread and 
rating. 














CC CCC- CCC+ B- B B+ BB- BB BB+ 
Credit Rating (BB+=11.. .. C-1) 
We use each individual bond's maturity (remaining months to maturity since 
issuance) as the measure of the bond's term. A number of studies have included term-to-
maturity as a possible explanatory variable in explaining yield premia of new issue high yield 
bonds. Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993) present a theoretical model for yield spread 
as a function of maturity, whereas spreads of callable bonds are smallest for short maturity 
issues, highest for intermediate maturity issues, and declining for longer maturity issues. 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) identified that spread for bonds with maturity of five to ten 
years first increases and then declines. Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) also included term to 
maturity in their analysis but it was found insignificant. 
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According to F ons (1994), longer-dated noninvestment grade bonds will generally 
display a negative spread pattern trend, while investment grade bonds will exhibit a positive 
spread pattern. He also argued that noninvestment grade companies face a great deal of near-
term uncertainty in the ability to meet their obligations but having overcome such obstacles 
and survived without default, an issue may be upgraded. In other words he suggested that the 
risk of default is relatively low once a company survives the first few years, and thus, it 
should carry lower yield premia over the remaining time horizon. Fridson and Garman (1998) 
included term as a variable in their analysis and hypothesized that their results would support 
those of Fons (1994). On the other hand, Helwege and Turner (1999) found that speculative 
grade bonds typically have upward-sloping credit yield curves. Due to the high cyclical and 
volatile nature of the shipping industry we could not assume that shipping companies become 
less risky after surviving in the debt market for the first few years. As a result, we will let the 
results of our model to specify the relationship between the term to maturity and yield premia 
on shipping high yield bonds. 
Prevailing freight rates directly affect the company's profitability. Low earnings 
mean that the shipping company may not be able to meet its debt obligations17 and, thus, its 
default risk increases. According to Zhou (200 I) default risk depends on the business cycle. 
When the economy enters a financial downturn period, bond issuers may face significant 
problems in generating enough cash flow to pay back interest and principal amounts. Thus, 
default risk increases and investor's perception of risk also changes, which is reflected by the 
higher risk premia required. Stopford (2009) links business cycle with freight rates. He 
suggests that "the business cycle lays the foundation for freight cycles. Fluctuations in the rate 
of economic growth work through into seaborne trade, creating a cyclical pattern of demand 
for ships,,18. Here the ClarkSea Index19 is employed as an indicator of the direction of 
17 Coupon repayments, other capital costs, operating costs, voyage costs etc. 
18 For instance, the two recessions in sea trade in 1975 and 1982-85 coincided with the recession in the 
world economy. 
19 ClarkSea Index is a weighted average of earnings for all the main commercial vessel types. The 
weighting is based on the number of vessels in each fleet sector (oil tankers, dry bulk carriers, gas 
carriers, and containerships). Clarkson Research collects rates direct from the Clarksons brokers on a 
daily and weekly basis and these are used to calculate the earnings that go to make up the ClarkSea 
Index. Operating costs are not included in the construction of the index because the charterer would not 
normally, pay for these. The earnings calculations that make up the index are consistent as commission, 
operating costs, and waiting time have never been included, and are only intended to be indicators of 
the direction of earnings and not the earnings on any actual vessel. (Clarkson Research Studies -
October 2002). 
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earnings in the shipping industry and we hypothesize that higher risk premia are associated 
with lower earnings, reflecting the deteriorating state of the shipping industry and the higher 
default risk involved. 
Laid up tonnage is a variable specific to the shipping industry. As noted by Stopford 
(2000), "Changes in freight rates may trigger a change in the performance of the fleet, 
through adjustments to speed and lay-up." When the freight rates are low and the shipping 
market is in depression then laid-up tonnage is high because market conditions make 
operation of vessels uneconomical - as the costs20 for the shipping company are high - and 
vice versa. 
The decision of shipowners to lay-up their vessels does not depend solely on the level 
of freights rates. If shipowners are able to cover the vessel's operating expenses and part of 
any debt obligations they have on that vessel, then they may still operate it (provided that the 
lending institution has accepted this scheme). Thus, they will normally lay-up their vessels 
when they cannot meet their operating expenses on the specific vessel. Grammenos and 
Arkoulis (2002) found a negative relationship between laid-up tonnage and shipping stock 
returns, and they attributed this to the fact that the increased laid-up tonnage is an indicator of 
a worsening shipping market. Zannetos (1996) has shown that the lower the freight rates, the 
greater the laid up tonnage (tanker vessels) will be. Laid-up tonnage is incorporated in our 
analysis as an indicator of the state of the shipping market and we also include a one month 
lag21 in order to capture the time delay of freight rate changes to be reflected in the laid up 
tonnage. 
In our analysis, we tested whether the size of the company does play a role in 
determining the credit spread. For the listed companies, we employed their market va1ue22 as 
a proxy of their size. On the other hand, for the unlisted companies, we could not perform any 
20 Oil prices - among other factors - are also related to the costs of a shipping company. They are of 
particular importance to the shipping industry as they affect the world economic growth and hence the 
supply and demand for seaborne trade (e.g. oil crises - 1973 and 1979). Fuel represents the 
most important factor of voyage costs, thus when oil prices rise then costs rise and profitability of the 
shipping company may shrink. Grarnmenos and Arkoulis (2002) have found a negative relationship 
between oil prices and shipping stock returns. However, we did not employ oil prices in our analysis 
and the reason is that they are already taken into account when calculating earnings in the construction 
of the ClarkSea Index. 
21 We have tried more than one month lags but we did not get any satisfactory results. 
22 Market value, or in other words, market capitalisation is defined as the company's number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the share price. _____ _ 
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test on size, as an explanatory variable, due to the lack of data. In order to measure the size of 
the unlisted companies we needed the total value of their vessels, a set of data which could 
not be collected for every single unlisted company on a monthly basis. Nevertheless, for the 
listed companies group, according to Van den End and Tabbat (2005) the default risk of a 
company increases when its market value decreases which, consequently, implies higher 
credit spread for its bond(s). Thus, we expect a negative relationship between credit spreads 
and the market value of a company. 
The month-to-month change in the yield of the ten-year Treasuries is used in order to 
calculate the change in interest rates as a possible explanatory variable. Various studies have 
employed interest rate changes as a variable in analyzing yield spreads and found a negative 
correlation between changes in the yield of the ten-year Treasuries and changes in the spread 
[Fridson and Kenney (1994); Longstaff and Schwartz (1995); Duffee (1998); Fridson and 
Garman (1998); and Garman (2000)]. The reasoning behind this is that in the short-term the 
spread between the two asset classes (10 year high yield bond and 10 year Treasury bond) 
compresses when the Treasury rates rise and expands when these rates fall; therefore yields 
on corporate bonds do not immediately respond to changes in government bond yields. In the 
view of these findings a negative relation between the spread of shipping high yield bonds 
and the monthly yield change in Treasuries is anticipated. 
Inflation can affect the world economy, the international trade and, consequently, the 
profitability of shipping companies. In other words, it is a source of risk. Ferson and Harvey 
(1994) include inflation in their study and they suggest that higher inflation may signal higher 
levels of economic uncertainty. Eckhold (1998) and Tarditti (1996) have found a positive 
relationship between inflationary uncertainty and bond yields. Garman and Fridson (1998) 
suggested that the net impact of escalating inflation is higher risk premia. In addition, Gruen 
(1995) found that inflation is a key determinant of nominal bond yields and there is a positive 
relationship between the two. In line with these findings, a positive relationship between 
escalating inflation and spreads of shipping high yield bonds is anticipated. 
Yield premia of individual bonds may be sensitive not only to changes in the yield of 
noninvestment grade bond market as a whole, but also to changes in the yield of the particular 
rating categories to which they belong. The vast majority of shipping high yield bonds is laid 
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out mainly into two rating tiers, double-B and single-B. As we can see from figure 3-2, the 
shipping bond index spread and the yield on double-B and single-B corporate indices move 
rather identically over time. Thus, we hypothesize that the yield on double-B and single-B 
indices may have a positive explanatory power on shipping high yield bond issues23 • 
Figure 3-2: Shipping High Yield Bond Index (Spread) vs Double-B and Single-B Indices (Yield) 
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3.5) Empirical Results 
The results for the panel regression model are shown in table 3-6. For the whole 
sample, our fixed effects model explains approximately 78 percent of the credit spreads 
variance. The significant variables are: credit rating, term-to-maturity, changes in the IO-year 
Treasury Bonds yield, changes in earnings, and the yield on the Merrill Lynch single-B index. 
Ofthese, Credit rating, changes in earnings, and the yield on the single-B index all display the 
expected signs as discussed previously in the text. 
On the other hand, changes in the yield on IO-year treasury bonds appear to be 
significant and have a positive relationship with the yield premia of shipping high yield 
bonds. As mentioned earlier, in the short-term, yield premia on corporate bonds should not 
reflect changes on Treasury bonds. In the case of shipping high yield bonds it can be seen that 
there is a positive relationship with changes in the yield on treasury bonds and it seems that 
23 We do not include Double-B index in our model due to multicollinearity problems. 
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yield premia reflect those changes in a very short time, as in our model there is one month lag 
in the variable. 
Table 3-6: Fixed Effect S~ecification Model 
Yi/ = f3li + X/ci/f3k + Gi/' i = 1,2,K ,N and t = 1,2,K ,T 
Sam~le Period 
A~ril1998 - December 2002 
Variables All Listed Unlisted Defaulted 
Non-defaulted 
Com~anies Com~anies Com~anies Com~anies Com~anies 
C 4.243*** 6.321 u* 2.626*** 4.038*** 4.387*** 
(0.239) (0.406) (0.346) (0.772) (0.258) 
RATt -0.285*** -0.448*** -0.352*** -0.187*** -0.158*u 
(0.039) (0.140) (0.041) (0.046) (0.056) 
TRMt 
-1.251 *** -1.593*** -0.513*** -1.501 *u -1.305*** 
(0.077) (0.133) (0.110) (0.252) (0.087) 
MUTt_l 0.263 -0.123 -0.031 -0.832 0.432 
(0.317) (0.438) (0.402) (0.665) (0.360) 
fJ.CPlt_1 
-0.137 3.853 8.238 55.80*** -10.76 
(9.714) (14.91 ) (11.42) (21.69) (11.71) 
M t- 1 0.482*** 0.222 0.774*** 1.345*** 0.251 ** 
(0.121) (0.194) (0.139) (0.219) (0.130) 
fJ.EARNt_1 
-2.542*** -3.908*** -1.544** 0.217 -3.108*u 
(0.566) (0.793) (0.687) (1.353) (0.619) 
MLBlt_1 1.318*** 1.357*** 1.609*** 2.157*u 1.095*** 
(0.118) (0.171 ) (0.161) (0.343) (0.122) 
MVt-l -0.279*** 
(0.040) 
Total Panel 1,339 526 813 302 1037 Observations 
Rl 0.782 0.811 0.767 0.670 0.735 
Adjusted - Rl 0.774 0.803 0.758 0.648 0.727 
F - statistic 101.1 103.5 80.61 30.23 
84.65 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
• Values in ( ) and [ ] are the standard errors and p-values respectively . 
• *, * *, * * * Indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level respectively . 
It was mentioned earlier that we will let our model to specify the relationship between 
yield premia and term-to-maturity. Table 3-6 suggests that the spread on shipping high yield 
bonds increases throughout time; our result is in contrast to Fons (1994) when he argued that 
the more a speculative company has been in the debt market the lower the yield premium 
should carry, but in line with the study of Helwege and Turner (1999). Thus, shipping 
companies illustrate higher yield premia throughout time and we attribute this phenomenon to 
the highly cyclical nature of the shipping industry. For instance, the bad shipping market 
conditions of 1998/99 led a number of shipping issues to default, and as a result, higher 
spreads might also be the outcome of a slow process of regaining the confidence of investors 
and credit rating agencies. 
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Another interesting result is the statistical significance of earnings. In our study we 
added earnings (alongside laid-up tonnage which was used as a variable in the study of 
Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) because we feel the shipping market is represented more 
accurately at any point of time, since the fluctuation in earnings manifest the volatility of the 
shipping market. It should be mentioned that in our model, the credit rating's statistical 
significance is dominant. Nevertheless, although investors take seriously into account credit 
ratings, the shipping market (which is represented by earnings) does play a role in 
determining the spread. That might be due to the following reasons: credit ratings are not 
normally adjusted immediately to reflect market changes and investors do look at the shipping 
market closely even though it is incorporated in the credit rating; or it shows the importance 
that investors base on the cash flow stability of the company and thus why they feel the need 
to monitor the shipping market constantly regardless its incorporation in credit ratings. As a 
result, investors assess the shipping market as well as taking into account the credit ratings 
when they decide to invest in shipping high yield bonds. At this point is should also be noted 
the difference between our paper and the paper of Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) regarding 
credit rating. As we mentioned above in our case the credit rating adjusts in order to reflect 
the quality of the issue (even though that might take a substantial amount of time since the 
fundamental change in the issue's quality and the overall shipping market) whereas in the 
study of Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) the credit rating is taken as given by investors at 
the time of issuance; in other words in our analysis we have a dynamic environment, whereas 
in the Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) analysis it was static. 
In short, our model suggests that shipping high yield bond's spread has a negative 
relationship with regard to credit rating, term-to-maturity, and earnings of the shipping 
market. On the other hand, it is positive related to the yield on the ten-year Treasuries and the 
Merrill Lynch single-B Index. 
In comparison to the Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) study, we can see that our 
results are in line with their findings as far as credit rating, and earnings (laid-up tonnage in 
their study, but both reflecting the status of the shipping market) are concerned. Both these 
factors appear to have statistical significance in explaining the dynamics of yield premia after 
issuing and throughout the time. 
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In order to investigate the magnitude and signs of the significant explanatory 
variables of our model, we categorised the whole sample into listed, unlisted, defaulted, and 
non-defaulted companies. In that way, we can also investigate whether the market value, as a 
variable, plays any significant role in explaining the dynamics of yield premia for bond issues 
offered by publicly listed companies. 
The sample for the listed companies contains fourteen issues offered by seven 
companies and the model includes the same variables as before, with the addition of the 
market value for each company as a possible explanatory variable. Results from this 
estimation procedure are reported in table 3-6. The significant variables are the same as in the 
whole sample, with the exception of changes in the yield on the ten-year Treasuries and, with 
the addition of market value. All coefficients are significant at a confidence interval of 99 
percent and display the expected signs. The addition of market value as a significant 
explanatory variable may signal that larger companies - in terms of market capitalisation -
are considered to be less risky by the investors and thus, they carry lower credit spreads on 
their high yield bond issues. 
The same fixed effects model was run (with the exclusion of market value variable) 
for the unlisted, defaulted and non-defaulted, companies; results can be found in table 3-6. 
The significant variables show the expected signs in all cases, and the prevailing factors in all 
three categories are: credit rating, term-to-maturity, changes in the 10-year Treasury bonds, 
changes in earnings, and the yield on the Merrill Lynch single-B index. 
3.6) Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated factors that may explain the dynamics of yield 
premia on seasoned shipping high yield bonds. Our results suggest that shipping high yield 
bonds' yield premia will be larger - all other things being equal- the lower the credit rating 
and the lower the earnings in the shipping market; moreover, the yield premia will also be 
wider throughout the passage of time until maturity and thus, we have found a negative 
relationship with term-to-maturity. Finally, changes in the yield of lO-year Tresury bonds and 
the yield on the Merrill Lynch single-B index appear to positively affect the yield premia on 
seasoned shipping high yield bonds. Our model appears to be valid even when we categorised 
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the whole sample into listed, unlisted, defaulted and non-defaulted, companies; whereas for 
the listed companies, their size - as measured by their market capitalisation - does play a 
significant role in explaining the yield premia of their seasoned high yield bond issues. 
Our results have implications for active management strategies; in particular, bond 
portfolio managers who allocate their holdings by industries/sectors and need to know which 
factors affect the dynamics of yield premia in the different industries/sectors. In addition, our 
results may have implications for shipping companies in the following ways: shipping 
companies are interested in yield premia as they have an impact on the company's image and 
thus, its future financing decision for further issuance of high yield bonds - they are an 
indication of possible cost level in order to enter the shipping high yield bond market - or 
their possible stepping to the equity capital market. 
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Chapter 4. Estimating the Probability of Default for Shipping 
High Yield Bond Issues 
Published in 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review (2008), 44, 1123-1138 
4.1) Introduction 
There can be little doubt that an increasing number of shipping companies are 
regarding the capital markets as an integral part of their comprehensive strategy for 
optimizing financial management through a combination of traditional bank lending, private 
placements and public issues of debt and equity. Additionally, it has been noticed that 
operational flexibility and efficiency are achieved: by increasing the size of shipping 
companies through purchasing secondhand, or ordering, new vessels; by mergers and 
acquisitions; by the formation of shipping pools. The first and second methods may imply an 
increased need for capital by the shipping industry - which is also intensified by the 
replacement requirement of older vessels. 
One method for raising capital - as mentioned above - is by tapping the high yield 
bond market. The first high yield bond offered by a shipping company took place in 1992 
when Sea Containers Ltd. issued $125 million of subordinated debentures; since then, more 
than 60 issues have taken place and raised more than $10 billion. Shipping is an industry 
characterized as being highly cyclical, volatile, capital intensive and often highly geared. This 
might constitute a problem for companies when they have to make interest and capital 
repayments in a recessed shipping market as they may not have sufficient cash flows to meet 
their obligations. This problem may also be enhanced when the shipping companies operate 
their fleet in the spot market rather than in the time-charter market l . For instance, a number of 
shipping companies - operating their fleet mainly in the spot market - entered the US high 
yield bond market in 1997/8 and found themselves unable to meet their debt obligations after 
the 1999 recession in the shipping market. 
1 The freight market - which is the marketplace in which sea transport is bought and sold - has two 
different types of transactions, the freight contract (spot) in which the shipper buys transport from the 
shipowner at a fixed price per ton of cargo and the time-charter under which the ship is hired by the 
day for a period of time (Stopford, 2009). 
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However, more recently we have seen an increased interest of shipping companies in 
the high yield bond market; during 2003-2005, sixteen new high yield bond issues were 
offered by shipping companies2• This, coupled with the capital intensity feature of the 
shipping industry and the high number of defaults which mainly occurred in 1999, was the 
main motivation for the creation of this paper. In addition, the importance of industry 
classification is another significant factor. Fridson and Garman, (1998) argued that when 
studying the pricing of new high yield bonds, it would be better to categorise the bonds by 
industry in order to avoid biased results; a useful argument as a number of bond portfolio 
managers allocate their holdings by industries/sectors. As a result, we hypothesize that 
shipping high yield bonds should be studied as an industry due to its cyclical, volatile and 
capital intensity characteristics. 
Prior research has produced a number of models in predicting financial distress in 
corporations. Most of the previous studies predict financial distress by using financial data for 
a number of months or years prior to the default event and only one uses financial data at the 
time of issuance3; when the decision by the high yield bond investor to buy, or not, the 
financial instrument, is made4• This paper utilises the method of the Huffman and Ward 
(1996) study, and contributes to the existing ship finance literature in the following ways: 
firstly, and for the first time in the ship finance literature, the probability of default - at the 
time of issuances - for high yield bonds offered by shipping companies is predicted by 
employing a binary logit model; investors may benefit from this research since, by employing 
easily accessible and quantifiable factors, they can identify at the time of issuance a) which 
factors to look at in making investment decisions, and b) issues that might have a high 
likelihood to default; at the same time, shipowners who offer high yield bonds can also 
identify which factors are important in predicting the probability of default for their issues. 
2 Source: Bloomberg. 
3 Huffman and Ward (1996). 
4 Although there is a secondary market for high yield bonds, this is very thin, and that is why the 
bid/ask prices differ between different sources; consequently, predicting the likelihood of default at the 
time of issuance is of importance to investors. 
5 The reason we focused on the time of issuance is because the financial data for a number of shipping 
companies were not available prior to default; that was due to the fact that many of shipping high yield 
bond issues defaulted approximately a year or a year and a half after their issuance. 
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Secondly, this is attempted by not only using financial ratios employed in previous models, 
but with the addition of two industry specific variables and another financial ratio, not used 
previously. Finally, by employing a bootstrap technique, we run in-and-out-of-sample tests in 
order to validate the robustness of our model. 
The chapter is organised in the following manner: in the next section 4.2, the literature 
review and methodology is provided; in section 4.3, the data and variable definitions are 
discussed; in section 4.4, the results of the analysis, the predictive ability of the model, and 
the out-of-sample tests are reported; finally, section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
4.2) Literature Review and Methodology 
Bankruptcy and default on a debt instrument represent different phases of financial 
distress, and the literature on bankruptcy models can be explored in the search for a 
methodology to predict the likelihood of default for high yield bonds. Bankruptcy occurs 
when a company is declared insolvent and the assets are liquefied in order to repay its 
creditors. On the other hand, default is defined as the failure of the company to make timely 
payments of interest or principal to bondholders; furthermore, default occurs prior to 
bankruptcy and the former may not lead to the latter. In the case of default, issuers and 
investors, with the help of financial institutions have to formulate a restructuring mechanism 6• 
Studies on predicting financial distress can be categorised into those using financial 
ratios and into those using cash flow measures in their analysis. Since the ground breaking 
research of Beaver (1966) and Altman (1968), numerous studies have concentrated on the 
prediction of financial distress. Beaver (1966) identified 30 financial ratios that were expected 
to capture the probability of failure. By using a univariate discriminant analysis, the ratios 
with the best predictive ability were the working capital over total assets and the net income 
over total assets which correctly identified 90 percent and 88 percent of bankrupt and non-
bankrupt firms in his sample respectively. Altman's (1968) study was the first one to use 
6 Nonnally, restructuring mechanisms include: traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy, pre-packaged 
bankruptcy, and out-of-court restructuring; for a detailed analysis on the choice among the different 
restructuring methods see Yost (2002). 
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multivariate discriminant analysis in order to explain the interaction of financial ratios in 
predicting bankruptcy. His final model was made up of 5 financial ratios: working capital 
over total assets; retained earnings over total assets; earnings before interest and taxes over 
total assets; market value of equity over book value of debt; and sales over total assets. 
Ohlson's (1980) study used a logit model and tested whether various financial ratios and other 
factors were associated with bankruptcy. His study was concerned not only with the 
predictive ability of the model, but also the model's coefficient estimates. Overall, 4 variables 
were included in his model: total assets over GNP price-level index; total liabilities over total 
assets; some performance measure or combination of performance measures (net income over 
total assets and/or funds provided by operations over total liabilities); and some measure of 
current liquidity (working capital over total assets or working capital over total assets, and 
current assets over current liabilities jointly). Other studies that used the logit analysis 
approach include, Santomero and Vinso (1977), Martin (1977), and, Estrella et al. (1999), 
where they tried to estimate the probability of failure for banks and the banking system. 
Studies using accounting ratios to predict bankruptcy for corporate companies include Collins 
(1980), who also made a comparison between discriminant analysis and linear probability 
models, Platt and Platt (1990), Bernhardsen (2001) who used logit analysis, and Saretto 
(2004) who applied a simple piece-wise constant hazard model to study how corporate bond 
defaults can be predicted using financial ratios and how the forecasted probability of default 
relates to the cross-section of expected stock returns. Finally, by employing the logit model, 
Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2006) show that the company's size, current performance, 
leverage, liquidity, and the group/industry to which it belongs, have a significant impact on 
the probability of failure. 
Nearly two decades after Altman's (1968) study, a new approach based on cash flows 
emerged. Gentry et at. (1985a, 1985b) were among the first to employ such an approach by 
using logit analysis; whereas Casey and Bartczak (1984) by using multiple discriminant 
analysis (MDA) and logit analysis concluded that cash flow data was a poor predictor of 
financial distress. On the other hand, Gombola et at. (1987) found that cash flow ratios were 
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useful in explaining future business bankruptcies and their study was followed by Aziz, 
Emanuel, and Lawson (1989), who identified the usefulness of financial ratios in predicting 
bankruptcy. Flagg and Giroux (1991) examined whether bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms 
could be correctly classified when the sample consisted of only failing firms; their results 
suggested a successful model where two failure events and four financial ratios were 
combined. In addition, Shumway (2001) proposed a simple hazard model - for forecasting 
bankruptcy - that uses both accounting ratios and market driven variables. Finally, Charitou et 
al. (2004) employed both logit and neural networks models for predicting failure for UK 
industrial companies. Their results suggested that a cash flow, a profitability and a financial 
leverage variable, yielded an overall correct classification accuracy of 83 percent one year 
prior to the failure - with both models showing no superiority between each other in their 
predictive ability. 
In the literature on high yield bond defaults, the work of Altman and Nammacher 
(1985) focused on the incidence of default in the high yield bond market. They concluded that 
the average annual default rate is in the I to 3 percent range, whereas the average spread of 
yields between quality and high yield bonds fluctuates within 3 to 5 percent, which more than 
offsets the default risk implicit in high yield bonds. In another study, Altman (1989) used a 
mortality rate concept to measure default rates conditional on the age of the bond. He found 
that cumulative bond mortality increases with the age of the bond and can reach as much as 
32 percent for single-B rated bonds over a ten-year period. Similarly, Asquith et al. (1989) 
found that the longer a high yield bond is outstanding, the greater the likelihood of default. In 
addition, Rosengren (1993) provided evidence that rated and non-rated convertible high yield 
bonds have significantly lower default rates. Hakim and Shinko (1995) showed that a 
reduction in equity value increased variation in long-term debt levels, and that reductions in 
cash flows are found to be statistically significant indicators of higher default probabilities for 
high yield bonds. Finally, Huffman and Ward (1996) have established a logit model for the 
prediction of default for high yield bonds at the time of issuance, using variables that were 
employed in previous studies. 
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Following Altman's (1968) seminal study, a number of studies applied the Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) approaches to 
develop a Z-score bankruptcy model for different markets [for example Taffler (1984) and 
Grice and Ingram (2001)]. According to Altman and Narayanan (1997), the most popular 
techniques worldwide are still the multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) and logistic 
regression. However, one criticism of MDA is that it assumes multivariate normality and 
equal covariance matrices for both healthy and failed companies - two assumptions that do 
not always reflect the real world and especially the case of financial ratios data'. On the other 
hand, the logistic regression has the added advantage that it does not assume multivariate 
normality and equal covariance matrices as MDA doess. For instance, the Laitinen and 
Kankaanpaa (1999) study discussed six alternative methods to the MDA and logit models, 
which have been applied in the search for failure prediction models, and concluded that no 
superior method - compared to the MDA and logit models - was found with the variables 
they employed. In addition, Boritz et al. (1995) made a comparison between MDA, logit, 
probit and neural networks analyses and found no superior method. Furthermore, Charitou et 
al. (2004) compared the performances of neural networks and logit models and found that 
both are reliable alternatives for company failure prediction. Balcaen and Ooghe (2004) study 
gives a clear overview and discussion of the alternative modelling methods compared to the 
classical discriminant analysis and logit models. The study, based on an extensive analysis of 
a large number of empirical studies, concludes that "although the alternative methods are 
computationally more complex and more sophisticated than the classical cross-sectional 
statistical methods, it is not clear whether they produce better performing corporate failure 
prediction models". 
Taking into account the findings of the above studies; the study of Bamiv et al. (2002) 
where it is stated that logit analysis has been the most commonly used technique in the recent 
literature; and the fact that the goal of this study is to propose - for the first time in the 
7 Deakin (1976). 
8 McFadden (1984) and Lo (1987) have identified several statistical reasons for preferring logit 
analysis to linear and multivariate discriminant analysis. 
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shipping finance literature - a model predicting the probability of default for shipping high 
yield bonds, and not to built a model through technical improvements in order to compare it 
with previous ones (as there is no previous model for shipping high yield bonds default), we 
concluded that a standard binary classification technique, here the logit analysis, would be the 
most appropriate one. 
The logit technique creates a score for each firm by weighting the independent 
variables. We assumed that the variable y, E {O,l}is related to an index y: by a linear 
function of the explanatory variables X;PX;2' ••• 'X;! and the random term u; such that: 
y; = 1 ifthe company has defaulted 
y; = 0 if the company has not defaulted 
By this structure we have; 
where Fu ( ) is the cumulative distribution function of u. We assume that u is logistically 
distributed and thus: 
where X; (i=l ...• k) are the independent variables, and Po and Pi (i=l •.. ,k) are the estimated 
parameters. 
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4.3) Description of Data and their Properties 
The data sample consists of 50 shipping high yield bonds issued in the period 1992 -
2004. Of these bonds, 13 had defaulted by the end of 2004, and the remaining 37 bonds were 
still trading assets or had expired. The financial9 and specific data for the companies were 
collected from the offering prospecti, whereas the industry specific variable for the shipping 
market was constructed using data collected from Clarksons' Shipping Intelligence Network. 
A number of variables were employed and tested in our analysis in order to best 
predict the probability of default of shipping high yield bonds at the time of issuance. These 
variables can be categorized into three groups: issue specific; financial specific; and industry 
specific. 
4.3.1) Issue Specific Variables 
The coupon (CP) is the amount the bondholder will receive as interest payments. 
Higher coupons mean higher interest payments to investors and, thus, we expect higher 
coupons to be associated with higher probabilities of default. 
We use each individual bond's maturity (MA1) (remaining months to maturity since 
issuance) as the measure of the bond's term. Non-investment companies that issue new high 
yield bonds face a great deal of near-term uncertainty in the ability to meet their debt 
obligations; having overcome such obstacles and survived without default of their issues , 
then the risk of default may be reduced. Nevertheless, due to the highly cyclical nature of the 
shipping industry, we cannot assume that shipping companies become less risky after 
surviving in the debt market for the first few years. As a result, we will let the findings of our 
model specify the relationship between the term to maturity and default probability of 
shipping high yield bonds. 
Credit Ratings (RA1) are meant to be an indication of the likelihood that a company 
will repay its debt on time. As such, ratings improve the flow of information between 
9 The financial data were extracted from the latest end-of-year income statements and balance sheets 
for the company at the time of the issue. 
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institutional lenders (investors) and borrowers (issuers) and they reduce the investor's costs 
of gathering, analyzing, and monitoring the financial positions of the borrowers. In our 
analysis we assign an integer variable for each of the Standard and Poor's rating scale. We 
allocate the value of 1 to high yield bonds with the lowest credit quality (C) up to 11 for 
bonds with the highest credit quality (BB+). We expect a bond issue with low credit rating to 
be more likely to default. 
4.3.2) Financial Specific Variables 
In assessing the significance of various financial data, managers engage in ratio 
analysis, i.e. the process of determining and evaluating financial ratios. The working capitallo 
over total assets ratio (WCnA) is a measure of the net liquid assets of the firm relative to the 
total assets. Normally, a firm with negative working capital is likely to experience problems 
meeting its short-term obligations because there are simply not enough current assets to cover 
them. As a result we would expect a higher probability of default to be related to lower values 
ofthis ratio. 
Current assets and liabilities are also an important part of the company's liquidity 
and, thus, we also employed the current ratio (current assets/current liabilities - CAlCL). 
When this ratio is below 1, the firm does not have enough current assets to meet its current 
liabilities and is, therefore, technically insolvent. In our analysis we expect a negative 
relationship between these two ratios and the probability of default. 
Cash over Freight Revenue (CASHlFR) is another liquidity ratio showing the 
company's most liquid assets in relation to its freight revenue (sales - in the P&L Account). 
A low value of this ratio would mean that the company is not keeping enough cash in relation 
to its freight revenue and this might constitute a problem in meeting future debt obligations. 
The Freight Revenue over Current Liabilities (FRlCL) measures the freight revenue 
generated by the company against current liabilities and is, therefore, seen as a conservative 
liquidity ratio. The formula is an indicator of the extent to which a company can pay current 
10 Working capital is defined as the difference between current assets and current liabilities. 
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liabilities without relying on the sale of its assets (vessels in the case of shipping companies) 
and without relying on the receipt of accounts receivables. A negative relationship is 
anticipated between these ratios and the likelihood of default. 
The Net Income over Freight Revenue (NUFR), or in other words the profit margin, 
is a measure of profitability. Profit margin is an indicator of a company's pricing policies and 
its ability to control costs and it can vary by industry but, all else being equal, the higher a 
company's profit margin compared to its competitors, the better. Another ratio similar to the 
profit margin is the Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation over 
Freight Revenue (EBITDAlFR) ratio which uses the profits before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortisation, rather .than the net profits. Thus, the expected sign for these 
two ratios is negative. 
The Net Income over Total Assets (NInA), the so called return on assets (ROA) 
ratio, is a measure of the company's asset intensity. Companies such as telecommunication 
providers, car manufacturers, railroads, and shipping are very asset-intensive, requiring large 
and expensive machinery, equipment or vessels, to operate and generate a profit. One of the 
most important profitability metrics is the Net Income over Shareholder's Equity ratio 
(return on equity - ROE). Generally, it reveals how much profit a company generates with 
the money its shareholders have invested. It is useful for comparing the profitability of a 
company to that of other firms in the same industry. The higher a company's return on equity 
and return on assets compared to its industry, the better. Consequently, the probability of 
default is expected to be negatively related with these ratios. 
A measure of cumulative profitability over time is given by the retained earnings 
over total assets ratio (REnA). Companies with a high retained earnings/total assets ratio 
suggest a history of profitability and the ability to stand up to a bad year of losses; thus, we 
expect a negative sign for this ratio. 
The Freight Revenue over Total Assets Ratio (Total Assets Turnover Ratio -
FRlTA) is meant to measure a company's efficiency in using its assets. The higher a 
company's asset turnover, the lower its profit margin tends to be, and vice versa. Similarly to 
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the total assets turnover, the Freight Revenue over Fixed Assets ratio (Fixed Assets 
Turnover -FRlFA) compares the total freight revenue with the fixed assets which the 
company has used to generate that freight revenue. The ratio measures the efficiency of 
capital investment and the higher it is, the better. Both ratios are expected to have a negative 
relationship with the probability of default. 
The Net Income over Interest Expenses ratio (Interest Coverage Ratio - NInE) is a 
measurement of the number of times a company could meet its interest payments by using 
only its earnings; the lower the ratio, the higher the company's debt burden. Thus, we should 
expect that lower interest cover ratios are associated with a higher probability of default. 
The Long Term Debt over Long Term Debt Plus Shareholder's Equity Ratio 
(Gearing Ratio - GEARll) shows at a glance how encumbered a company is with debt and is 
a measure of the company's ability to survive in income recession periods. A rising gearing 
will indicate an increasing reliance upon bank money or other forms of debt for vessel 
acquisitions, and this may create problems with paying interest and repaying capital if the 
market conditions deteriorate. Shipping companies with a high gearing ratio and problematic 
income generation, faced survival problems in the early 1980s, while others defaulted in their 
high yield debt obligations in 1998/9. However, during high income periods such as in the 
late 1980s and in 2003/4, highly geared companies substantially increased their revenues and 
expanded. Naturally, companies operating in the long term time-charter market may have no 
difficulties in paying out interest to the bondholders, while companies operating in the spot or 
in the short term time-charter markets may face severe difficulties in paying them interest, as 
happened in 1998/9. Grammenos and Arkoulis (2003) studied the initial pricing of shipping 
high yield bonds and emphasised the importance of gearing for high yield bonds offered by 
shipping companies. Thus, highly geared companies carry higher risk and, as a result, we 
should expect a positive relationship between the gearing ratio and the probability to default. 
II This ratio does not take into account the amount to be raised by the high yield bond issue offered by 
shipping companies, thus, it is a pre-issue gearing ratio. 
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The amount raised over total assets (ARlTA) ratio is also used and shows how big 
the issue is in relation to the size of the company. Rational investors should be cautious with 
companies entering the high yield bond market to raise large amounts in relation to their size. 
In our analysis, we hypothesize that a large value of this ratio is related to higher probabilities 
of default. 
4.3.3) Industry Specific Variables 
In order to capture the state of the shipping market at the time of each high yield bond 
issue we constructed the following industry specific variable. 
By using the time-charter rates12 for each sector of the shipping market (tanker, dry 
bulk, gas, chemical, offshore and liner) we constructed normalised indices in order to capture 
the shipping market conditions prevailing at the time of the issuel3 • The base period year for 
the indices was set to January 1987, in order to enables us to calculate 3 and 5 year moving 
averages prior to the first issue of a shipping high yield bond. The reason for constructing 
indices for each sector is that shipping companies entering the high yield bond market are 
divided into Tanker, Dry Bulk, Gas, Chemical, Offshore, Liner or a combination ofthesel4 ; in 
this way, we have indices that are representative of the market conditions in the sectors in 
which each company is operating. In our analysis, we compare the returns of the indices at the 
time of issuance with the last 3-year moving average, in order to evaluate the state of the 
shipping market at the time of issuance relative to the previous years market conditions. If the 
returns are above the 3-year moving average then the market conditions have improved 
compared to the immediate past; as a result, the shipping market is favourable when the issue 
12 With the exception of the Chemical Tankers Sector, where we used the spot rates - as such data as 
time-charter rates do not exist for the sector. 
\3 The indices are weighted according to the deadweight of each segment in the sector relative to the 
total deadweight of the sector. For example, in the tanker sector we construct normalised indices for 
each segment (VLCC, Suezmax, Aframax, Panamax, Handysize) by using time-charter rates; then, in 
order to construct the overall tanker index, we calculate the monthly rebalancing weights for each 
segment according to their deadweight in relation to the total deadweight of the tanker sector. 
14 In the case where we have a diversified company, for reasons of simplicity and due to the fact that it 
was difficult to find the exact types of vessels each company operated at the time of issuance, we gave 
equal weights to the indices. For example, if a company was operating in the tanker and dry bulk 
sectors, then the shipping index for this company is constructed by equally weighting the Tanker and 
Dry Bulk indices respectively. 
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takes place IS • Consequently, we expect a negative relationship between this variable (SHIP) 
and the likelihood of default. 
4.4) Empirical Results 
Descriptive statistics for the variables employed in our analysis are presented in table 
4-1, panel A and B respectively; panel A also presents the t-statistics of testing the null 
hypothesis that the mean values of the variables for both defaulted and non-defaulted issues 
are the same. This test provides a rough indication of the possible explanatory variables for 
our model. The variables that have significantly different means include all the liquidity 
ratios, the coupon, the credit rating of the issue, the gearing of the company, the amount 
raised-over-total assets ratio and, finally, the shipping variable, SHIP. More specifically, at 
the time of issuance, the issuers of defaulted shipping high yield bonds compared to those that 
did not default, are characterised as having: lower credit rating, lower working capital over 
total assets; lower retained earnings over total assets; lower current ratio; lower cash over 
current liabilities; and a lower value of SHIP. On the other hand they have higher coupons, 
higher gearing level, and a higher ratio of amount raised over total assets. 
The results reported in table 4-1 - panel B show that most of the new shipping high 
yield bonds were assigned a credit rating of double-B, with fewer a credit rating of single-B. 
Moreover, 8.82 percent of the double-B rated bonds (BB+, BB, and BB- ratings) in the 
sample defaulted, compared to 53.30 percent of single-B rated bonds (B+, B, and B- ratings). 
Thus, choosing only the higher rated bonds in a shipping high yield bond portfolio may 
ensure that the probability of default is reduced 16 • 
15 In our analysis we also tried the 5 year moving average; this did not affect the results presented in the 
paper. 
16 In our analysis, we also grouped credit rating in three categories, namely, BB, B, and CCC+. The 
reason for doing such an analysis was to check whether there was any difference in our final results by 
the treating credit rating scale as non-linear; nevertheless, no difference was detected. After all, credit 
rating agencies have the signs of (+) and (-) in order to better capture the different quality of each issue 
Moreover, previous literature has treated credit ratings in the same manner [Fridson and Garman 
(1998), Laitinen (1999)]. 
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-Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics for Shipping High Yield Bonds (Panel A) 
-
All Issues (50) Defaulted Issues (13) Non-Defaulted Issues (37) 
Standard Standard 
Standard t-Variable Mean Deviation Mean Deviation Mean Deviatio Statistic(a) n 
-Juue S2ecific 
Amount Raised - (AR) ($Million) 152,000,000 86,448,079 142,338,462 55,196,521 155,022,075 95,464,183 0.578 
Coupon - (CP) (%) 0.10001 0.01507 0.10712 0.01136 0.09750 0.01554 -2.370· 
Maturity - (MAT) (Months) 114.76 25.8374 104.307 23.1782 118.432 26.0048 1.829 
_Rating - (RAT) (C=J, ... BB+=JJ) 8.680 1.26877 7.53846 1.33012 9.08108 0.98258 3.830· 
_ Uguidity Ratios 
Working Capital/Total Assets 0.00665 0.12746 -0.09019 0.10757 0.04069 0.11697 3.687· (We/TA) 
Current Ratio - (CA/CL) 1.51566 2.03115 0.62857 0.55739 1.82735 2.26446 2.973· 
Cash / Freight Revenue -
0.16751 0.22692 0.09182 0.09299 0.19411 0.25379 2.010· 
, 
(CASH/FR) 
Sash Ratio - (CASH/CLl 0.62727 0.89866 0.21408 0.21176 0.77245 1.00049 3.197· 
.!rofitability Ratios 
Profit Margin - (NI/FR) 0.08496 0.11685 0.10669 0.18300 0.07733 0.08481 -0.557 , 
EBITDA / Freight Revenue -! 0.34176 0.17060 0.37542 0.20207 0.32994 0.15954 -0.734 ~ (EBITDA/FR) 
, 
Return on Assets - (NIITA) 0.03377 0.04550 0.04048 0.06953 0.03142 0.03443 ·0.451 f 
Return on Equity - (NIISE) 0.03374 0.43622 0.14405 0.33327 ·0.00501 0.46481 ·1.242 
Retained Earnings / Total Assets 0.21134 0.29535 0.07150 0.10686 0.26048 0.32463 3.095· J.R£lTA2 
~ctivity Ratios 
Total Assets Turnover - (FRlTA) 0.45626 0.27612 0.43297 0.29923 0.46445 0.27142 0.334 
£.ixed Assets Turnover - (FRlFA2 0.57399 0.40614 0.51022 0.42174 0.59640 0.40403 0.640 
Debt Ratios 
-
i' Interest Cover - (NIl/E) 1.81067 3.12454 1.87508 3.59731 1.78805 2.99544 -0.078 ~earing - (GEAR) 0.570080 0.970096 0.70236 0.13159 0.53201 0.21037 -3.388· 
_Other Ratios 
Amount Raised / Total Assets 0.54870 0.62898 \.30228 0.62931 0.28396 0.35972 ·3.505· (ARrA) 
!etums of Shipping Index (SHIP) 0.089551 0.326821 -0.04168 0.02267 0.13566 036988 2.900· 
-lable 4-1- Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Shipping High Yield Bonds Ratings 
-
All Issues (50) Defaulted Issues (12) Non-Defaulted Issues (38) 
-
Number Number 0/0 of GrouE Number 0/0 of GrouE 
BB+ 4 0 0·" 4 100·" 
BB 5 1 10-;. 4 so-/_ 
BB. 15 2 s-;_ 13 92-/_ 
Total BBs 34 3 8.82% 31 91.18% 
Bt 6 3 50.00·" 3 SO.OO·/_ 
B 8 5 61.50*/. 3 37.SO-/. 
B. 1 1 100·/. 0 0·/. 
Total Bs 15 9 53.30% 6 46.70% 
CCC+ 1 1 l008f. 0 0·/. 
~ Issues in Sample 50 13 24-/. 37 768f. 
(a) t-statistic testing the mean difference between defaulted and non-defaulted issues; *indicates means are significantly different at 
the S% level. 
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In search ofthe best model to predict the probability of default for shipping high yield 
bond issues we used the stepwise method, which was also used in the studies of Charitou et 
al. (2004). Barniv et al. (2002), and Back et aI., (1996)17. This involves the following steps. 
Firstly, we identified the possible explanatory variables by running univariate logistic 
regressions, consisting of an intercept term and one possible explanatory variable. It should be 
stressed that statistically significant variables in the univariate model may not necessarily 
enter in the multivariate model. Next, we altered the model by adding or removing a variable 
in accordance to its p-value and the likelihood ratio test - making always sure that we did not 
enter variables that are highly correlated with the already existing variables in the model. 
Each selection step was followed by one or more entry/elimination steps, with variables 
already selected into the model not necessarily staying if proved insignificant. The selection 
process was terminated if no further variable could be added to the model, or if the variable 
lastly entered was the only one removed in the subsequent elimination step. 
One possible problem from the use of correlated variables is multicollinearity, which 
may result in biased results. Following the suggestion of Lewis-Beck ( 1980) - that correlation 
coefficients between the explanatory variables which are greater than 0.8 may indicate the 
presence of multicollinearity - we examined the bivariate correlations among the independent 
variables and in all cases correlation coefficients were less than 0.8. In addition, we also 
employed the tolerance statistic (Lewis-Beck, 1980) in order to check for multicollinearity 
between the independent variables included in the model. The tolerance statistic is defined as 
the percentage variance of each independent variable that is not explained by all the other 
independent variables in the model. For the independent variable XI the tolerance statistic 
equals 1- R~, ' where R~i is the R2 of a linear regression using variable XI as the dependent 
variable and all the remaining variables as independent variables. If the value of the statistic 
for a given independent variable is close to 0, that indicates that the infonnation the variable 
provides can be expressed as a linear combination of the other independent variables. As a 
17 It should be mentioned that one limitation of the studies in predicting corporate default is the lack of 
a sound theoretical framework to guide the selection of the best potential explanatory variables 
[Huffman and Ward (1996). and Charitou et al. (2004)]. 
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rule of thumb, only tolerance statistics lower than 0.2 are cause for concern. The tolerance 
statistics for each independent variable included in our model can be found in table 4-2. 
The results from the final estimated model are presented in table 4-2. Our final model 
includes a set of financial ratios and a market specific ratio; these are: the working capital 
over total assets ratio, the retained earnings over total assets ratio, the gearing ratio, the 
amount raised over total assets, and the index SHIP. 
Table 4-2: Logit Model for Predicting the Probability of Default for Shipping High Yield Bond 
Issues 
F(-p'x;)= 1_ = _ _ 1 ." 
1 +exp(P'xj) 1 + exPl-{a + p\Xjl + ... + PkXjk)] 
Constant WCffA REffA GEAR ARffA SHIP 
-15.693· -13.335· -9.262" 18.398· 3.955· -28.868· 
(5.111) (5.086) (4.023) (6.045) (1.084) (11.92) Coefficient 
Tolerance Statistic 













., •• indicates significance at the 99% and 95% confidence level respectively. 
values in ( ) and [ ] are standard errors and p-values respectively. 
LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope coefficients except the 
constant are zero. It is used to test the overall significance of the model and the 
number in parentheses is the degrees of freedom, which is the number of restrictions 
under test. 
H-L Statistic is the Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) test statistic; lower values and 
higher p-values indicate a good fit. 
Tolerance Statistic is the test for multicollinearity problems of Lewis-Beck (1980); as 
a rule of thumb, tolerance statistics lower than 0.2 indicate the presence of 
multicollinearity . 
The likelihood ratio statistic is significmt at the 5% confidence interval md, thus, the 
null hypothesis that the non-intercept coefficients are simultarIeously equal to zero is rejected. 
Furthermore, the McFadden R-square stmds at 0.829, indicating a good fit. Additionally, in 
order to evaluate how effectively the estimated model describes the dependent variable, the 
Hosmer md Lemeshow (1989) goodness-of-fit is also applied; lower values of the H-L 
statistic and higher p-values indicate a good fit to the data and, therefore, a good overall 
model fit. The H-L statistic and p-value of 1.94 md 0.98, respectively, confirm the goodness-
of-fit of the estimated model. Each slope coefficient in the model is the partial slope 
coefficient, md measures the chmge in the estimated logit model for a unit chmge in the 
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value of the given regressor. In summary, our model suggests that there is a positive 
relationship between the probability of default and both gearing, and the amount raised over 
total assets ratio; on the other hand, the working capital over total assets ratio, the retained 
earnings over total assets ratio, and SHIP, are negatively related to the probability of default. 
Finally, we should also mention that the working capital over total assets and retained 
earnings over total assets ratios are two of the main significant ratios in Altman's (1968) Z-
score model. 
In order to see how the probability of default responds to changes in the explanatory 
variables, we transform the estimates of our model into yield estimates ofthe marginal effects 
- that is, the change in predicted probability associated with changes in the explanatory 
variables. The marginal effects are nonlinear functions of the parameters' estimates and the 
levels of the explanatory variables (Anderson and Newell, 2003). For instance, the marginal 
effect of Xj on the default probability is given by: cJE(y;\Xpp) = j(- X;p)pj , where 8Xij 
j{X) = dF{x)/ dx is the density function corresponding to F. The direction of the effect of a 
change in Xj depends only on the sign of the Pj coefficient. The following graphs illustrate 
the marginal effects on the probability of default. 
The marginal effect of working capital over total assets is illustrated in figure 4-1. It 
can be observed that changes of this ratio have a negative effect upon the probability of 
default. When the ratio is positive, the marginal effect is close to zero. We notice, though, that 
when a company's working capital over total assets ratio is initially at -30 percent and 
subsequently rises to 0 percent, then the probability that this company will default decreases 
by almost 10 percent. Consequently, it is clear from figure 1 that the marginal effects on the 
probability of default are greater when changes occur at negative levels of this ratio. Looking 
at table 4-1, we can observe that the average working capital over total assets ratio for the 
defaulted and non-defaulted companies was around -9 and 4 percent respectively. Thus, there 
is no doubt that companies with lower working capital over total assets ratio prior to the issue 
have a higher likelihood to default compared to the non-defaulted ones. 
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Turning next to the graph for the retained earnings over total assets ratio, in figure 4-
2, we can see that changes in this ratio seem to have a greater impact on the probability to 
default when they occur between the range of -10 and 20 percent. For instance, when the ratio 
increases from -10 percent to 20 percent, the probability of default decreases by almost 4 
percent. Thus, positive changes in the ratio have an inverse effect on the probability. 
Nevertheless, even though the marginal effect of this ratio on the probability of default is 
small in magnitude, it plays an important role in explaining the probability of default; by 
looking at table 4-1 we can observe that defaulted companies had an average ratio of 7 
percent, whereas non-defaulted companies had an average ratio of 26 percent. 
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Figure 4-3 shows the marginal effects of gearing ratio on the default probability. It 
can be observed that a change in the ratio from 0.6 to 0.8 increases the default probability by 
almost 10 percent. For changes occurring in values lower than 0.6 the marginal effect is zero. 
In our analysis and as table 4-1 indicates, defaulted and non-defaulted companies had an 
average gearing ratio of 0.7 and 0.53, respectively. 
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Figure 4-3: Marginal Effect of Gearing on Default Probability 
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Figure 4-4 illustrates the marginal effects of the amount raised over total assets on the 
likelihood to default. It can be observed that, when the company's high yield bond issue does 
not exceed its total assets by more than 80 percent, then changes in this ratio do not have a 
great impact on altering the probability of that company to default. When the ratio is greater 
than 80 percent, the marginal effect is larger. For instance, an increase in the ratio from 80 to 
180 percent increases the probability to default by almost 20 percent. As a result, it is obvious 
that this ratio has an impact on the probability of default when shipping companies raise an 
amount - through their high yield bond issue - that exceeds their total assets by more than 80 
percent. Table 4-1 confirms this, as the ratio of the amount raised over total assets for the 
defaulted and non-defaulted companies is 130 and 28 percent, respectively. 
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Figure 4-4: Marginal Effect of Amount Raisedffotal Assets on Default Probability 
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Finally, figure 4-5 illustrates the marginal effect of the variable SHIP on the default 
probability; SHIP reflects the market conditions at the time of the issue compared to the past 
3 year moving average. We can notice that a change in this variable from -15 percent to 0 
percent decreases the probability of default by almost 40 percent. Thus, as expected, there is a 
negative relationship between this variable and the probability of default. In other words, 
when an issue takes place at a period where the shipping market is performing better than in 
the last three years, then, the probability of default is also reduced. The fact that the marginal 
effect of this ratio on the probability of default is zero - when changes occur in the positive 
territory - can also be confirmed from table 4-1, where we can observe that, for the defaulted 
and non-defaulted companies, this variable was -4 and 13.5 percent, respectively. 
Chapter 4 - Page 83 



























-- --~ -------t 
I 
I I 
I I I I I I I 
____ ~ ______ L _____ ~ ______ L _____ ~ ______ L ______ ~ _____ _ 
I I I : I I ' 















I I I 
0.2 
0.0+-_-1-_-+_---+_~1___+_-...... -..,..-_+_-_+-~ 
-.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 
SHIP 
.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 
The model's ability to predict the probability of default is examined next. The overall 
prediction rates of the model are not meaningful without taking into consideration the Type I 
and Type II errors (Zavgren, 1983). A Type I error occurs when the model predicts that a 
bond will not default when it actually does. A Type II error occurs when the model predicts 
that a bond will default when it does not. Table 4-3 depicts the actual number and percent of 
issues correctly classified and misclassified by our model given a specified cut-off probability 
- here set to 0.4918 • In the overall sample, our model correctly predicts 36 out of the 37 issues 
(97.30%) that have not defaulted, and 12 out of 13 issues (92.31%) that have defaulted. 
18 Instead of relying on a simple a priori cut-off probability of 0.5, we calculate the optimal cut-off 
probability according to PaJepu (1986). The condition that will allow us to determine the optimal cut-
f.. (PI; = defaulted) 
off probability is the following: '"I' ) ~ 1 f2 \p I = non - defaulted 
where f.. ( ) is the distribution of defaulted issues and 12 ( ) is the corresponding distribution for 
non-defaulted issues. To determine the optimal cut-off probability we first estimate the conditional 
probability density functions of f.. ( ) and f2 ( ) by plotting the distribution of the estimated 
probabilities for the defaulted and non-defaulted issues that are used to estimate the model parameters. 
The optimal cut-offprobability is the value where the two plots intersect. 
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Overall, the estimated model correctly predicts 96 percent of the observations and the Type II 
error is 2.70 percent, whereas the Type I error is 7.69 percent19 • 
Table 4-3: Prediction Table of Models 
Number Number 
Correct % Correct Incorrect TJP..e 1/ TJP..e II Error % 
Defaulted Issues 12 92.31 1 7.69 (Type I) 
Non-Defaulted Issues 36 97.30 1 2.70 (Type II) 
Total 48 96.00 2 
Although our model predicts correctly more than 90 percent of the defaulted and non-
defaulted issues, one criticism may be the fact that the total number of observations in our 
sample is small. In order to test the robustness of our model further, we ran additional in- and-
out of-sample tests using simulation techniques2o • Our approach was as follows: from the 
overall sample of 50 observations, we randomly selected 45 issues and estimated the logit 
model described in the previous section for these issues only; this sample of 45 issues forms 
the basis for the simulated in-sample results. The remaining 5 observations are then used to 
assess how well the model performs on an out-of-sample basis. This process is then repeated 
5,000 times, selecting a different random sample of 45 companies each time. 
Table 4-4 - panel A presents the empirical confidence intervals for the coefficients of 
the in-sample model. As we can observe, the values of the original model, in table 4-2, lie in 
the 95 percent confidence interval given by the in-sample model and are very close to the 
median of the empirical estimates. In addition, in all cases the estimated coefficients are 
significantly different from zero. Table 4-4 - panel B indicates that the in-sample model - on 
average - can correctly predict 92.29 percent of the defaulted issues and 98.07 percent of the 
non-defaulted issues. In addition, the in-sample model correctly predicts 96.57 percent of the 
overall observations and the Type I and Type II errors are low at 7.67 percent and 1.93 
19 Our model was also compared to a model including only credit rating as an explanatory variable. The 
reason behind this comparison was the following: credit ratings are supposed to have taken into 
account the different financial ratios of the company when assigning their rating; as a result, we wanted 
to check whether our model was better in predicting default compared to the one where only credit 
rating is used. The comparison showed that our model outperformed the credit rating based model. 
20 Bootstrap technique has been used previously in failure prediction studies in order to validate the 
results oftheir models [Charitou et al. (2004), Barniv et al. (2002), Huffman and Ward (1996), Boritz 
et al. (1995), Platt and Platt (1990)]. 
Chapter 4 - Page 85 
percent, respectively. Turning next to the out-of-sample tests, we can see that the model can 
correctly forecast - on average - 74.64 percent of the defaulted issues and 92.34 percent of 
the non-defaulted issues. Furthermore, the overall prediction stands at 87.83 percent. On the 
whole, the results further indicate the robustness of our original model in predicting the 
default of shipping high yield bonds. 
Table 4-4: In-Sample Logit Model for Predicting the Probability of Default for Shipping High Yield Bond 
Issues (Panel A) (45 Randomly Selected issues - 95 % Confidence Interval) 






















Table 4 - Panel B: Percent Correctl;r Classified in the In and out-of Sam2le Model - Average Values 
Defjlulted Issues Non-DeLaulted Issues 
TypeJ Type 11 Total 
Number % Number Error Number % Number Error % 
Correct Correct Incorrect % Correct Correct Incorrect % Correct 
In-Sample 10.83 92.29 0.90 7.67 32.63 98.07 0.64 1.93 96.57 
Out-of-
Sam21e 0.94 74.64 0.32 3.44 92.34 0.29 
• The Type I and Type II errors in the out-of-sample model are omitted as they cannot be estimated 
reliably due to the small sample size (5 issues). 
4.5) Conclusions 
87.83 
In this paper we examined how shipping high yield bond defaults can be predicted at 
the time of the issue by using a combination of financial ratios and industry specific variables. 
The key financial variables that are associated with the probability of default are: the gearing 
ratio, the amount raised over total assets ratio, the working capital over total assets ratio, the 
retained earnings over total assets ratio and an industry specific variable that captures the 
shipping market conditions at the time of issuance. 
The estimation results of the logit model indicate that higher gearing levels are 
associated with higher probabilities of default and that changes in the ratio - when these occur 
at levels above 65 percent - are positively related to the probability of default. Similarly, 
when companies raise an amount that exceeds their total assets by 80 percent or more, then 
the probability of default will also be high. On the other hand, the variable capturing the 
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shipping market conditions is negatively related to the default probability of a company that 
issues high yield bonds; additionally, the working capital over total assets ratio, and the 
retained earnings over total assets ratio are also negatively related to the probability of 
default. 
Our results have implications for both investors and shipowners. By employing easily 
accessible and quantifiable variables at the time of issuance, investors can identify which 
issues have a high likelihood to default, thus, assisting their investment decisions. In addition, 
shipowners who plan to issue high yield bonds can identify the factors on which they need to 
focus in order to offer an issue that does not entail a high probability of default and, thus, is 
more attractive to investors. In particular, our results outline the importance of leverage and 
cash flow strength. Therefore, shipowners - who wish to offer high yield bond issues - may 
be better off by focusing on their companies' income stability which would, consequently, be 
adequate in servicing their debt obligations; and income stability could be achieved by 
offering better quality of services in order to attract first class charterers and longer chartering 
contracts. 
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Chapter 5. US Shipping Initial Public Offerings: Do Prospectus 
and Market Information Matter? 
Under Review: 
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and transportation Review 
5.1) Introduction 
Over the past few years, and especially during the shipping boom of 2002-2008, we 
have witnessed an increase in the number of shipping companies entering the US equity 
capital markets'. Undoubtedly, a large number of shipping companies consider the capital 
markets as an essential part of their strategy for optimizing financial management, through a 
combination of traditional bank lending, private placements and public issues of debt and 
equity. The main reasons for the above are: (1) the temporary difficulty of the banking system 
to provide on time the necessary funds for newbuilding and/or second-hand purchases; this 
happened during the banking crisis of 1982-85 and the world financial crisis of 2008-2010; 
(2) the depletion of the equity base of shipping companies in the mid 1980's; (3) the recent 
large scale vessel replacement programme; (4) the high vessel prices in 1999s and 2000s; (5) 
the need to increase the size of the shipping companies; and (6) the emergence of a new 
generation of shipowners with a different academic background and more liberal philosophy 
towards the ownership of the vessel. 
Grammenos and Marcoul is (1996) are the first to document that during the period 1983 
to 1995 the number and size of shipping companies entering the equity capital markets has 
increased. According to the results of their study, companies entering the equity markets for 
debt repayment purposes appear to be on average larger in size than those entering the equity 
markets for vessel acquisitions purposes. In addition, vessel acquisition appears to be the 
main purpose for going public (63%) followed by asset play (24%). Debt repayment (13%) 
constitutes another reason for going public, with only one company deciding to go public for 
trading activities. On a similar note, in the finance literature, Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1999), and Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) highlight the IPO decision as a strategic move to 
1 For an overview of US equity capital markets as a source of finance for shipping companies see 
Grammenos and Papapostolou [forthcoming (a)]. 
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raise equity financing for growth purposes. Furthermore, Kim and Weisbach (2008) find that 
funds raised by an IPQ are used for several purposes in addition to financing growth, such as 
rebalancing leverage and increasing cash balances. 
Shipping stocks should be more closely followed by investors for a number of reasons. 
First, due to the underlying economic fundamentals of the shipping industry and the fact that 
the majority of goods transported around the world, i.e. international trade is conducted 
through seaborne trade. Global shipping and the price industrial companies are willing to pay 
to ship goods across the world are good indicators of the supply and demand for international 
trade. Since the demand for international trade, thus seaborne trade, is directly linked to 
economic growth around the world (Stopford, 2009), shipping may be used as an economic 
indicator by economists. 
Second, it is due to the fact that the increased number of shipping initial public 
offerings (lPOs) resulted in the shipping industry gaining a higher profile in the global 
investment stage and, at the same time, China's economic boom also helped the industry to 
become a mainstream investment theme. Such exposure has made shipping companies a 
target of private equity and attracted the interest of institutional investors2. Furthermore, over 
the last years, the increase in the number of analysts covering shipping stocks (see figure 5.1) 
may be another indication that shipping stocks and the shipping industry are increasingly 
regarded by investors as a mainstream investment opportunity rather than a niche sector for 
few specialised investors as it used to be in the past. 
2 For instance, Overseas Shipholding Group has 387 institutional investors with their share in the 
company accounting for 88.82 percent. Other notable examples are Genco Shipping & Trading, 
Alexander & Baldwin Inc. and Horizon Lines Inc. where the holdings of institutional investors are 
85.05, 76.42, and 90.90 percent respectively (Source: Reuters Thomson Financial Banker One, March 
2010). 
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Figure 5-1: Average Number of Analyst Coverage per Share 
Source: Norton (2008), Jefferies & Co, and Bomozis (20 I 0), Capital Link. Tanker companies include: 
Frontline Ltd. (FRO); General Maritime Corp. (GMR); Nordic American Tankers (NAT); and 
Overseas Shipholding Group (OSG). Drybulk companies include: Diana Shipping Inc. (DSX); 
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Third, public shipping companies listed in the US equity capital markets have 
strengthened their corporate structure. They have become larger in size, due to their growth 
strategies through mergers and acquisitions3 ; and increased in market value terms due to their 
share price appreciation. Furthermore, they have become larger not only in market value 
terms but also in deadweight tonnage terms4 due to the overall fleet expansion. 
Finally, it is the vision of a generation of younger shipowners who have raised finance 
through growth shipping companies by tapping international capital markets during 1993-
3 The impact of mergers and acquisitions on the share price of shipping stocks, hence their market 
value, has been highlighted by Panayides and Gong (2002) who studied the share price reaction to 
mergers and acquisition announcements in the liner shipping; and by Samitas and Kenourgios (2007) 
who investigated the case of tramp shipping companies. Both studies concluded that merger and 
acquisition announcements have positive impact on the stock price of the companies, thus their size. 
4 8.87 percent of the total (tanker, dry bulk, and container vessels) world deadweight tonnage is 
controlled by companies who are listed on a US stock exchange; thus, indicating their large size, 
importance and impact that may have on the shipping industry. In the case of the tanker sector, the fleet 
of US public shipping companies is even larger in percentage terms of the total deadweight tonnage of 
the sector, standing at approximately 14 percent. Additionally, these companies, through their public 
listings and subsequent secondary offerings have also managed to finance their growth plans and create 
a relatively new fleet compared to the industry'S average. On average, dry bulk public companies 
operate a relative young fleet compared to the sector' s average, where the sector average fleet age is 
14.40 years and that of public companies 9.43 years (Source: Clarksons Shipping Intell igence Network, 
March 2010). 
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1997 and 2004-2007, and their willingness to continue using equity capital markets as a major 
source of capital S • 
It is the linkage between international trade, seaborne trade, the world economy and 
shipping companies; the proportion of shipping stocks held by institutional investors and the 
increased analysts' coverage for the stocks; the increase in size - both in terms of market 
capitalisation and deadweight tonnage; and finally, the appetite of young shipowners to utilise 
equity capital markets as a major source of finance, that led us to a closer examination of the 
shipping US Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), and more specifically, the underpricing6 
phenomenon. 
A number of empirical studies, in the finance literature, document positive initial day 
returns or underpricing of IPOs over a wide range of time periods and countries'. For 
example, Ibbotson (1975) studies the initial performance of newly issued common stocks 
offered to the public during the 1960s and finds an average initial return of 11.4 percent; 
Ibbotson et a1. (1988) report an average underpricing of 21 percent for 2,259 firms during 
1980-1984, whereas, Ritter and Welch (2002) find an average initial day return of about 19 
percent for the period 1980-2001; and, Ritter (2009) documents that for the period 1960-2009 
the average initial day return for US IPOs stands at 16.9 percent. 
Underpricing is probably the most researched topic in IPO markets and theories 
regarding underpricing often arise from: 1) informational asymmetries between market 
participants - the issuer, the underwriter, the initial investors, and the secondary market 
investors - in the sense that one group of participants has superior information as to the true 
S Examples are the 2010 IPOs of Baltic Trading Inc. and Crude Carriers Corp. that raised finance in the 
US capital markets in order to acquire newbuilding vessels and stating in the prospectus that their 
frowth strategy to further finance future projects will be through equity and no debt. 
Underpricing represents money "left on the table" that the new IPO firm forgoes. In other words, this 
money accrues to initial investors in an IPO but not the pre-IPO owners of the IPO firm Daily et aI., 
(2005). Following Dunbar (2000) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), among others, we proxy 
underpricing with the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the initial 
ffi · d ta f th '" 1 fti . R [(CPFD - POffer )] 100 o er pnce expresse as a percen ge 0 e 101t1a 0 er pnce: FD = X 
POffer 
where: RFD = First day return, CPFD = First day closing price, Poffer = Offer price. 
7 For an updated table of underpricing on different countries (Loughran et aI., 1994), see 
https:/lbear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter.lnt.pdf. 
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value of the issuing company compared to the rest; 2) symmetric information theories (Ritter 
and Welch, 2002)8. Theories based on asymmetric information9 include: 1) the Winner's 
Curse theory (Rock, 1986), 2) the Information disclosure theory (Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989), 3) the Principal - agent theory (Baron, 1982), and 4) the Signalling theory (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989). On the other hand, theories that rely on the symmetric assumption lO 
include: 1) the Legal liability theory (Tinic, 1988), and 2) the Prospect theory (Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002). 
The use of financial ratios and other information obtained from the IPO prospectus and 
their impact on the final IPO offer prices has been investigated previously. Kim et al. (1995) 
find evidence that the offer price is significantly affected by prospectus variables, such as 
earnings per share, offer size, industry-wide prospects and the offer type. Klein (1996) 
investigates the significance of prospectus related variables and concludes that accounting 
information is important in the pricing of IPOs. Kim and Ritter (1999) argue that accounting 
comparables II, without further adjustments, have modest explanatory power on the IPO price. 
In particular, they argue that their model's explanatory power improves when they use 
forecast earnings for the following year rather than pre-IPO historical earnings. Hand (2003) 
demonstrates a model of accounting data which is useful in explaining the IPO offer price of 
internet companies as well as the market prices over the subsequent two years. In addition, 
Bhabra and Pettway (2003) use prospectus data and show that financial and operating 
8 Ljungqvist (2006) has classified the theories into four categories: asymmetric information theories; 
ownership and control theories, institutional theories; and behavioural theories. 
9 The Winner's curse theory is based on informed versus uniformed investors and empirical research on 
this theory can be found in Keloharju (1993), and Lee et al. (1999). The Information disclosure theory 
is based on the fact that underwriters can obtain information from informed investors during the IPO 
process; work on this theory includes Hanley (1993), Comelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) and, 
Jenkinson and Jones (2004). The Principal-agent theory assumes that issuers are less informed than 
underwriters, whereas the Signalling theory assumes the opposite, issuers are more informed than 
underwriters (Ljungvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Michaely and Shaw, 1994; Welch, 1989). 
10 The Legal liability theory assumes that underpricing takes place in order to reduce possible future 
litigation from investors (Lowry and Shu, 2002). The Prospect theory argues that issuers permit 
underpricing because their wealth gain from the IPO is greater (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2005). 
II The variables tested are the price-earnings (PIE) ratio, market-to-book ratio, and price-to-sales ratio. 
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characteristics, as well as offering characteristics have limited relation with the one-year stock 
In the shipping finance literature, Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) is the first study to 
examine shipping IPOs initial day returns in a cross-country framework and the results show 
that gearing appears to be statistically significant and positively related to initial day returns 
of shipping IPOs; furthermore, underpricing is found to be of small magnitude and on average 
standing at 5.32 percent. Cullinane and Gong (2002) investigate the transportation IPOs in the 
China mainland and Hong Kong and find evidence that freight related IPOs are subject to 
more severe underpricing than non-freight related IPOs, 104.95 percent and 19.17 percent 
respectively. Merikas et a1. (2009) investigate global shipping lPOs and find an average 
underpricing of 17.69 percent. Additionally, the study examines factors that may explain first 
trading day returns and concludes that underpricing is positively related to the age of the firm, 
the reputation of the stock market, and the IPO market conditions prevailing at the time of the 
issue; on the other hand, the reputation of the underwriter affects underpricing negatively. On 
a similar note, Merikas et a1. (20 I 0) examine shipping initial public offerings in the US for 
the period 1987 - 2007 and find an average underpricing of 4.4 percent. Finally, our study 
finds that shipping US lPOs have on average a 2.69 percent initial day return; whereas, when 
the sample is categorised into underpriced and overpriced issues, the average first day return 
is 8.53 and -3.87 percent respectively. 
This chapter focuses on two asymmetric information theories for explaining 
underpricing, the factors that affect the initial day returns, and the probability of underpricing 
a shipping lPO. More specifically, we use information provided in the IPO prospectus, and 
alongside with market related variables, we examine their usefulness in testing the partial 
adjustment theory of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Rock's (1986) winner's curse theory; 
additionally, using the same set of variables we examine the probability of underpricing a US 
shipping IPO. The study contributes to the existing shipping finance literature by testing the 
12 The study employs firm characteristics such as: leverage, total assets and sales, spending on 
Research and Development (R&D) and profitability. Other studies on the same topic include Levis 
(1993); Loughran and Ritter (1995); Lee et al. (1996); Chen et a1. (200\). 
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hypotheses of partial adjustment and winner's curse theories as an explanation for shipping 
IPOs initial day returns. Moreover, we use variables that have not been previously employed 
in shipping studies and we also examine the probability of underpricing of shipping IPOs for 
the first time. The results of our study show that by employing readily available information 
prior to the IPO, the factors that affect the initial day returns of shipping IPOs can be 
identified and the probability of underpricing a shipping initial public offering can also be 
predicted. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 describes the initial public 
offering procedure and the hypotheses being testing. The possible variables to be employed in 
the analysis and their descriptive statistics are presented in Section 5.3. The empirical results 
are laid out in Section 5.4, and Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
5.2) Background and Testable Hypotheses 
The pricing of an IPO occurs in two stages (to andt l ) and the underpricing level is 
detennined in the third stage (t 2) as shown below. It begins at the time the underwriter 
perfonns an initial due diligence investigation and a preliminary prospectus is filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In this preliminary prospectus 13 , the 
underwriters set a range of prices within which they expect to set the offer price. The 
midpoint of the range is normally used as an estimate of the expected final offer price 
(stageto)' Between stages toand t l , the road show takes place where the underwriters receive 
indications of interest from investors and can gauge the demand for the specific issue. In the 
second stagetl , typically after the market closes on the day before the offering, the final offer 
price is set by the underwriters; this is the price at which the issue is offered to the public. 
Finally, between stages t I and t 2 , the stock starts trading and the market assesses the value of 
the company; and in stage t 2 ,the initial day return is calculated based on the closing price 
and the offer price. 
13 According to Bhabra and Pettway (2003) a detailed prospectus is required before new shares can be 
offered to the public in an initial public offering. The prospectus provides information about the 
offering, a brief history of the company and its business, the growth strategy, historical financial 
information, ownership details, and the risks associated with the issue. Additionally, the prospectus is a 
legal document that protects the issuer and the underwriter in the sense that it is a written proof that the 
investor is provided with all the relevant facts associated with the offering. In other words, the 
prospectus is often the first window to a potential investor about the company's past performance and 
its growth prospects. 
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Price Update I" Day Trading 
Filing Price Range Offer Price I st Day Closing Price 
IPO Pricing and Underpricing Timeline, adopted from Lowry and Schwert (2004) 
According to Benveniste and Spindt (1989) underwriters must compensate those 
investors who provide private information regarding the value of the issue by only partially 
incorporating the information into the final offer price and the rest of the adjustment coming 
in the form of underpricing. During the road show, underwriters collect indications for the 
demand of the issue by private/institutional investors. After collecting investors' interest, 
underwriters allocate only a few shares (or no shares at all) to investors who demandedlbid in 
a conservative way. On the other hand, investors who demandedlbid the shares aggressively, 
hence revealing positive information about the IPO, are rewarded with large allocations of 
shares. Hanley (1993) is the first to test this theory and finds that upward offer price revisions 
are positively related to first trading day returns. Similarly, Comelli and Goldreich (2001) 
show that the private information gained during the registration period is only partially 
incorporated into the offer price. Finally, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) find that institutions 
which reveal more valuable and positive information during the registration period are 
rewarded with higher allocations of the issue. 
If private information, obtained prior to the offer date, is partially incorporated in the 
final offer price, then the price update variable (see next section for a description of this 
variable) should be significant in explaining the first trading day returns of shipping IPOs. 
Hence, the first hypothesis to test is the following: 
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Hypothesis 1: testing information disclosure theory 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) 
Ho: first trading day return of a shipping IPO can be explained by the final offer price 
revision. 
HI: first trading day return of a shipping IPO cannot be explained by the final offer 
price revision. 
One of the best known asymmetric infonnation theories explaining underpricing is the 
winner's curse of Rock (1986). Rock (1986) argues that some investors have superior 
infonnation and are better infonned about the true value of the shares offered by a company. 
Furthennore, he argues that infonned investors demandlbid only attractive IPOs, whereas 
uninfonned investors demandlbid IPOs in a random way. Consequently, the winner's curse 
imposes that in unattractive IPOs uninfonned investors receive all the shares they have 
demandedlbid, while in attractive IPOs their demandlbids is partially crowded out by the 
infonned investors. Financial infonnation, issue specific characteristics, and market specific 
data constitute infonnation readily available to all potential investors. Finding statistical 
significance for these variables would leave less room for Rock's (1986) winner's curse 
theory that some investors have superior infonnation and uninfonned investors cannot 
identify which IPOs are likely to be underpriced. As a result, the second hypothesis to test is 
the following: 
Hypothesis 2: testing winner's curse theory 
(Rock, 1986) 
Ho: first trading day return of a shipping IPO can be explained by pre-I PO publicly 
available information. 
HI: first trading day return of a shipping IPO cannot be explained by pre-IPO publicly 
available information. 
Finally, we examine the statistical importance of the variables employed to test the 
aforementioned hypotheses in predicting the probability of underpricing shipping IPOs. 
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5.3) Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data sample consists of 51 shipping US IPOSl4 that took place in the period 1987-
2008. Of these 51 IPOs, 24 have been overpriced and 27 have been underpriced. The 
variables employed in our analysis are categorised into three groups: IPO-specific; market 
sentiment-specific; and financial-specific. The IPO-specific data, the market sentiment-
specific data, and the offering prospecti data are collected from Thomson Reuters Banker One 
Database and Thomson Reuters Datastream. In the case of the shipping market-sentiment 
variable, data are collected from Clarksons Shipping Intelligence Network. Finally, the 
financial-specific IS data for the companies are collected from the offering prospecti. 
5.3.1) Transaction Characteristics 
The proceeds raised by the IPO (SIZE) have traditionally been used as a proxy for the 
risk of the issue. IPOs with large proceeds are considered to be less risky; hence, they 
command a lower level of underpricing (Chalk and Peavy, 1987; Ibbotson et al., 1994; and 
Jain and Kini, 2000). To adjust for inflation, the offer proceeds are converted to 1996 dollars 
using the US Consumer Price Index (CPI), and are then transformed using logarithms to 
reduce skewness. 
Overhang (OVER) is the ratio of retained shares to the public float at the IPO (Bradley 
and Jordan, 2002). When the number of shares issued in the IPO is small relative to the shares 
retained by the company's owners or pre-issue shareholders, there will be greater 
underpricing due to limited supply of shares. Additionally, the higher underpricing can also 
result from the asymmetric information model of Leland and Pyle (1977). The signalling 
theory of Leland and Pyle (1977) suggests that the proportion of equity retained by the 
original owners is positively related to the firm's health. By giving up a small fraction of the 
14 Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) IPOs were excluded from our sample because no 
financial data are available for these companies prior to their public listing debut. Additionally, the 
sample spans up to 2008 as this is the year when the last shipping company with historical financial 
information went public. Since then, three shipping companies, with no prior financial information, 
have entered the US public equity market (Baltic Trading Ltd., Crude Carriers Corp., and Scorpio 
Tankers Inc.). 
IS The financial data were extracted from the latest end-of-year income statements and balance sheets 
for the company at the time of the issue. 
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company in the IPO, owners can signal that the company is of high value and as a result push 
the price up, leading in that way to undepricing. Bradley and Jordan (2002) find that the 
retention rate is highly correlated with underpricing and a good predictor of it. Further, 
Downes and Heinkel (1982) and Jain and Kini (1994) find a significant positive relationship 
between post-IPO performance and the proportion of equity retained by the owners. 
Prior to marketing an IPO, the issuing company and the investment banks are required 
to file an estimated price range in the registration statement; while, the final offer price is set 
on the day prior to the offering after receiving indications of interest from potential 
institutional investors. The final offer price may lie within the original filing price range, 
above or below it. An offer price set above the initial filing price range indicates strong pre-
IPO demand and confidence by institutional investors regarding the prospects of the issuing 
company. An offer price below the initial filing price range represents weak demand, while an 
offer price within the range indicates expected demand. We measure pre-IPO demand, which 
will constitute our price update variable (PUPDATE), according to Derrien (2005). The price 
update variable is calculated as the final offer price minus the lower bound price of the initial 
filing price range divided by the width of the initial filing price range. Specifically: 
WR = (FPRu - FPRL ) 
FPRL 
p. _ (Poffer - FP RL ) 
UPDATE - WR 
Where, WR = width of initial price range; FPRu = Upper bound of filing price range; 
FPRL = Lower bound of filing price range; PUPDATE = IPO offer price relative to price 
range; and Poffer = IPO offer price. 
In terms of underwriter's reputation (RANK) we first use Carter and Manaster's (1990) 
ranking measures of underwriter reputation, as updated by Carter, Dark and Sigh (1998) and 
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Loughran and Ritter (2004) 16. Underwriter's ranking ranges from zero to nine, with higher 
rank representing higher reputable underwriters. In general, a ranking of 8 and above reflects 
high-ranked, prestigious national underwriters. According to the underwriter certification 
hypothesis by Booth and Smith (1986), higher underwriter's rank has been widely 
documented to reduce underpricing. Nevertheless, Beatty and Welch (1996), Cooney et al. 
(2001), and Loughran and Ritter (2004) have seen this negative relationship reversing in the 
1990s. In our sample, approximately every shipping issue had at least one leading underwriter 
with a rank. of 8. Hence, one may reach the conclusion that in the case of shipping IPOs 
underwriter's reputation does not really affect underpricing. We test the significance of 
underwriter's reputation, as measured by the aforementioned literature/ranking system, and 
the variable is found to be insignificant. 
Since we do not find any statistical significance of underwriter's reputation, we then 
categorise the underwriters in our sample by the amount raised as in Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) and Bradley and Jordan (2002). In particular, we measure the reputation of each 
underwriter by the amount raised by each underwriter over the total amount raised in the 
shipping US IPO market during our sample period, and the higher the amount raised by an 
underwriter the higher the reputation: 
. AR. 
Reputation = 51 ] 
LAR; 
;=1 
where AR j is the amount raised by each underwriter j and i is the company that went 
public. 
Table 5.1 shows that the underwriters with the highest ranking in the shipping IPO 
arena are Merrill Lynch, UBS, Citigroup, Jefferies & Co, and Cantor Fitzgerald, accounting 
for almost 45 percent of our sample; where the total amount raised by 51 shipping US IPOs 
stands at US$7.314 billion with an average deal of approximately US$143.41 million. In our 
analysis, we assign a dummy value (RANK) equal to one if the lead underwriter has a rank of 
six and above, and zero otherwise. 
16 The latest update of the rankings, up to 2009, can be found at http://bear.warrington.ufl.edulritter/ipodata.htm. 
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Table 5-1: League Table of US Shipping IPOs Underwriters: This table ranks the underwriters of 51 shipping IPOs according to the amount raised in the period 1989-2008. 
Ranking varies from 1 to 9, with 9 indicating the highest level of underwriter's ranking. % of total amount raised is defined as the amount raised by an underwriter over the total 
amount raised for shipping IPOs in our sample period. Average amount raised per deal is defined as the average amount raised by each underwriter. Deals(number) is the number of 
deals that each underwriter has participated. % of total deals is the number of deals each underwriter has participated over the total number of shipping IPOs in our sample. Deals 
leading underwriter (numbe!lls_ defined as the number of deals each underwriter partic~ted as a leading underwriter. 
RANK Underwriter Amount Raised % of Total Amount Average Amount Deals 
(Number) 
% of Total 
Deals 











(S) Raised Raised per Deal 
(S) 
Merrill Lynch 780,895,838 10.67% 43,383,102 16 35.29% 10 
UBS 742,406,038 _10.15%~ 46,400,377 18 31.37% 14 
Citigroup 686,685,575 9.38% 68,668,558 10 19.61% 10 
Jefferies & Co 605,964,954 8.28%_ ___ 35,644,997 17 33.33% 10 
Cantor Fitzgerald 460,032,250 6.29010 65,718,893 7 13.73% 5 
Bear Stearns & Co 362,695,375 4.96% _ _ _ 32,972,307 11 21.57% 5 
Morgan Stanley 282,711,221 3.87% 28,271,122 10 19.61% 5 
Lazard Freres 265,475,046 3.63% 24,134,095 II 21.57% 3 
JP Morgan & Co 237,326,358 3.25% 33,903,765 7 13.73% 3 
Goldman Sachs & Co 226,036,680 3.09% 32,290,954 7 13.73% 6 
Lehman Brothers 184,919,600 2.53% 23,114,950 8 15.69% 3 
Credit Suisse First Boston 184,093,000 2.52% 20,454,778 9 17.65% 3 
Maxim Group 150,000,000 2.05% 150,000,000 I 1.96% 1 
Banc of America 145,461,575 1.99010 48,487,192 3 5.88% 2 
Dahlman Rose Weiss 131,131,155 1.79010 13,113,116 10 19.61% 0 
Fortis Securities LLC 122,957,025 1.68% 13,661,892 9 17.65% 1 
Raymond James & 
Associates 
Hibernia Southcoast Capital 
Deutsche Bank 
Wachovia Securities 
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19 37.25% 2 
9 17.65% 2 
7 13.73% I 
4 7.84% 0 
9 17.65% 0 
30 
5.3.2) Market Characteristics 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) originally documented the hot issue puzzle where there is a 
cyclical pattern in the IPO market in which clusters of IPOs have higher than average initial 
returns. Ritter (1984) extends this study and finds that hot issue markets continue to exist, 
whereas Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2002) show that initial returns 
are positive autocorrelated. Previous studies in the finance literature have defined hot and 
cold markets on the basis of the monthly IPO volume (Helwege and Liang, 2004; Alti, 2006; 
Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996). To define hot and cold months in our analysis, we use a 
three-month centered moving average of the number of IPOs for each month as it smoothes 
out seasonal variation (Helwege and Liang, 2004; Alti, 2006). Our sample includes 11,125 
US IPOs for the period June 1975-December 2008; financial and REITs 17 IPOs, spinoffs 18, 
LBOSl9 and lPOs offered at less than $1 per share are excluded. Hot months are defined as 
those that are above the median in the distribution of the monthly moving average IPO 
volume across all months in the sample (Alti, 2006). Figure 5.2 plots the monthly moving 
average IPO volume for the period 1975-2008 and the horizontal line is the median standing 
at 21.66. For each shipping IPO in our sample, a dummy variable (IPOMKT) is assigned the 
value of one if the company goes public in a hot month and zero otherwise. 
17 An investment trust that owns and manages a pool of commerci~ properties and mortgages and other 
real estate assets. 
18 Spin-off refers to a type of corporate action where a company splits off sections of itself as a separate 
business. 
19 Company acquisition financed by debt. In practice, a holding company is set up to take on the debt 
used to finance the acquisition of the target. 
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Figure 5-2: 3-montb Moving Average ofIPO volume 
Sample includes 11,125 finn-commitment IPOs in the Thomson Reuters Banker One database from 
June 1975 to December 2008; financial and REITs IPOs, spinoffs, LBOs and !POs offered less than $1 
per share are excluded. The horizontal line is the median monthly !PO volume for the whole sample. 
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In addition to employing the hot or cold IPO market variable, we use a control variable 
for the general stock market sentiment20 and our sample includes daily closing prices of the 
S&P500 between 31st March 1986 and 1st December 2009. A number of studies note that 
IPOs take place during positive investor sentiment (Aggrawal and Rivoli, 1990; Pagano, 
Panetta and Zingales, 1998; Lowry and Schwert, 2002). To define the stock market sentiment 
(STOCK%) we use the S&PSOO cumulative return for the 60 trading days prior to the IPO 
date21 • According to Derrien (2005) when the market sentiment is bullish at the time of the 
offering, the underwriter sets an IPO price that reflects the sentiment. Nevertheless, the high 
demand due to the bullishness leads to positive initial returns. Similarly, we assume that IPOs 
taking place during bullish sentiment periods are associated with higher demand than those 
taking place in neutral or bearish periods; hence, this variable should be positively related 
20 Definitions about sentiment vary in the literature and range from investors' errors to specific 
psychological biases (Barberis et aI., 1998; Brown and Cliff, 2004, Baker and Wurgler, 2007). In this 
paper we refer to stock market sentiment as the investors' optimism or pessimism about the stock 
market. 
21 Derrien (2005), and Lowry and Schwert (2002) have employed a similar variable to identify market 
sentiment. 
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with first day returns. In a similar way, we use the shipping market earnings to control for the 
shipping market sentiment (SHIP%); once again, we capture the shipping sentiment by the 
cumulative returns of the quarter prior to the IP022. 
5.3.3) Firm Characteristics 
We use variables from the IPO prospecti that can proxy the pre-IPO financial status and 
operational performance of the issuing company; these variables are categorised into 
liquidity, profitability, efficiency and debt ratios. The liquidity of the company is proxied by 
the current ratio (CR), which is defined as current assets over currents liabilities. The current 
ratio (CR) calculates how many times the current assets of the company, normally cash and 
short-term investments, can cover the current liabilities. Current ratios vary by industry, but 
generally speaking 1.5 is considered as a healthy current ratio and as the number approaches 
or falls below I special attention is needed to make sure there are no liquidity issues (Leptos-
Bourgi, 2009). 
As a measure for profitability we use the return on assets (ROA) which is calculated by 
dividing the net income by total assets. The ratio measures the profitability of the company 
and shows the company's asset intensity. In other words, it reveals how much profit a 
company generates for every dollar invested in assets; and the higher this ratio the better. 
Shipping companies are very capital intensive and require expensive equipment, i.e. vessels, 
to operate and generate profits. Thus, it is useful to compare the profitability of a shipping 
company to that of its peers. 
To capture the operating efficiency of the shipping company we use the total assets 
turnover (EFFIC) estimated by dividing the freight revenue over total assets. The efficiency 
22 Our sample contains companies operating in different sectors of the shipping industry. Specifically, 
the sample includes 24 tanker companies, 14 dry-bulk companies,S container companies, 4 offshore 
companies,2 chemical companies, and 2 multi-sector (a mix of tanker and dry-bulk) companies. In our 
analysis, we calculate the smpolo variable of the different sectors and make sure we use the relevant 
one for each company. For instance, for the tanker and dry-bulk companies we use the weighted 
average earnings for each sector respectively; for the container companies we use a time-charter rate 
index; for the offshore companies we use spot rates; and for the chemical companies we use time-
charter rate equivalents, and all the above data is provided by Clarksons Shipping Intelligence 
Network. In the case of the 2 multi-sector companies we multiply the relevant earnings index by a 
weight given by the percentage of the company's fleet operating in each segment. 
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ratio we employ indicates the effectiveness of the company to generate freight revenue with 
the use of its total asset base, the vessels. The ratio should always be compared to the industry 
average because it varies greatly between different industries. For example, in capital-
intensive companies (steel, autos, and shipping) the total asset turnover ratio is typically less 
than one (100 in the case the ratio is expressed in percentage terms), while in retail and 
services companies it may be over ten. Other things being equal, the higher this ratio the 
better. 
To estimate the debt of the company, we employ the gearing ratio (GEAR) defined as 
the long-term debt over the long-term debt plus the shareholder's equity. This ratio shows at a 
glance how burdened a company is with debt and measures the ability of the company to 
survive periods of income instability and recession. High gearing indicates an increasing 
reliance upon bank funds or other forms of debt for vessel acquisitions, and this may create 
problems with meeting interest and capital repayments in the case of market conditions 
deterioration. For instance, shipping companies with high gearing and unstable income 
generation faced survival problems in the early 1980s, while other companies defaulted in 
their high yield debt obligations in 1998/1999. On the other hand, during high income periods 
such as in the late 1980s and in 2003-2008, highly geared companies substantially increased 
their revenues and expanded. Hence, gearing can be considered as a double-edge sword in the 
sense that during prosperity periods highly geared companies do not have problems meeting 
their interest and capital payments, while at times of recession/depression the same companies 
may face difficulties in meeting their debt obligations. Finally, highly geared companies 
operating in the spot or in the short-term time-charter markets may be the ones who face the 
greatest danger in periods of a market downturn. 
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5.3.4) Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the sample in our analysis are presented in table 5.2 which 
includes the mean and standard deviation values for all issues, the underpriced issues and the 
overpriced issues, respectively. The p-value of testing the null hypothesis that the mean 
values of the underpriced and overpriced issues are the same is also presented; a test that may 
provide a rough indication of the possible explanatory variables for our final model. 
Table 5-2: Descriptive Statistics: This table provides descriptive statistics on all issues, undepriced and overpriced issues samples. 
The p-values of mean comparisons between underpriced and overpriced issues are also presented. The symbols ., •• , ••• indicate 
significance at the 10,5 and 1 percent respectively. Initial trading day return (RFD) is the difference between the closing price on the 
first day of trading and the initial offer price expressed as a percentage of the initial offer price. IPO proceeds (SIZE) is the 
logarithmic form of the issue price times the number of shares offered. Overhang (OVER) is defined as the ratio of retained shares 
to the total public float at the IPO. Price Update (PUpdate) is calculated as the final offer price minus the lower bound price of the 
initial filing price range divided by the width of the initial filing price range. Underwriter rank (RANK) is underwriter's reputation 
calculated using a method similar to Megginson and Weiss [1991] and, Bradley and Jordan [2002] and takes the value of 1 if the 
underwriter is highly reputable and 0 otherwise. IPO market (IPOMKT) takes the value of 1 if the issue takes place in a hot month 
and 0 otherwise; hot months are defined as those that are above the median in the distribution of the monthly moving average US 
IPO volume across all months for the period 1975-1008. Stock market sentiment (STOCK%) is defined as the S&P500 cumulative 
return for the 60 trading days prior to the IPO date. Shipping Market Sentiment (SHIP%) is defined as the shipping earnings 
cumulative return for the 60 days prior to the IPO date. Current ratio (CR) is calculated as the current assets over current liabilities. 
Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the net income over total assets. Total assets turnover (EFFIC) is given by dividing freight 
revenue over total assets. Gearing (GEAR) is calculated as long-term debt over long-term debt and shareholder's equity. 
All Issues Underpriced Issues Overpriced Issues 
Mean St.Deviation Mean St.Deviation Mean St.Deviation p-value 
First Trading 
2.69 0.091 8.53 0.090 -3.87 0.026 0.06· Day Return (%) 
TotalIPO 
148,293,268 92,787,120 163,032,098 109,858,322 131,712,084 67,314,515 0.110 Proceeds (Sm) 
Overhang (%) 45.00 0.276 46.10 0.281 43.80 0.276 0.382 
Price Update (%) 1.39 0.165 6.05 0.198 -3.85 0.099 0.013·· 
Underwriter 
0.627 0.488 0.741 0.447 0.500 0.510 0.040·· Rank 
IPOMarket 
0.843 0.367 0.963 0.192 0.708 0.464 0.009··· [Hot=t; Cold=O) 
Stock market 
5.30 0.084 8.60 0.071 1.70 0.085 0.0015·· Sentiment (%) 
Shipping Market 14.30 0.466 25.70 0.506 1.50 0.388 0.029·· Sentiment (%) 
Current Ratio 1.263 1.296 1.540 1.648 1.018 0.833 0.085· 
Return on Assets- 5.80 0.083 7.60 0.097 3.60 0.059 0.039·· ROA-(%) 
Total Assets 44.90 0.593 59.20 0.723 28.80 0.351 0.029·· Turnover (%) 
Gearing(%) 62.00 0.231 68.70 0.230 54.50 0.212 0.013·· 
The average first day return for the US shipping IPOs in our sample stands at 2.69 
percent, with underpriced and overpriced issues at 8.53 and -3.87 percent respectively. The 
average total IPO proceeds for all issues stands at US$148.3 million and it is observed that -
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on average - underpriced issues raise more money than overpriced issues, US$163 million 
and US$131.7 million respectively. In terms of shares retention, it can be argued that all 
companies retain, on average, around half of the outstanding shares, between 44 and 46 
percent. Furthermore, shipping IPOs have on average a positive offer price revision of 1.39 
percent, whereas underpriced and overpriced issues have a final offer price revision of 6.05 
and -3.85 percent, respectively. Finally, the last IPO-specific variable, the underwriter's 
ranking has an average value of 0.62 for the entire sample. This means that, on average, 62 
percent of shipping US IPOs have a reputable underwriter. For the underpriced and 
overpriced issues the average stands at 0.74 and 0.5, respectively. 
Turning to the market-specific variables we observe that, on average, 84.3 percent of all 
shipping IPOs in our sample take place during hot IPO markets; 96.3 percent of underpriced 
issues take place in a hot IPO market and this number drops to 70.8 percent for overpriced 
issues. In terms of stock market sentiment, shipping companies enter the equity markets at a 
time when the average 60 day cumulative return of the SP500 prior to the IPO is 5.3 percent; 
companies with underpriced issues go public when the average cumulative return is 8.6 
percent and those with overpriced issues when it is 1.7 percent. Hence, it can be concluded 
that, on average, underpriced issues take place during much higher (bullish) investor 
sentiment than overpriced issues. Last, shipping IPOs take place when shipping market 
returns - on average - are at 14.3, 25.7 and 1.5 percent for all, underpriced, and overpriced 
issues respectively. Once again, we notice that underpriced issues take place during higher 
(bullish) shipping sentiment periods. 
In terms of current ratio table 5.2 shows that shipping companies entering the US equity 
market have on average a ratio of 1.26. For companies that their issues are underpriced and 
overpriced the ratio is 1.54 and 1.01 respectively. Furthermore, the profitability of shipping 
companies, on average, is 5.8 percent, while for companies with underpriced and overpriced 
issues is 7.6 and 3.6 percent respectively. The statistics also show that the operating efficiency 
for shipping companies on average stands at 44.90 percent with the number increasing to 
59.20 percent for companies with underpriced issues; while it decreases to 28.80 for 
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companies with overpriced issues. Finally, the average gearing for all companies is 62 percent 
while for the underpriced and overpriced issues the average gearing stands at 68.70 and 54.50 
percent respectively. 
Overall, in respect to the financial-specific variables, we observe that companies with 
overpriced issues on average tend to have a better financial status in terms of the gearing 
ratio, whereas underpriced issues in terms of liquidity, profitability and operational efficiency. 
Finally, the variables that have significantly different means include the offer price revision, 
the underwriters' reputation, the IPO hot/cold market, the stock and shipping markets 
sentiment, the current ratio, the returns on assets ratio, the total assets turnover ratio, and the 
gearing ratio. 
5.4) Empirical Results 
5.4.1) Explaining First Trading Day Returns 
The dependent variable in our regressions is the IPO initial returns, calculated as the 
percentage change in the first day close price relative to the offer price, and the independent 
variables are in accordance to the t-tests of mean difference between overpriced and 
underpriced issues23. All variables are observed on the date before the IPO, with the financial 
specific and the underwriters' ranking available to investors well before the IPO. One 
possible problem arising from the use of correlated variables is multicollinearity, which may 
result in biased results. Following Lewis-Beck (1980) that correlation coefficients between 
the explanatory variables which are greater than 0.8 may indicate the presence of 
multicollinearity, we examine the bivariate correlations among the independent variables and 
in all cases correlation coefficients are low and well below 0.8. Additionally, we employ the 
tolerance statistic24 (Lewis-Beck, 1980) to check for multicollinearity between the 
23 We do not find any statistical significance and relationship between total IPO proceeds, overhang 
and initial day returns; and, our final model results do not change by excluding these two variables. 
24 The tolerance statistic24 is defined as the percentage variance of each independent variable that is not 
explained by all the other independent variables in the model. If the value of the tolerance statistic for a 
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independent variables in our model. The tolerance statistics for each independent variables 
included in our model are presented in table 5.3 and show that our model does not suffer from 
multicollinearity problems. 
given independent variable is close to 0, is an indication that the information the variable provides can 
be expressed as a linear combination of the other independent variables. As a rule of thumb, only 
tolerance statistics lower than 20 percent are cause of concern. 
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Table 5-3: Regressions Models with First Trading Day Return as the Dependent Variable: This table presents the results of our regression models. The adjusted R2 and the F-Statistic for 
each regression are reported, with standard errors in parentheses and p-values in []. In addition, the tolerance statistics is reported. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10,5 and 1 
percent respectively. The two OLS regressions reported in the table are: 
RFD(/) = a o + bl x PUPDATE(/-I) + &1 
RFD(/) = a o + bl x PUPDATE(t-l) + b2 X RANKt_1 + b3 X IPOMKTt-I + b4 X STOCK%t_1 + h5 X SHIP%t_1 + b6 X CRt_1 + b7 X ROAt_1 + bs X EFFICt _1 + b9 X GEARt _1 + Et 
Initial trading day return (RFD) is the difference between the closing price on the first day of trading and the initial offer price expressed as a percentage of the initial offer price. Price Update 
(PRICEUpdate) is calculated as the final offer price minus the lower bound price of the initial filing price range divided by the width of the initial filing price range. Underwriter rank (RANK) is 
underwriter's reputation calculated using a method similar to Megginson and Weiss [1991] and, Bradley and Jordan [2002] and takes the value of 1 if the underwriter is highly reputable and 0 
otherwise. IPO market (IPOMKT) takes the value of I if the issue takes place in a hot month and 0 otherwise; hot months are defined as those that are above the median in the distribution ofthe 
monthly moving average US IPO volume across all months for the period 1975-1008. Stock market sentiment (STOCK%) is defined as the S&P500 cumulative return for the 60 trading days 
prior to the IPO date. Shipping Market Sentiment (SHIP"Io) is defined as the shipping earnings cumulative return for the 60 days prior to the IPO date. Current ratio (CR) is calculated as the 
current assets over current liabilities. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the net income over total assets. Total assets turnover (EFFIC) is given by dividing freight revenue over total assets. 
Gearing (GEAR) is calculated~ lo~!!g-term debt ov:..::e:!.r..!!lo~n~gi:.-t!!e:!.!rm:!!..!d!!e::::b!..:t an~d!...:s~h!!ar:=.:e::!h:.::o:!:ld~e::!.r....::'s:..:e=qL!:u:=.:ity:.z....:....' _____________________ _ 
Regression InterceptYuPDATE RANK IPOMKT STOCKO/O SHIP% CR ROA EFFIC GEAR Adj.R1 
















































The first regression in table 5.3 examines the price update variable (PUPDATE) and its 
explanatory power on shipping IPOs first day returns. The estimated slope coefficient is 
positively related to shipping IPOs initial day returns and is highly significant. As mentioned 
earlier, we assume that PUPDATE is a reflection of private information given to the underwriters 
by the investors during the road show. Therefore, the positive sign of the coefficient and its 
statistical significance suggest that there is under-adjustment to private information, not 
contained in the final offer price, which explains about 20 percent of the initial returns for 
shipping IPOs. More specifically, underwriters of shipping IPOs tend to compensate 
private/institutional investors for revealing their information about the issuing company 
during the registration period, and this compensation comes in the form of a partial under-
adjustment in the final offer price. The fact that there is partial adjustment to private 
information in shipping IPOs confirms the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) theory; hence, we 
cannot reject hypothesis 1. 
In the second regression, in addition to the PUPDATE variable, we control for the 
underwriters' reputation, the market conditions prevailing at the time of the shipping IPOs 
and the financial status of the issuing company. Namely, we use the underwriter's rank 
(RANK), whether the shipping IPO takes place in a hot or cold month (IPOMKT), the stock 
market sentiment (STOCK%), the shipping market sentiment (SHIP%), the current ratio 
(CR), the returns on assets (ROA), the total asset turnover (EFFIC) and the gearing (GEAR) 
of the company. The positive relationship between shipping IPO initial day returns and 
underwriter's rank (RANK) suggests that market investors perceive the reputation of the 
underwriter as a positive factor for the IPO and it is consistent with the findings in the finance 
literature (Beatty and Welch, 1996; Cooney et al., 2001; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). In terms 
of market conditions, all three variables exhibit a positive sign and are statistically significant. 
This result implies that underwriters tend to underestimate the prevailing market conditions 
when setting the final offer price. In other words, underwriters tend to only partially 
incorporate the bullish sentiment in the final offer price. Another explanation may be in 
accordance to Derrien (2005) who argues that although the IPO offer price is set to reflect the 
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market sentiment, nevertheless, the high demand due to the bullishness leads to positive 
initial returns. Finally, regarding the financial status of the company, the current assets (CR) 
and the return on assets (ROA) are found significant and negatively related to shipping IPO 
first-day returns. This suggests that underwriters have a tendency to overestimate these two 
variables when setting the final offer price for a shipping IPO. The total asset turnover 
(EFFIC) and the gearing ratio (GEAR) are found to be statistically significant and positively 
related to first day returns. This indicates that underwriters underestimate the gearing and the 
operational efficiency ratios of the issuing company. The positive sign of the gearing 
coefficient means that gearing is considered by the market investors as a positive element for 
the growth of the issuing company in periods of good shipping market conditions. As 
mentioned earlier, high gearing can be perceived as a positive element for a company during 
periods of market prosperity and as a bad sign during periods of a market downturn. The fact 
that the shipping market sentiment and the gearing ratio are both found to be statistically 
significant and positively related to the first-day returns further confirms the above. 
Our results have both theoretical and empirical implications for shipping IPOs. On the 
theoretical side, explanations of shipping IPO initial day returns that rely on informed and 
uniformed investors may be difficult to stand alone. Rock's (1986) model assumes the 
existence of uninformed investors who cannot identify which IPOs are likely to be 
underpriced, but our results show that no specific expertise is required since all the variables 
in our model are publicly available prior to the issue. As a result, we cannot reject hypothesis 
2. On the empirical side, our variables provide a set of control variables regarding shipping 
IPOs, and these variables may be useful in analysing shipping IPOs underpricing. To test the 
empirical usefulness of our results, we examine, in the next section, the probability of a 
shipping IPO being underpriced by employing the variables of our OLS regression models. 
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5.4.2) Probability of Underpricing 
To determine the relationship between our variables and the probability of shipping 
IPOs being underpriced we employ the logit technique which creates a score for each 
company by weighting the independent variables. We assume that the variable y, E {O,l}is 
related to an index y; by a linear function of the explanatory variables Xii' x j2 , ••• , xjk and the 
random term uj such that: 
y; = 1 if the IPO is underpriced; 0 otherwise. 
By this structure we have; 
where, Fu is the cumulative distribution function of u. We assume that u is logistically 
distributed and thus: 
where X; (i=l .... k) are the independent variables, and Po and Pi (i=l •..• k) are the estimated 
parameters. 
The results of the final estimated logit model are presented in table 5.4, panel A, and 
the final model includes the following variables: PUPDATE, IPOMKT, SPX%, SHlPOlo, EFFIe, 
and GEAR 25. The likelihood ratio statistic is significant at the 5 percent confidence interval, 
2S The CR, ROA, and RANK variables were found insignificant in explaining the probability of 
underpricing and were drop from our logit model. This does not change the statistical significance of 
the remaining variables. 
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thus, the null hypothesis that the non-intercept coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero is 
rejected. Further, the McFadden R2 stands at 65.6 percent indicating a good fit. To evaluate 
how effectively the estimated model describes the dependent variable we perform the Hosmer 
and Lemeshow (1989) goodness-of-fit test; the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic and chi-square p-
value of 1.557 and 0.99, respectively, confirm the goodness-of-fit of the estimated model. 
Each coefficient in the model is the partial slope coefficient, and measures the change 
in the estimated logit model for a unit change in the value of the given regressor. Our model 
suggests that there is a positive relationship between the probability of underpricing and the 
price update variable; thus, shipping issues have a higher probability of underpricing when 
there is a higher final offer price revision. A result that agrees with the descriptive statistics in 
table 5.2 which shows that underpriced issues have, on average, an upward price revision of 
6.05 percent compared to a downward price revision of 3.85 percent for the overpriced issues. 
Similarly, the condition of the IPO market, the stock market sentiment, and the shipping 
market sentiment are also positively related to the probability of underpricing. As a result, it 
can be argued that, when the stock and shipping market sentiments are bullish the probability 
that a shipping IPO will be underpriced is also higher. Similarly, the probability of 
underpricing a shipping issue that takes place during a hot month is also higher. All the above 
results further confirm the descriptive statistics (see table 5.2) where it is found that 
underpriced issues on average, compared to the overpriced issues, mainly take place during 
hot months, and bullish stock and shipping market sentiment. 
Similarly, the total assets turnover is also found to be positively related to underpricing. 
This result suggests that companies with strong operational efficiency, in terms of total assets 
turnover have their issues underpriced by underwriters. This result may mean that 
underwriters underestimate the operating efficiency of the company when pricing a shipping 
IPO. 
Gearing is found to be significant in explaining the probability of underpricing and 
positively related to the likelihood of underpricing. As mentioned earlier, gearing can be 
considered as a double edged sword. Hence, the positive sign of the variable implies two 
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possibilities: first, higher gearing entails higher risk and, thus, an issue is underpriced by 
underwriters in order to reflect the risk profile of the company going public, a result similar to 
the Grammenos and Marcoulis (1996) study; second, the fact that the shipping sentiment is 
also found to be positively related to the probability of underpricing may mean that high 
gearing is perceived as a growth sign during prosperity periods and as a sign of higher risk 
during bad shipping market conditions. Consequently, we can conclude that the latter 
explanation about gearing and the probability of underpricing is more appealing. 
In the previous section we established, on the theoretical part, that the final offer price 
is partially adjusted to public available information; our logit model further strengthens that 
result from an empirical point of view. Overall, the results of our logit model indicate that by 
employing publicly available data, accessible to investors prior to the IPO, the probability of 
underpricing of US shipping IPOs can be estimated. Furthermore, we observe that the 
liquidity and profitability ratios do not play a role in whether a shipping lPO will be 
underpriced or not; whereas, in the OLS model were both found to be negatively affecting 
first day returns. This may lead to the conclusion that underwriters, when setting the final 
offer price may overestimate the current and return-on-assets ratios, but when it comes to 
measuring underpricing or overpricing, investors prefer to base their investment decisions on 
the operational efficiency and gearing level of the company. 
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Table 5-4: Logit Model and Evaluation Results: 
Pr(v, ~ Ilx;p)~ F.(- x;p)~ I ( , ) = r I __ 
1 + exp x,p 1 + exp - (Po + AX,I + ..... + Pk X'k)1 
The McFadden R2 and the LR-Statistic for each regression are reported, with standard errors in. In addition, the Hosmer-Lemeshow (1989) goodness-of-fit test and the tolerance 
statistic is reported. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and I percent respectively. The dependant variable in the model takes the value of 1 if the issue is 
underpriced and 0 otherwise. Price Update (PUpdale) is calculated as the final otTer price minus the lower bound price of the initial filing price range divided by the width of the initial 
filing price range. IPO market (IPOMK T) takes the value of 1 if the issue takes place in a hot month and 0 otherwise; hot months are defined as those that are above the median in the 
distribution of the monthly moving average US IPO volume across all months for the period 1975-1008. Stock market sentiment (STOCK%) is defmed as the S&P500 cumulative 
return for the 60 trading days prior to the IPO date. Shipping Market Sentiment (SHIPO/o) is defined as the shipping earnings cumulative return for the 60 days prior to the IPO date. 
Total assets turnover (EFFIe) is given by dividing freight revenue over total assets. Gearing (GEAR) is calculated as long-term debt over long-term debt and shareholder's equity. 
Panel B presents the expectation-prediction table alongside with the type I and type II errors; type I error occurs when the model predicts that an issue will be overpriced When it 
actually is underpriced. Type II error occurs when the model predicts that an issue will be underpriced when it actually is overpriced. Panel C presents the empirical confidence 
intervals for the coefficients of the in-sample model as given by the bootstrap technique. Finally, panel D presents the evaluation table for the in and out-of-sample as given by the 
bootstrap results. . 
Panel A: Logit 
Model 
Variable Constant PUPDATE IPOMKT STOCK% SHlp% EFFIC GEAR 
Coefficient -14.907*** 7.021 * 7.546*** 38.591*" 1.815* 7.354*** 6.097** 
(3.234) (3.60) (1.638) (9.606) (0.991) (1.791) (2.636) 
Tolerance Statistic 0.758 0.896 0.807 0.815 0.926 0.770 
LR Statistic 46.26 
Prob. (LR Stat) [0.00] 
McFadden Rl 0.656 
H-L Statistic 1.557 
Prob. Chi-~ ___ [0.99J 
Panel B: Ex~tation-Prediction Evaluation Table 
Number % Correct Number Type 1/11 Error Correct Incorrect (01.) 
Underpriced Issues 26 96.30 1 3.70 (Type I Error) 
Overpriced Issues 20 83.33 4 16.67 (Type II Error) 
Total 46 90.20 5 
Panel C: Bootstrap Check for Robustness I Coefficients 
CI % Constant PUPDATE IPOMKT STOCK°1. SHIP% EFFIC 
@O.0025 -45.211 3.511 6.279 29.415 0.913 5.196 
@O.5 -15.436 7.082 7.674 38.437 1.824 7.582 
@O.975 -12.857 16.323 36.604 62.246 4.155 13.054 





Underpriced Issues __ ___ _ __ Qv~~ceo ISSUes 
Number % Correct Number Type I Error (0/0) Number % Correct Number Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
In-Sample 21.3734 89.70% 2.4404 10.30% 17.7772 83.89% 3.4090 
Out-of-Sample 2.420 77.12% 0.733 2.275 80.17% 0.573 









The models' ability to predict the probability of underpricing is examined next. The 
overall prediction rates of the model are not meaningful without taking into consideration the 
type I and type II errors26 (Zavgren, 1983). Table 5.4, panel B, depicts the actual number and 
percent of issues correctly classified and misclassified by our model given a specified cut-off 
probability set to 0.4827 • Our model predicts correctly 26 out of 27 issues (96.30 percent) that 
have been underpriced, and 20 out of 24 issues (83.33 percent) that have been overpriced. 
Overall, the estimated model predicts correctly 90.20 percent of the whole sample with type I 
and type II errors at 3.70 and 16.67 percent respectively. 
Although our model predicts correctly 90 percent of the entire sample, one criticism 
may be the fact that the total number of observations in our sample is small. To further test 
the robustness of our model, we run additional in and out-of-sample tests using simulation 
techniques28 • From the overall sample of 51 issues we select randomly 46 issues and estimate 
the logit model only on these issues; this sample of 46 issues forms the basis for the simulated 
in-sample results. The remaining 5 observations are then used to assess how well the model 
performs on an out-of-sample basis. This process is repeated 5,000 times by selecting a 
different in-sample each time. 
26 Type I error occurs when the model predicts that an issue will be overpriced when it actually is 
underpriced. Type II error occurs when the model predicts that an issue will be underpriced when it 
actually is overpriced. 
27 Instead of relying on a simple a priori cut-off probability of 0.5, we calculate the optimal cut-off 
probability according to Palepu (1986). The condition that will allow us to determine the optimal cut-
I. (PI; = undepr;ced) 
off probability is the following: 1-1' .) ~ 1 
12 V' I = overpriced 
where I. ( ) is the distribution of underpriced issues and 12 ( ) is the corresponding distribution for 
overpriced issues. To determine the optimal cut-off probability we first estimate the conditional 
probability density functions of I. ( ) and 12 ( ) by plotting the distribution of the estimated 
probabilities for the underpriced and overpriced issues that are used to estimate the model parameters. 
The optimal cut-off probability is the value where the two plots intersect. 
28 The bootstrap technique we use in this paper has been used previously in failure prediction studies to 
validate the results ofthe models (Grammenos et al., 2008; Charitou et al., 2004; Barmiv et al., 2002; 
Huffman and Ward, 1996). 
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Table 5.4, panel C, presents the empirical confidence intervals for the coefficients of 
the in-sample model and it can be seen that the values of the original model, in panel A, are 
very close to the median of the empirical estimates. Table 5.4, panel D, indicates that the in-
sample model --on average -predicts correctly 89.70 percent of the underpriced issues and 
83.89 percent of the overpriced issues. Further, the in-sample model correctly predicts 87 
percent of the overall observations with low type I and type II errors at 10.30 and 16.11 
percent respectively. Turning next to the out-of-sample tests, we observe that the model 
forecast correctly predicts - on average - 77 .12 percent of the underpriced issues and 80.17 
percent of the overpriced issues, with an overall prediction rate of 78.27 percent. The 
bootstrap results further indicate the robustness of our original model in predicting the 
probability of underpricing a shipping US IPOs. 
In order to check how the probability of underpricing responds to changes in the 
explanatory variables, we transform the estimates of our model into yield estimates of the 
marginal effects - that is, the change in predicted probability associated with changes in the 
explanatory variables. The marginal effects are non-linear functions of the parameters' 
estimates and the levels of the explanatory variables29 (Anderson and Newell, 2003). Figures 
5.3.1 - 5.3.6 illustrate the marginal effects on the probability ofundepricing. 
29 For instance, the marginal effect of x j on the probability of underpricing is given 
aE{Y;lx;,fJ) ( ') LI) LI) by = f - zJ) I{3j' where f \;C = aF \;C / aX is the density function corresponding 
aXiJ 
to F . The direction of the effect of a change in X j depends only on the sign of the fJ j coefficient. 
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Figures 5-3.1- 5.3.6: Marginal Effects of Variables on the Probability of Underpricing 
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The marginal effect of PUPDATE is depicted in figure 5.3.1. It is observed that changes of 
this variable have a positive effect upon the probability of underpricing. For example, 
consider two shipping companies X and Y that have similar characteristics, in regard to the 
rest of our models' variables but the PUPDATE variable, and go public at the same time. Next, 
let us assume that company X has no price revision in its final offer price, whereas company 
Y has a 10 percent upward price revision. In this case, the probability that the IPO of 
company Y will be underpriced is 10 percent higher than that of company X. 
Turning to figure 5.3.2 for the IPOMKT variable, we can see that when this variable 
changes from 0 to I (1, if the issue takes place during a hot IPO month and, 0 otherwise) the 
probability of underpricing increases by almost 90 percent. Figure 5.3.3 presents the marginal 
effects of the SPX% variable on the probability of underpricing. Note that when the stock 
market sentiment stands at 0 percent and subsequently rises to 5 percent, the probability of 
undepricing increases by approximately 40 percent. Looking back at table 5.2, it is observed 
that the average stock market sentiment for the undepriced and overpriced issues is 8.6 
percent and 1.7 percent, respectively. Thus, there is no doubt that issues taking place at times 
when the stock market sentiment is higher (bullish) have higher likelihood of being 
underpriced. Figure 5.3.4 shows the marginal effect of SHIP% on the likelihood of 
underpricing. It is observed that, a change in this variable from 0 percent to 20 percent 
increases the probability of underpricing by almost 30 percent; hence, there is a positive 
relationship between this variable and the probability of underpricing. In other words, when 
the shipping market sentiment is more bullish then the probability of an issue being 
underpriced also increases. This can also be confirmed by looking at table 5.2, where we can 
see that the mean value for this variable is 25.7 and 1.5 percent for the underpriced and 
overpriced issues, respectively. 
Figure 5.3.5 shows the marginal effects of total assets turnover (EFFIC). When EFFIe 
changes from 20 to 40 percent it can be seen that the probability of underpricing increases by 
almost 40 percent; for changes occurring above 70 percent and below 20 percent the marginal 
effect is close to zero. As a result, positive changes in this variable have positive effects on 
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the likelihood of undepricing a shipping IPO. Finally, Figure 5.3.6 illustrates the marginal 
effects of gearing ratio on the probability of underpircing. A change in the ratio from 40 
percent to 60 percent increases the probability by almost 35 percent. For changes occurring 
between 0 to 20 percent and above 80 percent the marginal effect is close to zero. For 
instance, let us assume that two companies X and Y have identical values regarding our logit 
model variables, tap the equity capital market at the same time and the only variable which is 
different between the two companies is the gearing ratio. If company X has a gearing ratio of 
60 percent and company Y of 40 percent, then the issue of company X has a probability of 
being underpriced which is 35 percent higher than the probability of company Y. 
5.5) Conclusions 
This paper provides tests of the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) partial adjustment theory 
and Rock's (1986) winner's curse theory for shipping US initial public offerings. In 
particular, we find evidence consistent with the partial-adjustment phenomenon, where the 
final offer price update is found to be significant and explains about 20 percent of the first day 
returns for shipping US IPOs. Additionally, we examine the extent to which first day returns 
can be explained by using public information available prior to the offering date. The 
variables employed in our model include the final offer price update, the underwriters' rank, 
three variables controlling for hot or cold IPO markets, the stock and shipping market 
sentiments, the current ratio, the return on assets ratio, the total assets turnover ratio, and 
finally, the gearing ratio. Our results suggest that the above variables explain about 53 percent 
of the first day returns for shipping IPOs and they clearly provide evidence that the final offer 
price does not fully reflect many types of public available information. More specifically, it 
seems that underwriters overvalue the significance of the current ratio and the return on assets 
ratio. Furthermore, underwriters tend to be conservative when taking into account the market 
conditions prevailing at the time of the issue and in regards to the total assets turnover and 
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gearing ratios. Overall, our results support the partial adjustment theory of Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) while at the same time reject the winner's curse theory of Rock' s (1986). 
After finding evidence that there is partial adjustment in the final offer price and that 
public infonnation may explain the first day returns of shipping US IPOs, we examine 
whether the probability of underpricing for shipping US IPOs can be predicted. Our logit 
model, which predicts correctly 90 percent of the entire sample, includes variables easily 
accessible by all investors and available prior to the IPO. In particular, the market conditions 
at the time of the issue, the final offer price update, the operating efficiency and the gearing 
level of the company appear to be statistically significant in predicting the likelihood of 
shipping IPOs underpricing. The fact that the current ratio and the return-on-assets do not 
affect the probability of underpricing leads us to the conclusion that investors, when making 
their investment decisions, prefer to look at the operational efficiency and gearing level of the 
company rather its liquidity and profitability status.To check the robustness of our model, we 
perfonn in and out-of-sample tests which further confinn the reliability of our model. Overall, 
our logit model suggests that there is no asymmetric information between participants (the 
issuer, the underwriter, the initial investors, and the secondary market investors) in shipping 
IPOs and investors can predict the likelihood of underpricing by analysing public information 
available prior to the first trading day of the IPO. 
Chapter 5 - Page 121 
References 
Aggrawal, R., and Rivoli, P., 1990. Fads in the initial public offering market? Financial 
Management, 19(4),45-57. 
Alessandrini, F., 1999. Credit risk, interest rate risk, and the business cycle. Journal of Fixed 
Income, 9(2), 42-53. 
Alizadeh, A. H., and Nomikos, N. K. 2006. Trading strategies in the market for tankers. 
Maritime Policy and Management, 33(2), 119-140. 
Alizadeh, A. H., and Nomikos, N. K., 2007. Investment timing and trading strategies in the 
sale and purchase market for ships. Transportation Research: Part B, 4(1), 126-143. 
Allen, F., and Faulharber, G., 1989. Signalling by underpricing in the IPQ market. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 23(2), 303-323 
Alti, A., 2006. How persistent is the impact of market timing on capital structure? Journal of 
Finance, 61(4), 1681-1710. 
Altman, E.I., 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589-609. 
Altman, E.!., 1989. Measuring bond mortality and performance. Journal of Finance, 44(4), 
909-922. 
Altman, E.!., and Hotchkiss, E., 2006. Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy, Third 
Edition, John Wiley and Sons Inc. 
Altman, E.!., Nammacher, S.A., 1985. The default rate experience on high yield corporate 
debt. Financial Analysts Journal, 41(4), 25-41. 
Altman, E.I., Narayanan, P., 1997. An international survey of business failure classification 
models. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 6(2), 1-57. 
Amihud, Y., and Mendelson, H., 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 17(2),223-249. 
Anderson, S., and Newell, R.G., 2003. Simplified marginal effects in discrete choice models. 
Economic Letters, 81(3), 321-326. 
References - Page 122 
Asquith, P., Mullins, D.W., Wolff, E.D., 1989. Original issue high yield bonds: Aging 
analyses of defaults, exchanges, and calls. Journal of Finance, September, 44(4), 
923-952. 
Asteriou, D., 2006. Applied Econometrics, A Modem Approach using EViews and Microfit. 
New York: Pal grave Macmillan. 
Aziz, A., Emanuel, D., Lawson, G.H., 1989. Cash flow reporting and financial distress 
models: testing hypotheses. Financial Management, 18(1),55-64. 
Back, B., Laitinen, T., Sere, K., Van Wesel, M., 1996. Choosing bankruptcy predictors using 
discriminant analysis, logit analysis, and genetic algorithms. Technical Report No. 
40, Turku Centre for Computer Science. 
Baker, M., and Wurgler, J., 2002. Market timing and capital structure. Journal of Finance, 
57( 1), 1-32. 
Balcaen, S., Ooghe, H., 2004. Alternative methodologies in studies on business failure: Do 
they produce better results than the classical statistical methods? Ghent University, 
Department of Accountacy and Corporate Finance, Belgium, Working Paper. 
Baltagi, B.H., 2005. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Bancel, F., and Mittoo, U. R., 2001. European managerial perceptions of the net benefits of 
foreign stock listings. European Financial Management, 7(2),213-236. 
Bancel, F., and Mittoo, U. R., 2009. Why do European firms go public? European Financial 
Management, 15(4),844-884. 
Barnhill, T. M., Joutz, F.L., Maxwell, W. F., 2000. Factors Affecting the Yields on 
Noninvestment Grade Bond Indices: A Cointegration Analysis. Journal of Empirical 
Finance, 7(1), 57-86. 
Bamiv, R., Aggarwal, A., and Leach, R., 2002. Predicting bankruptcy resolution. Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting, 29(3/4), 497-520. 
Baron, D., 1982. A model of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution 
services for new issues. Journal of Finance, 37(4),955-976. 
References - Page 123 
Bayless, M., and Chaplinsky, S., 1996. Is there a window of opportunity for seasoned equity 
issuance? Journal 0.( Finance, 51(1),253-278. 
Beatty, R.P., and Welch, I., 1996. Issuer expenses and legal liability in initial public offerings. 
Journal of Law and Economics, 39(2), 545-602. 
Beaver, W.H., 1966. Financial ratios as predictors of failure. Empirical Research in 
Accounting: Selected Studies, 4(3), 71-111. 
Bedendo, M., Cathcart, L., and EI-Jahel, L., 2004. The shape of the term structure of credit 
spreads: an empirical investigation. Working Paper. Tanaka Business School. 
Imperial College. 
Benveniste, L., and Spindt, P., 1989. How investment bankers determine the offer price and 
allocation of new issues. Journal of Financial Economics, 24(2), 343-361. 
Bernhardsen, E., 2001. A model of bankruptcy prediction. Norges Bank - Financial Analysis 
and Structure Department. December. Working Paper. 
Betker, B.L., 1997. The administrative costs of d~bt restructurings: Some recent evidence. 
Financial Management, 26(4), 56-68. 
Bhabra, H.S., and Pettway, R.H., 2003. IPO prospectus information and subsequent 
performance. The Financial Review, 38(3), 369-397. 
Bhandari, L.C., 1998. Debt-equity ratio and expected common stock returns: empirical 
evidence. Journal of Finance, 43(2), 507-528. 
Booth, lR., and Smith, R., 1986. Capital raising, underwriting and the certification 
hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics, 15(2),261-281. 
Boritz, lE., Kennedy,D.B., and De Miranda e Albuquerque, A., 1995. Predicting corporate 
failure using a neural network approach. Intelligent Systems in Accounting. Finance 
and Management, 4(2), 95-111. 
Bomozis, N., 2010. Shipping and the capital markets. Capital Link, presentation given at Cass 
Business School. City University London, March, London, UK. 
Bradley, OJ., and Jordan, B.D., 2002. Partial adjustment to public information and IPO 
undepricing. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 37(4), 595-617. 
References - Page 124 
Brau, J. C, and Fawcett, S., 2006. Initial public offerings: an analysis of theory and practice. 
Journal 0/ Finance, 61(1), 399-436. 
Brav, A., and Gompers, P.A., 1997. Myth or reality? The long-run performance of initial 
public offerings: evidence for venture and nonventure capital-backed companies. 
Journal o/Finance, 52(5),1791-1821. 
Breitung, J., 2000. The Local Power of Some Unit Roots Tests for Panel Data. Advances in 
Econometrics, 15, 161-177. 
Carapeto, M., 2005. Bankruptcy bargaining with outside options and strategic delay. Journal 
a/Corporate Finance, 11(4),736-746. 
Carter, R., Dark, R., and Singh, A., K., 1998. Underwriter reputation, initial returns and the 
long-run performance of IPO stocks. Journal 0/ Finance, 53( 1), 285-311. 
Carter, R., and Manaster, S., 1990. Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation. Journal 
0/ Finance, 45(4), 1045-1067. 
Casey, C.J., Bartczak, N., 1985. Using operating cash flow data to predict financial distress: 
Some extensions. Journal 0/ Accounting Research, 23(1), 384-401. 
Chalk, A., and Peavy, J., 1987. Initial public offerings: daily returns, offering types, and the 
price effect. Financial Analysts Journal, 43(5), 65-69. 
Chan, K., Wang, l, and Wei, K.C.J., 2004. Underpricing and long-term performance of IPOs 
in China. Journal o/Corporate Finance, 10(3),409-430. 
Chang, Shao-Chi, Chung, Tsai-yen, and lin, Wen-Chun, 2010. Underwriter reputation, 
earnings management and the long-run performance of initial public offerings. 
Accounting and Finance, 50(1), 53-78. 
Charitou, A., Neophytou, E., and Charalambous, C., 2004. Predicting corporate failure: 
empirical evidence for the UK. European Accounting Review, 13(3), 465-497. 
Chatterjee, S., Dhillon, U.S., and Ramirez, G., 1996. Resolution of financial distress: Debt 
restructurings via chapter 11, prepackaged bankruptcies, and workouts. Financial 
Management, 25(1),5-18. 
References - Page 125 
Chemmanur, T. J., and Fulghieri, P., 1999. A theory of the going public decision. Review of 
Financial Studies. 12(2),249-279. 
Chen, G., Firth, M., and Krishnan, G., 2001. Earnings forecast errors in IPO prospectuses and 
their associations with initial stock returns. Journal of Multinational Financial 
Management, 11(2),225-240. 
Chen, Hsuan-Chi, and Ritter l R, 2000. The seven percent solution. Journal of Finance, 
55(3), 11 05 - 1131. 
Choi, I., 2001. Unit Root Tests for Panel Data. Journal of International Money and Finance, 
20(2), 249-272. 
Clarkson Research Studies, October, 2002. Sources & Methods for the Shipping Intelligence 
Weekly. 
Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R.S., and Martin lS. 2001. The determinants of credit spread 
changes. Journal of Finance, 56(6), 2177-2207. 
Collins, R.A., 1980. An empirical prediction on bankruptcy prediction models. Financial 
Management, 9(2), 52-58. 
Cook, D.O., Kieschnick, R, R, and Van Ness, R A., 2006. On the marketing of IPOs. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 82(1), 35-61. 
Cooney, J.W., Singh, A.K., Carter, R.B., and Dark, F.H., 2001. IPO initial returns and 
underwriter reputation: has the inverse relationship flipped in the 1 990s? Unpublished 
working paper, University of Kentucky, Case Western Reserve University, and Iowa 
State University. 
Cornelli, F., and Goldreich, D., 2001. Bookbuilding and strategic allocation. Journal of 
Finance, 56(6), 2337-2369. 
Cornelli, F., and Goldreich, D., 2003. Bookbuilding: how infonnative is the order book? 
Journal of Finance , 58(4), 1415-1443. 
Corwin, S.A., and Schultz, P., 2005. The role of IPO underwriting syndicates: pricing, 
information, production and underwriter competition. Journal of Finance, 60(1), 443-
486. 
References - Page 126 
Cullinane, K., and Gong, X., 2002. The mispricing of transportation initial public offerings in 
the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong. Maritime Policy and Management, 29(2), 
107-118. 
Daily, M.C., Certo, T.S., and Dalton, R.D., 2005. Investment bankers and IPO pricing: does 
prospectus information matter? Journal of Business Venturing, 20(1), 93-111. 
De Bondt, G. and Marques, D., 2004. The high yield segment of the corporate bond market: 
A diffusion modelling approach for the US, the UK and the Euro area. European 
Central Bank. Working Paper Series. 
Deakin, E.B., 1976. Distributions of financial accounting ratios: Some empirical evidence. 
Accounting Review, 51 (1), 90-96. 
Derrien, F., 2005. IPO pricing in "hot" market conditions: Who leaves money on the table? 
Journal of Finance, 60(1), 487-521. 
Dewaellheyns, N., Van Hulle, C., 2006. Corporate failure prediction modelling: Distorted by 
business groups' internal capital markets? Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 33(5/6), 909-931. 
Downes, D., and Heinkel, R., 1982. Signalling and the valuation of unseasoned new issues. 
Journal of Finance, 37(1), 1-10. 
Drobetz, W., Schilling, D., and Tegtmeier, L., 2010. Common factors in the returns of 
shipping stocks. Maritime Policy and Management, 37(2),93-120. 
Duffee, a.R., 1998. The Relation between Treasury Yields and Corporate Bond Yield 
Spreads. Journal of Finance, 53(6), 2225-2241. 
Dunbar, C., 2000. Factors affecting investment bank initial public offering market share. 
Journal o/Financial Economics, 55(1), 3-41. 
Eckhold, K.R., January 1998. Determinants of New Zealand Bond Yields. Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand Research Discussion Paper. 
Estrella, A., Park S., Peristiani, S., 1999. Capital ratios and credit ratings as predictors of bank 
failures. Federal Reserve Bank o/New York. September. 
References - Page 127 
Fabozzi, F., 2005. The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities. 7th ed. New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Ferson, W., Harvey, C., 1994. Sources of Risk and Expected Returns in Global Equity 
Markets. Journal of Banking and Finance, 18(4),775-803. 
Flagg, J.C., Giroux, G.A., 1991. Predicting corporate bankruptcy using failing firms. Review 
of Financial Economics, 1(1),67-79. 
Fons, J.S., 1994. Using Default Rates to Model the Term Structure of Credit Risk. Financial 
Analyst Journal, 50(5), 25-32. 
Franks, J.R., and Torous, W.N., 1989. An empirical investigation of US firms in 
renegotiation. Journal of Finance, 44(3), 747-769. 
Fridson, M.S., Garman, C.M., 1998. Determinants of Spreads on New High-Yield Bonds. 
Financial Analyst Journal, 54(2), 28-39. 
Fridson, M.S., Kenney, J.F., July/August 1994. How Do Changes in Yield Affect Quality 
Spreads? Extra Credit, 4-13. 
Frieder, L., and Subrahmanyam, A., 2005. Brand perceptions and the market for common 
stock. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 40(1), 57-85. 
Gabbi, G., Sironi, A., 2002. Which Factors Affect Corporate Bonds Pricing? Empirical 
Evidence from Eurobonds Primary Market Spreads. Newfin Research Center. 
Bocconi University. Working Paper. 
Garman, C.M., 2000. Pricing European High-Yield New Issues. Journal of Fixed Income, 
9(4),35-42. 
Garman, C.M., Fridson, M., 1998. Monetary Influences on the High Yield Spread versus 
Treasuries. In: High Yield Bonds: Market Structure, Portfolio Management, and 
Credit Risk Modelling, edited by Theodore M. Barnhill Jr., William F. Maxwell, and 
Mark RShenkman, New York: McGraw-Hill, 251-268. 
Gentry, J.A., Newbold, P., Whitford, D.T., 1985(a). Classifying bankrupt firms with funds 
flow components. Journal of Accounting Research, 23( 1), 146-161. 
References - Page 128 
Gentry, lA., Newbold P., Whitford D.T., 1985(b). Predicting bankruptcy: If cash flow's not 
the bottom line, what is? Financial Analysts Journal, 41(5), 47-57. 
Gilson, S.C., John, K., and Lang, L.H.P., 1990, Troubled debt restructurings: An empirical 
study of private reorganisation of firms in default. Journal of Financial Economics, 
27(2),315-353. 
Gombola, MJ., Haskins, M.E., Ketz, lE., Williams, D.O., 1987. Cash flow in bankruptcy 
prediction. Financial Management, 16(4),55-65. 
Gompers, P.A., and Lerner, 1, 2003. The really long-run performance of intial public 
offerings: the pre-NASDAQ evidence. Journal of Finance, 58(4), 1355-1392. 
Grammenos C. Th., 1979. Bank finance for ship purchase. Bangor Occasional Papers in 
Economics, no. 16. 
Grammenos, C.Th., 1985. Challenges and prospects in bank shipping finance. Europort 
Congress Spreech, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
Grammenos, C. Th., 1989. Shipping investment in capital markets within a dynamic 
international environment. The American Stock Exchange Shipping Conference. 
Grammenos, C. Th., 1994. Financing the international fleet. The Nautical Institute Annual 
Lecture. 
Grammenos, C. Th., 1994; 2010. Capital markets as a source for shipping finance: equity and 
high yield bond markets. Shipping Investment and Finance, Lecture Notes, Cass 
Business School, City University London. 
Grammenos, C. Th., 2000. Grammenos predicts return to high yields. Lloyd's List, 13th May, 
London, UK. 
Grammenos C. Th., 2002. Credit risk analysis and policy in bank shipping finance. The 
Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business, edited by Grammenos, C. Th., 
chapter 32, 731-751, London Press (LLP), London. 
Grammenos C. Th., Alizadeh, A. H., and Papapostolou, N. C., 2007. Factors affecting the 
dynamics of yield premia on shipping seasoned high yield bonds. Transportation 
Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 43(5),549-564. 
References - Page 129 
Grammenos, C. Th., and Arkoulis, A., 1999. The long-run performance of shipping initial 
public offerings. International Journal of Maritime Economics, 1, 71-93. 
Grammenos C.Th., and Arkoulis, A.G., 2002. Macroeconomic Factors and International 
Shipping Stock Returns. International Journal of Maritime Economics, 2002, 4(1), 
81-99. 
Grammenos C.Th., Arkoulis A.G., 2003. Determinants of Spreads on the New High Yield 
Bonds of Shipping Companies. Transportation Research: Part E: Logistics and 
Transportation Review, 39(6), 459-471. 
Grammenos, C. Th., Biniaris, K., and Mantis, E., 1998. Debt financing of the oil tanker 
market: 1982-1997. Mimeo, Cass Business School. City University London. 
Grammenos C.Th., Marcoulis S. N., 1996a. Shipping Initial Public Offerings - A Cross-
Country Analysis. Empirical Issues in Raising Equity Capital, edited by M.Levis, 
North-Holland. 
Grammenos C.Th., and Marcoulis S. N., 1996b. A cross-section analysis of stock returns: the 
case of shipping firms. Maritime Policy and Management, 23(1), 67-80. 
Grammenos, C. Th., Nomikos, N. K., and Papapostolou, N. C., 2008. Estimating the 
probability of default for shipping high yield bond issues. Transportation Research 
Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 44(6), 1123-1138. 
Grammenos, Th. C., and Papapostolou, N. C., forthcoming (a). Ship finance: US public 
equity market. The Blackwell Companion to Maritime Economics, ed. by Talley, W. 
K., chapter 20. 
Grammenos, Th. C., and Papapostolou, N. C., forthcoming (b). Ship finance: US high yield 
bond market. The Blackwell Companion to Maritime Economics, ed. by Talley, W. 
K., chapter 21. 
Granger, C.W.J., Newbold, P., 1974. Economic Forecasting: The Atheist's Viewpoint. In: 
G.A. Renton (edition), Modelling the Economy, London: Heinemann. 
Grice, G.S., Ingram, RW., 2001. Tests of the generalizability of Altman's bankruptcy 
prediction model. Journal of Business Research, 54( 1), 53-61. 
References - Page 130 
Gruen, D., 1995. Financial Market Volatility and the World-Wide Fall in Inflation. Research 
Discussion Paper, December 1995, Economic Research Department, Reserve Bank of 
Australia. 
Hakim, S. R., Shimko, D., 1995. The impact of firm's characteristics on junk bond default. 
.Journal of Financial and Strategic Decisions, 8(2),47-55. 
Hand, l R.M., 2003. Profits, losses and the non-linear pricing of internet stocks. In lR.M. 
Hand and Lev, B., eds., Intangible Assets: Values, Measures and Risks, New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
Hand, l, Holthausen, R., and Leftwich, R., 1992. The effect of bond rating agency 
announcements on bond and stock prices. Journal of Finance, 47(2), 733-752. 
Hanley, W.K., 1993. The underpricing of initial public offerings and the partial adjustment 
phenomenon. Journal of Financial Economics, 34(2), 231-250. 
Hansen, R. S., 2001. Do investment banks compete in IPOs? The advent of the 7% plus 
contract. Journal of Financial Economics, 59(3), 313-346. 
Hausman, J .A., 1978. Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6), 1251-1271. 
Helwege, l and Liang, N., 2004. Initial public offerings in hot and cold markets . .Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(3), 541-569. 
Helwege, J., Tumer, C.M., 1999. The Slope of the Credit Yield Curve for Speculative-Grade 
Issuers. Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1869-1884. 
Hosmer Jr., D.W., and Lemeshow, S., 1989. Applied Logistic Regression, John Wiley & 
Sons, New York. 
Hotchkiss, E., and Mooradian, R., 2004. Post-bankruptcy performance: Evidence from 25 
years of chapter 11. Working Paper, Boston College and Northeastern University. 
Hsiao, C., 2003. Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge University Press. 
Huang, R. and Ritter, J. R., 2009. Testing theories of capital structure and estimating the 
speed of adjustment. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44(2), 237-271. 
Huffman, S.P., and Ward, D.J., 1996. The prediction of default for high yield bond issues. 
Review of Financial Economics, 5(1), 75-89. 
References - Page 131 
Huyghebaert, N., and Hulle, C. V., 2005. Structuring the IPO: empirical evidence on the 
portions of primary and secondary shares. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(2), 296-
320. 
Ibbotson, R. G., 1975. Price performance of common stock new issues. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 2(3), 235-272. 
Ibbotson, R.G., and Jaffe, J.F., 1975. Hot issue markets. Journal of Finance, 30(4), 1027-
1042. 
Ibbotson, R. G., and Ritter, J. R., 1995. Initial public offerings. Hanbooks in Operations 
Research and Management Science, edited by Jarrow, R. A., Maksimovic, V., and 
Ziemba, W. T., vol. 9, chapter 30, 993-1016, Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Ibbotson, R. G., Sindelar, J. L., and Ritter, J. R., 1988. Initial public offerings. Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 1(2),37-45. 
Ibbotson, R.G., Sindelar, J.L., and Ritter, J.R., 1994. The market's problems with the pricing 
of initial public offerings. Journal of Appliead Corporate finance, 7( 1), 66-74. 
1m, K.S., Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y., 2003. Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous Panels. 
Journal of Econometrics, 115(1),53-74. 
Jain, B., and Kini, 0., 1994. The post-issue operating performance of IPO firms. Journal of 
Finance,49(5),1699-1726. 
Jain, B., and Kini, 0., 2000. Does presence of venture capitalists improve the survival profile 
of IPO firms? Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 27(9/1 0), 1139-1176. 
Jenkinson, T., and Jones, H., 2004. Bids and allocations in European IPO bookbuilding. 
Journal of Finance, 59(5),2309-2338. 
Joutz, F., Mansi, S.A., Maxwell, W. F., 2001. The Dynamics of Corporate Credit Spreads. 
Center for Economic Research, The George Washington University, Department of 
Economics, Discussion Paper No. 01-03. 
Kavussanos, M.G., Marcoulis, S.N., 1997. The Stock Market Perception of Industry Risk and 
Microeconomic Factors: The Case of the US Water Transportation Industry versus 
References - Page 132 
Other Transport Industries. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and 
Transportation Review, 33(2), 147-158. 
Kavussanos, M. G. and Marcoulis, S. N., 2000a. The stock market perception of industry risk 
and macroeconomic factors: the case of the US water and other transportation stocks. 
International Journal of Maritime Economics, 2(3),235-256. 
Kavussanos, M. G. and Marcoulis, S. N., 2000b. The stock market perception of industry risk 
through the utilisation of a general mu1tifactor model. International Journal of 
Tramport Economics, 27(1), 77-98. 
Ke\oharju, M., 1993. The winner's curse, legal liability, and the long-run price performance 
of initial public offerings in Finland. Journal of Financial Economics, 34(2), 251-
277. 
Kim, 1.J., Ramaswamy, K., Sundaresan, S., 1993. Does Default Risk in Coupons Affect the 
valuation of Corporate Bonds? A Contingent Claims Model. Financial Management, 
Autumn, 22(3), 117-31. 
Kim, J., Krinsky, I., and Lee, 1, 1995. The role of financial variables in the pricing of Korean 
initial public offerings. Pacific-basin Finance Journal, 3(4), 449-464. 
Kim, M., and Ritter, l, 1999. Valuing lPOs. Journal of Financial Economics, 53(3),409-437. 
Kim, W., and Weisbach, M. S., 2008. Motivations for public equity offerings: an international 
perspective. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 281-307. 
Kindahl, A., 2008. The credit crisis - will shipping stand the test? Standard and Poor's, 
presentation given at the German Ship Finance Forum, February. 
Kisgen, D., 2006. Credit ratings and capital structure. Journal of Finance, 61 (3), 1035-1072. 
Klein, A., 1996. Can investors use the prospectus to price initial public offerings? The 
Journal of Financial Statement Analysis, 2(1), 23-29. 
Klevmarken, N.A., 1989. Panel Studies: What Can We Learn From Them? European Review, 
33(2/3), 523-529. 
References - Page 133 
Kricheff, B. and Strenk, V., 1999. The high yield market. High Yield Bonds: Market 
Structure. Portfhlio Management and Credit Risk Modeling, edited by Barnhill, T. 
M., Maxwell, W. M., and Shenkman, M. R., chapter 1, McGraw-Hili, New York. 
Laitinen, E.K., 1999. Predicting a corporate credit analyst's risk estimate by logistic and 
linear models. International Review of Financial Analysis, 8(2), 97-121. 
Lee, PJ, Taylor, S., and Walter, T., 1996. Australian IPO pricing in the short and long run. 
Journal l?f Banking and Finance, 20(7), 1189-1210. 
Lee, P. J., Taylor, S. L., and Walter, T. S., 1999. IPO underpricing explanations: implications 
from investor application and allocation schedules. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 34(4),425-444. 
Leggate, H. K., 2000. A European perspective on bond finance for the maritime industry. 
Maritime Policy and Management, 27(4), October, 353-362. 
Leland, H., and Pyle, D., 1977. Information asymmetries, financial structure, and financial 
intermediation. Journal of Finance, 32(2), 371-387. 
Levin, A., Lin C.F., Chu C., 2002. Unit Root Test in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite 
Sample Properties. Journal of Econometrics, 108(1), 1-24. 
Levis, M., 1993. The long-run performance of IPOs: the UK experience 1980-1988. Financial 
Management, 22( 1), 28-41. 
Lewis-Beck, M.S., 1980. Applied regression: an introduction, Qualitative Applications in the 
Social Science, SAGE University paper, SAGE Publications. 
Ljungqvist, A., 2006. IPO underpricing, Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical 
Corporate Finance, edited by B. Espen Eckbo, vol. A, chapter 7, North-Holland: 
Elsevier. 
Ljungqvist, A., and Wilhelm, W., 2002. IPO allocations: discriminatory or discretionary? 
Journal o.f Financial Economics, 65(2), 167-201. 
Ljungqvist, A., and Wilhelm, W., 2003. IPO pricing in the dot-com bubble. Journal of 
Finance, 58(2), 723-752. 
Lloyd's Shipping Economist, 2000. "Junk Bonds: A High Price to Pay?" June, pp. 17-18. 
References - Page 134 
Lloyd's Shipping Economist, 2000. Setting the Right Rate. August 2000, 34-37. 
Lo, A., 1987. Logit versus discriminant analysis: A specification test and application to 
corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Econometrics, 31 (2), 151-178. 
Logue, D. E., Rogalski, R. J., Seward, J. K., and Foster-Johnson, L., 2002. What is special 
about the roles of underwriter reputation and market activities in initial public 
offerings? Journal of Business, 75(2), 213-243. 
Longstaff, F.A., Schwartz, E.S., 1995. A Simple Approach to Valuing Risky Fixed and 
Floating Rate Debt. Journal of Finance,50(3), 789-819. 
Lougrhan, T. and Ritter, J.R., 1995. The new issues puzzle. Journal of Finance, 50(1),23-51. 
Loughran, T., and Ritter, J. R., 2002. Why don't issuer get upset about leaving money on the 
table in IPOs? Review of Financial Studies, 15(2), 413-444. 
Loughran, T., and Ritter, J.R., 2004. Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? Financial 
Management, 33(3),5-37. 
Loughran, T., Ritter, J.R., and Rydqvist, K., 1994. Initial public offerings: international 
insights. Pac~fic-Basin Finance Journal, 2(2/3), 165-199. 
Lowry, M., and Schwert, G.W., 2002. IPO market cycles: bubbles or sequential learning. 
Journal 0.( Finance, 57(3), 1171-1200. 
Lowry, M., and Shu, S., 2002. Litigation risk and IPO underpricing. Journal of Financial 
Economics. 65(3),309-335. 
Maddala, G.S., Wu, S., 1999. A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with Panel Data and a 
New Simple Test. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61(4), 631-652. 
Maksimovic, V., and Pichler, P., 2001. Technological innovation and initial public offerings. 
Review of Financial Studies, 14(2),459-494. 
Martin, D., 1977. Early warning of bank failure. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1(2/3), 
249-276. 
McFadden, D., 1984. Econometric analysis of qualitative response models: in Z. Griliches 
and M. Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 2, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam. 
References - Page 135 
Merikas, A., Gounopoulos, D., and Karli, C., 2010. Market perfonnance of US-listed 
shipping IPOs. Maritime Economics and Logistics, 12(1),36-64. 
Merikas, A., Gounopoulos, D., and Nounis, c., 2009. Global shipping IPOs perfonnance. 
Maritime Policy and Management, 36(6), 481-505. 
Michaely, R., and Shaw, W., 1994. The pricing of initial public offerings: test of adverse 
selection and signalling theories. Review of Financial Studies, 7(2), 279-317. 
Moody's Global Corporate Finance, 2009. Global shipping industry: Rating methodology. 
Moody's Investors Service. 1995. Global credit analysis. Edited by Stimpson, D., IFR 
Publishing Ltd. 
Moody's Investors Service, 1999. Global Credit Analysis. Edited by David Stimpson. 
Mourdoukoutas, P., and Stefanidis, A., 2009. To list or not to list: expectations versus reality 
for Greek shipping IPOs. South Eastern European Journal of Economics and 
Business, 4( 1), 125-134. 
Myers, S. C., 1984. The capital structure puzzle. Journal of Finance, 39(3), 575-592. 
Myers, S. c., 2001. Capital structure. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 81-102. 
Myers, S. c., and Majiluf, N. S., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when 
finns have infonnation that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 
13(2), 187-221. 
Newey, W., Kenneth, W., 1994. Automatic Lag Selection in Covariance Matrix Estimation. 
Review (?f Economic Studies, 61(4), 631-653. 
Norton, H., 2008. Hot topics - capital markets. Jefferies & Co., presentation given at the 21" 
Annual Marine Money Week, June, New York, USA. 
Ohlson, J.A., 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 18( 1), 109-131. 
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., and Zingales, L., 1998. Why do companies go public? An empirical 
analysis. Journal of Finance, 53, 27-54. 
References - Page 136 
Pagano, M., and Roell, A., 1998. the choice of stock ownership structure: agency costs, 
monitoring and the decision to go public. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), 
187-225. 
Palepu, K.G. 1986. Predicting takeover targets: A methodological and empirical analysis. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8(1), 3-35. 
Panayides, P. M., and Gong, X., 2002. The stock market reaction to merger and acquisition 
announcements in liner shipping. International Journal of Maritime Economics, 4(1), 
55-80. 
Platt, H.D., Platt, M.B., 1990. Development of a class of stable predictive variables: The case 
of bankruptcy prediction. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 17(1), 31-51. 
Ritter, J. R., 1984. The hot issue market of 1980. The Journal of Business, 57(2), 215-240. 
Ritter, J. R., 1991. The long-run performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance, 
46(1),3-27. 
Ritter, J.R., 2003. Differences between European and American IPO markets. European 
Financial Management, 9(4), 421-434 
Ritter, J. R., 2009. Some factoids about the 2009 IPO market. Working Paper. University of 
Florida, http://bear.cba.ufl.edulritter. 
Ritter, J., and Welch, I., 2002. A review ofIPO activity, pricing, and allocations. Journal of 
Finance, 57(4), 1795-1828. 
Rock, K., 1986. Why new issues are underpriced. Journal o.f Financial Economics, 15(112), 
187-212. 
Rosengren, E.S., 1993. Defaults of original issue high-yield convertible bonds. Journal of 
Finance, March, 48(1),345-362. 
Samitas, A. G., and Kenourgios, D. F., 2007. Impact of mergers and acquisitions on stock 
returns of tramp shipping firms. International Journal of Financial Services 
Management, 2(4),327-343. 
Santomero, A.M., Vinso, J.D., 1977. Estimating the probability of failure for commercial 
banks and the banking system. Journal of Banking and Finance. 1(2/3), 185-205. 
References - Page 13 7 
Saretto, A.A., 2004. Predicting and pricing the probability of default. UCLA Research Paper. 
Shumway, T., 2001. Forecasting bankruptcy more accurately: A simple hazard rate model. 
Journal o.lBusiness, 74(1),101-124. 
Sorensen, E., Burke, T., 1986. Portfolio Returns from Active Industry Group Rotation. 
Financial Ana~vsts Journal, 42(5), 43-50. 
Standard and Poor's Ratings Direct: www.ratingsdirect.com 
Stevenson Ill, C. H., 2007. Evaluation of public tanker companies relative to offshore 
companies. MSc Dissertation, The Costas Grarnmenos International Centre for 
Shipping, Trade and Finance, Cass Business School, City University London. 
Stopford, M., 2002. Shipping Markets Cycles. The Handbook of Maritime Economics and 
Business. Chapter 10, 203-224, Edited by Costas Th. Grarnmenos - published by 
LLP. 
Stopford, M., 2009. Maritime Economics, 3rd edition, Routledge. 
Taffler, RJ., 1984. Empirical models for the monitoring of UK corporations. Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 8(2), 199-227. 
Tarditti, A., 1996. Modelling the Australian Exchange Rate, Long Bond Yield and 
Inflationary Expectations. Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper, 
November 1996. 
Tashjian, E., Lease, R.C., and McConnell, lJ., 1996. An empirical analysis of prepackaged 
bankruptcies. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(1),135-162. 
Tinic, S. M., 1988. Anatomy of initial public offerings of common stock. Journal of Finance, 
43(4), 789-822. 
Van den End, J.W., Tabbat, M., 2005. Measuring Financial Stability: Applying the MtRisk 
Model to the Netherlands. DNB Working Paper, March, No. 30. 
Warner, J.B., 1977. bankruptcy costs: Some evidence. Journal of Finance, 32(2), 337-347. 
Welch, 1., 1989. Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and the underpricing of initial public 
offerings. Journal of Finance, 44(2), 412-449. 
References - Page 138 
Yost, K., 2002. The choice among traditional chapter 11, prepackaged bankruptcy, and out-
of-court restructuring. School of Business University of Wisconsin - Madison, 
Working Paper. 
Zannetos, Z.S., 1996. The Theory of Oil Tankship Rates: An Economic Analysis of Tankship 
Operations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Zavgren, C. V., 1983. The prediction of corporate failure: the state of art. Journal of 
Accounting Literature. 2, 1-38. 
Zhou, c., 2001. Credit Rating and Corporate Defaults. Journal of Fixed Income, 11(3),30-40. 
References - Page 139 
